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ABSTRACT

Facing the Fringe
by
Laura Gradowski

Advisor: John D. Greenwood

Fringe theories are a broad set of alternative views that mainstream scientists deny. Case studies
from the past two centuries demonstrate that fringe theorists have sometimes been marginalized to
the detriment of scientific advancements. While it is accepted that once in a blue moon comes a
diamond in the rough, there are far more cases of fringe theories becoming mainstream than has
been traditionally acknowledged. Indeed, fringe theories become mainstream with such regularity
that our epistemic intolerance towards them is in need of urgent reexamination. With the
recognition that tolerance is an epistemic virtue, we can view debates about theory choice with
new eyes. While sometimes theory choices are based on theory-laden interpretations of evidence,
there are also occasions in which theory choices are made based on logic and competing-theory
neutral interpretations of evidence. However, even these commensurable theory choices can be
seen to oscillate over time, as novel observations continuously accumulate. I argue that theory
choices are in principle never final, which leaves room for keeping fringe theories on the table.
Paired with the revelation that theory-entrenchment prevents mainstream scientists from
acknowledging important anomalies that are readily explained by fringe theories, this fact suggests
that theoretical pluralism is the best route forward for a global epistemic community seeking
scientific progress. Theoretical pluralism resolves debates that have long occupied philosophers of
science, including the pessimistic induction and the demarcation problem. After considering
worries about giving fringe theories space in our current political landscape, I provide a suggestion
for carefully putting theoretical pluralism into practice.
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Come then, I shall tell you, and do you pay attention to the account when you
have heard it, which are the only ways of inquiry that can be conceived; the one
[says]: “exists” and “it is not possible not to exist,” it is the way of persuasion
(for persuasion follows upon truth); the other [says]: “exists-not” and “not to
exist is necessary,” this I put out to you is a path wholly unknowable. For you
could not know that which does not exist (because it is impossible) nor could
you express it.
…for the same thing can be thought and can exist.

—Parmenides (5th C. BCE), Fragments II-III, from Parmenides: A Text
with Translation, Commentary, and Criticism, translated by Leonardo
Taran, 1965
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INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 2022, an article titled “Pentagon UFO study led by researcher who believes in the
supernatural” with the byline “Critics dumbfounded by reality TV star Travis Taylor's position as
‘chief scientist’” appeared in Science. Taylor is the ringleader in National Geographic Channel’s
Rocket City Rednecks. He also stars in the History Channel’s The Secret of Skinwalker Ranch—a
ranch in Utah that is reported to be struck with paranormal activity that follows visitors home. Ever
since Taylor spent time at Skinwalker, he says,

My car has started and stopped itself—sometimes the electronics will act weird for no reason
and then they’ll be fine—I’ve actually had that happen once driving out of my driveway, my
car just turned itself off… so I got out of the car and I looked up and there was an odd vortex
in the clouds above my house when this happened.

Taylor even makes appearances on Ancient Aliens, a program about alien visitors to the ancient
world. The article reads,

Taylor’s critics are simply astonished by what they call his antiscientific embrace of the
supernatural—and the Pentagon’s willingness to work with him. “I'm starting to see why [the
government's] task force was so unsuccessful in identifying its UAPs [Unidentified Aerial
Phenomena]!” wrote Robert Sheaffer, a UFO skeptic and author, on his blog.

Not only is Taylor a star amongst the fringe, he has a history with NASA and the Department of
Defense (DOD) as an aerospace engineer and astrophysicist. He is stacked with scientific degrees
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from the University of Alabama, Huntsville—an M.S. in Physics, a Ph.D. in Optical Science and
Engineering, an M.S.E. in Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, and a Ph.D. in Astronomy.
There is a fringe community celebrating a disclosure and public awakening; there is a
community of mainstream scientists maintaining skepticism and avoiding paranormal research.
Is there something we fear in fringe theories—in the unknown, the paranormal, the
extraordinary—that we cannot tolerate as part of our reality? Why are such ideas so popular? Are
they pseudoscientific? What is pseudoscience? How and why are fringe ideas silenced within
academic communities? Does such theoretical conservativism promote scientific progress? How
is silencing effected? Is silencing sometimes warranted?
This dissertation presents cases from the past two centuries to reconstruct the way
theoretical progress happens. These histories alongside contemporary events suggest that the
fringe plays a significant role in theoretical progress—more so than we might currently be
comfortable with. The first three chapters contain histories of fringe theories becoming
mainstream: (1) continental drift, (2) the germ theory of disease, and (3) conditioned taste aversion.
Chapter 4 presents several other cases. I argue that the marginalization of fringe theorists is harmful
and that this needs urgent correction. Chapter 5 considers the incommensurability thesis, but
argues that there are moments of commensurability. However, I show that theory choices based
on commensurable evidence must be historically indexed, and that they can even oscillate over
time. We continuously observe novelty. This suggests that a pluralistic approach to theories in
science may be the appropriate course of action. In Chapter 6, I explore the potential benefits of
theoretical pluralism. Finally, in Chapter 7, I address concerns that arise for pluralism, including
demarcation given the lack of funding, the fraught political landscape, and the need to be careful
about implementation.
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CHAPTER ONE

From Fringe to Mainstream: Continental Mobilism

1. Introduction
One plausible case of a fringe theory becoming mainstream is continental drift. 1 Infamous in its
fringe status by the 1920s, continental drift is now, arguably, an orthodox view. In his book At the
Fringes of Science, Michael Friedlander (1998) rejects this example. He claims that the fringe
proposal of continental drift never became mainstream. Rather, in the 1970s, a different theory,
plate tectonics, became mainstream. His motive is to show that this case of theoretical change
offers no “delay in recognition” of a fringe theory that could be “used to defend the proposals of
pseudoscientists or inventors” (1998, p. 22). He rejects the claim that “experts have been proven
wrong before and that the current [fringe] proposal, whatever it is, will also, in time, be shown to
be correct, to the discomfort of experts who know this but do not wish to relinquish their current
orthodoxy and exalted status” (Friedlander, 1998, p. 22).
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While this case is over-treated, it is simultaneously under-researched. A number of elements are wanting
in historical and philosophical treatments. First, scholars are typically fixated on the moment of widespread
acceptance of mobilism, which occurred in the 1960s, with the exception of some mention of Alfred
Wegener (1880-1930) (e.g. Hurley, 1968, p. 57; Hallam, 1971, pp. 65 and 105; Frankel, 1982, p. 1; Glen,
1982, p. 353; Giere 1985, p. 351). This period is far too short to derive a conclusion regarding the supposed
revolution that took place in geology. Largely speaking, the accumulation of evidence that helped bring the
theory of continental mobilism into the mainstream took place well before the 60s—and even before
Wegener’s first proposal in 1912. The evidence for a mid-ocean ridge and seafloor spreading, for instance,
crucial to the development of plate tectonics, got its bearings on the piano wire and lead weight sounding
technique developed by William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) back in the 1870s. The jigsaw-fit of the continents
was recognized beginning in the Renaissance. Tropical climate species were found in Antarctic glaciers in
the year of Wegener’s first proposal. The evidence for seafloor spreading accumulated by the 1940s. The
rift in the mid-ocean ridge was being mapped in the 1950s.
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A bit of background. In his 1915 The Origin of Continents and Oceans, Alfred Wegener
(1880-1930) proposed in detail his theory of continental drift,2 in which the continents underwent
large-scale lateral movements, drifting through the seafloor, having once collectively formed a
larger landmass. This theory ran against the prevailing theory of fixism (sometimes called
stabilism), which stated that continental crust and ocean basins are non-interchangeable,
permanent features of the earth; continental movements are solely vertical and attributable to the
rise and fall of sea levels.3 Fixists held that the seven continents have been fixed in their respective
positions for millions of years. During the first half of the 20th century, geoscientists saw the earth
as a cooling and contracting sphere with continents and ocean basins as permanent grounds upon
which to explain geological features like mountains, on Eduard Suess’s metaphor of the skin of a
shriveling, dried up or baked apple (Greene, 2015, p. 253). Just as an apple will shrivel
disproportionately, there was no obvious global pattern amongst the earth’s varied geological
features, which were studied region by region.
Against that view, Wegener proposed that continental movement could be due to pole-flight
forces, such as the earth’s rotation and wobble, as well as tidal forces, or the gravity of other
astronomical objects. While details changed and these explanatory aspects of Wegener’s proposal
were never taken up by the mainstream, the broader theory of mobilism—which stated that the
positions of the continents could change drastically—was fringe in the early 1900s, but by 1967

Wegener’s earliest proposals were in 1912, when he published his theory in three parts in an article “Die
Entstehung der Kontinente” (“The Origin of the Continents”) in German, in the journal Geologische
Rundschau. The same year, he also published the manuscript of his first lecture on his theory which he gave
to the Geological Association (Geologische Vereinigung) in Frankfurt under the title “Die Herausbildung
der Grossformen der Erdrinde (Kontinente und Ozeane), auf geophysikalischer Grundlage” (“The
formation of the large forms of the earth's crust (continents and oceans), on a geophysical basis") (Wegener,
1912a-d; see Hoffman, 2012 for more details). Wegener was preceded by Frank Taylor’s 1908 lecture and
1910 paper in the Geological Society of America’s Bulletin.
3
Back in 1922, Émile Argand, a Swiss Geologist, presented (in French) the terms ‘fixism’ and ‘mobilism’
as opposing attitudes that existed amongst geologists.
2
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was and still is mainstream. Furthermore, plate tectonics, as well as the sea-floor spreading
hypothesis that preceded it, evolved directly out of and are continuous with Wegener’s early
continental drift theory (Dietz, 1977, p. 1; Frankel, 1987, p. 198).
Friedlander (1998, p. 27) attributes the theoretical change from fixism to mobilism to novel
evidence that arose with the feverish development of technologies during World War II, such as
radio sonar. Friedlander would have us believe that the early proposals of mobilism were
inadequate and without support, and that it was an entirely different version of mobilism that
succeeded in superseding fixism. According to this narrative, early fringe mobilism deserved its
marginalization and derision, and should not be regarded as a case that supports the view that
fringe theories deserve to be taken more seriously. This narrative, however, ignores the history
that indicates that early mobilism had much evidence in its favor and directly contributed to the
later mobilism that was ultimately embraced.
I use the case of continental mobilism to show that orthodoxy can forestall scientific
advances, and that such advances can begin with promising theoretical ideas proposed by nonspecialists and non-experts working on the fringes of a science. Fixism and mobilism were
commensurable in light of evidence;4 that is to say, the evidence logically favored mobilism given
successful predictions that fixists at the time could not adequately explain. However, this is
ostensibly up for debate amongst geophysicists, since the evidence was—and with sufficient
imagination—apparently always could be interpreted in light of one theory or the other. To that
end, some geoscientists continued to argue against mobilism, reinterpreting the evidence according
to the fixist framework, even after mobilism celebrated mainstream status (Dietz, 1977, p. 1;

In Chapter 5, I suggest that the ‘incommensurability’ thesis implies that there is a lack of an objective
evidential measure to choose between two theories, rather than it being merely a matter of a lack of
intertranslatability between two theories.
4
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Frankel, 1978, p. 198; Spilhaus, 1984, p. 258; Greene, 1984, p. 760). In what follows, I will
reconstruct the mobilist vs. fixist debate, moving from rejection to acceptance.

2. Rejection
The fringe theory of mobilism was denied sometimes for reasons beyond what most would deem
acceptable scientific criticism. Scientific criticism is directed at a theory’s lack of evidence, lack
of coherence or completeness, and lack of utility or predictive power. While mobilism deserved
some scientific criticism, fixism did as well—hence the decades of conferences and serious debate
prior to World War II. I show that, in these debates, there were few fair scientific critical reasons
to reject mobilism, and that the rejection can be best accounted for in terms of theoretical
entrenchment in fixism. Theoretical entrenchment is not simply a matter of conservatism, which
may sometimes be healthy for a science. Rather, it invokes biases that come with investment in a
theory, such as closed-mindedness and epistemic insensitivity to relevant and promising
alternatives. Theory-laden interpretations of evidence and neglect of evidence can both be seen as
negative results of theoretical entrenchment. Furthermore, we would like to believe that experts
are fair-minded, but evidence indicates that this may not be the case when core views are
threatened. While there were certainly fixists who had sympathies for continental drift, the bias in
favor of fixism sometimes manifested in toxic forms of speech and the silencing of mobilists in
the academy.
Consider an account of the rejection of mobilism that could be deemed fair scientific
criticism. Continental drift was criticized for a few explicit reasons in particular: first, there was
insufficient evidence for continental movement, second, the theory was immature insofar as there
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was no feasible mechanism to account for the continental movement, and third, there were no
predictable patterns to the proposed movements (for this account see, e.g., Giller et al. 2004;
Doppelt, 2007). I suggest that none of these reasons were good enough to justify the
marginalization of continental drift.
First, the evidence for mobilism up to the early 1960s while the theory continued to be
rejected was considerable. This evidence included: (1) the geographical complementary fit of the
continents, recognized sporadically through the centuries, beginning with the 16th century
proliferation of world atlases, (2) cross-continental fossils of the same extinct land species, (3)
pronounced continuities and geographical correspondences in geomorphological and stratigraphic
data across vast expanses of ocean, (4) paleomagnetic data in which sets of nearby magnetic rocks
recorded vastly different locations of the magnetic poles upon their cooling, (5) the mid-ocean
ridge, first proposed and confirmed in 1873, which provided a locus from which the continents
split, (6) seismological patterns in which geographical locations of volcanic activity trend,
corresponding with island arcs like Hawaii or the Aleutian Islands, also indicating loci of
continental movement, (7) coincident with Wegener’s first publication of continental drift in 1912,
fossilized tropical climate species locked in Antarctic glaciers, (8) vast discrepancies between
continental and seafloor radiometric data, which indicated that the seafloor was relatively young.
It should be clear from this incomplete list that mobilism did have empirical support during
the period that it was rejected. However, these data points, taken individually or collectively, were
not enough to convince the mainstream to take on a mobilist theory. Why not? At least in part, the
reason is that none of this information could be taken as objective, competing-theory neutral
evidence—evidence that clearly favored mobilism even on a fixist view of that evidence. In other
words, the evidence that mobilists used was consistently interpreted divergently or otherwise
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neglected by mainstream theorists, which thus restricted its potency. That is not to say that
mobilism was without evidence. As Wegener himself put it in a letter to his father-in-law, “You
consider my primordial continent to be a figment of my imagination, but it is only a question of
the interpretation of observations” (Bressan, 2012). While this is ostensibly the case, it is also in
part a question of how fixists were weighing different theoretical values; for example, it does seem
that Wegener’s lack of a sound mechanism played a significant role in the rejection of the theory.
That said, even when a mechanism was forthcoming later on, the mainstream continued to neglect
mobilist research while brave heretics on the fringe constructed a theory of sufficient maturation.
Each of the phenomena (1)-(8) could be equally well explained according to either of the two
incompatible but self-consistent theories under consideration. Let’s consider how fixists explained
each in turn:

(1) While mobilists used the complementary patterns of, for instance, the east coast of South
America and the west coast of Africa, to show that the continents were like pieces of a
broken jigsaw puzzle, fixists found ways to reject this. This apparent complementary fit
was first noted as indicating continental splitting by Abraham Ortelius in the 16th century,
but continuously ignored for centuries, even while mobilist frameworks continued to be
sporadically proposed in light of it.5 Once the complementary patterns were attentively
faced by fixists in the 20th century, they rejected them as coincidence, or illusory and too
imperfect.

5

For example: Placet (1666), Lilienthal (1756), Leclerc (1778), von Humboldt (1801), Young (1807),
Hooker (1853), Owen (1857), Snider-Pelligrini (1858), Darwin (1879), Fisher (1882), Mantovani (1889),
Ortmann (1902), Pickering (1907), Taylor (1910), Bailey (1910), Baker (1912).
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(2) Cross-continental fossil evidence was either ignored or interpreted according to fixist
theory with ad hoc hypotheses of land bridges, or convergent evolution.
(3) Stratigraphic data was collected by fixists that worked against the evidence in favor of the
cross-continental stratigraphic continuity.
(4) Paleomagnetic differences were explicitly dismissed as data that was too unestablished, or
interpreted according to fixist theory, e.g. with the ad hoc hypothesis of polar fluctuations
(as opposed to landmass movement).
(5) Little was known about the mid-ocean ridge; that it spanned the earth’s oceans and that
there is the central rift therein was not established until the late 1950s and early 60s
(Frankel, 1979, p. 42). Fixists could claim these features to be permanent and akin to
mountain ranges, rejecting that they could serve as vertical boundaries from which
continents moved laterally.
(6) Seismic and volcanic patterns coincident with island arcs did not entail continental
splitting.
(7) Fixists could explain the fossilized tropical climate species in Antarctica the same way as
the paleomagnetic evidence: as due to polar fluctuations.
(8) Fixists had at least two options to deal with the discrepancies between continental and
seafloor radiometric data. First, fixists proposed that the difference was due to
environmental conditions of the rocks on the seafloor versus the rocks on the continents or
due to the ocean floor’s constant refreshment by the movement of waters. Second, they
also dismissed the data as illegitimate—as afforded by an unestablished technique (only
recently proposed by Rutherford in 1905). By rejecting the legitimacy of carbon-dating,
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fixists could argue that there is no evidence from the phenomenon of radioactive decay to
yield a determinate difference between the age of the seafloor and the age of the continents.

Secondly, early mobilism was scientifically criticized for its immaturity. In particular, it is
frequently said that continental drift was rejected because its proponents lacked a convincing
mechanism to explain continental movement. While this is inarguably the case, even the plate
tectonics version of mobilism that was accepted did not have a complete mechanism to explain the
continental movement. A general mechanism for sea-floor spreading and plate accretion was
established with the theory of plate tectonics, but the details of this mechanism “remain[ed]
elusive” (Dietz, 1977, p. 2). Even as late as the 1980s, geoscientists continued proposing
hypotheses for the driving mechanism for the plate tectonic process to “explain why the continents
move” (Alvarez, 1982). This suggests that a theory lacking a mechanistic explanation that satisfies
its audience may in general not be a good reason to reject a theory, since scientists can and should
play a role in helping develop one.6
Furthermore, it was hypocritical for fixists to deride mobilism on the grounds that it had
inadequate evidence or lacked theoretical coherence. In order to explain the anomalous fossil
evidence that indicated the same species inhabited either side of the Atlantic, too far to swim, that
so convinced Wegener of his view, the fixists of the early 20th century posited ad hoc land bridge
after land bridge connecting the continents—so many, in fact, that there was little ocean left behind
(Bryson, 2004). Land bridges were maintained throughout the early 20th century, despite lack of
evidence on the ocean floor, and despite lacking a mechanism for the sinking bridges that
conformed well with the accepted theory of isostasy they were designed to uphold (Frankel, 1978).

6

In Chapter 6, I argue that the lack of a mechanistic explanation is a reason to work on a theory, rather than
a reason to neglect it.
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While these were both problems that there may have been ways of resolving from a fixist
perspective, the same was the case for the problems with mobilism.
The third aspect of early mobilism that was scientifically criticized was that there were no
patterns to the proposed movements. Without patterns to the movements, there was no way to
predict future movements. However, this apparent lack of patterns was due to lack of imagination,
as well as lack of research. The patterns of movement are indeed there; they just aren’t
geometrically obvious. The discovery of these patterns took decades of research. With the mapping
of the mid-ocean ridges and hotspots for seismic, volcanic, and geothermal activity, a clear pattern
of plates that separated and moved the continents emerged. Crucially, these patterns explained the
conjectured historical movements, as well as enabled some prediction of potential future
movements.
In sum, none of these scientific criticisms were legitimate reasons to reject mobilism, and
certainly not with ridicule. But these criticisms were not the only powers at work against mobilism.
Undoubtedly, biases also played some role in the theory’s rejection. These included theoretical
biases, biases against non-expert or non-specialized professional status, and biases due to personal
disputes.
One reason mobilism was unattractive was that it had been heavily associated with
catastrophism in previous centuries (Rupke, 1970, p. 350). Mainstream geoscientists not only
rejected catastrophism, but despised it. In the centuries prior to the 20th, catastrophic theories of
lateral continental motion were sporadically proposed.7 By the 20th century, James Hutton’s (1785)
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The earliest proposals of drastic continental splitting, so far as historians are aware, date back to the
Renaissance. The first known mention comes from the original atlas maker, Abraham Ortelius. It was in
Ortelius’s (1596) last edition of his atlas’s accompanying text, Thesaurus Geographicus, that he--in
passing—made unremarkable note of the complementary patterns, suggesting that continental splitting
could have been caused by volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. His idea was buried by history for us to
rediscover 400 years later—unknown to Wegener—after mobilism had become mainstream.
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doctrine of uniformitarianism was mainstream. Uniformitarianism stated that no non-natural or
extraordinary powers or events are needed to understand the history of the earth, and, in other
words, “the present is the key to the past” (Hutton, 1788). By the 20th century, the theory that the
earth gradually and uniformly changed over time, consistent with Darwinian evolution by natural
selection, largely guided the study of the earth across the mainstream and even into the fringes. In
the 1860s, in the academically well-read Manual of Geology: Treating of the Principles of the
Science, James Dwight Dana (1863, p. 732), the most renowned geologist of his day, stated the
core principles of geology, the seventh as follows: “The continents and oceans had their general
outline or form defined in earliest time… And, if the outlines of the continents were marked out,
it follows that the outlines of the oceans were no less so.” The permanence of continents and oceans
became scientific orthodoxy. During mid-19th century, the catastrophist framework was cast out
of fashion as debates about evolution came to the fore and Alfred Russel Wallace’s and Charles
Darwin’s theory of natural selection gained acceptance thanks to Charles Lyell and Joseph Hooker,
who presented it to the Linnean Society in 1858 (Marshall, 2018). The movement towards
understanding all changes on earth as gradual and uniform was largely influenced by Lyell (1830,
1832, 1833), who provided a developed framework in his Principles of Geology. Wallace (1892)
later fed the uptake of this view in geology with The Permanence of the Great Ocean Basins,
following the conclusions of both Darwin’s island adventures and the work of Dana.

At the time of Ortelius’s continental splitting suggestion, the catastrophic biblical flood event was
not regarded as a myth (and, perhaps, now is seeing its elevation from mythology back into mainstream
reality with growing evidence). Throughout the next two centuries, continental mobilism was proposed via
the overarching framework of catastrophism, the view that singular or multiple catastrophes have shaped
the form of the present earth. These catastrophic versions of mobilism were mostly associated with the
sinking of Atlantis (e.g. Placet, 1666; Leclerc, 1778) and the biblical flood (e.g. Lilienthal, 1756; von
Humboldt, 1801; for details, see Rupke, 1970).
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By Wegener’s day, uniformitarianism had become the overarching mainstream framework
for interpreting geological evidence. The central principle of landmass change was not movement,
but merely altered coastlines due to the rise and fall of sea levels—and this, only longitudinally.
Continents and ocean floor were, not just in theory, but in principle, non-interchangeable. Any
theory that provided even the semblance of going against such canonical principles, and any theory
reminiscent of catastrophism, was regarded with scorn.
Throughout the late-19th century, catastrophist mobilist earth histories were proposed.
Antonio Snider-Pelligrini (1858) proposed a theory of drastic continental upheaval in terms of
multiple catastrophic events. Darwin’s own son, George Howard Darwin (1879) suggested that
the hollows of the ocean were created after the moon was thrown off, leaving the earth’s cooled
granite crust behind as the separated continents. Oswald Fisher (1882) followed suit.
But the early 20th century fringe mobilists pulled the theory out from under the catastrophist
lens. Various theorists conceived uniformitarian versions of mobilism. At the turn of the century,
mobilist proposals began to align more and more with uniformitarian thought. For instance,
Roberto Mantovani (1889; 1909) developed a mobilist theory based on the idea of an ancient
supercontinent broken apart by volcanic fracturing due to the slow thermal expansion of the earth.
And most famous for the view next to Wegener, Frank Bursley Taylor (1910) proposed a theory
of general crustal creep, arguing that the great mountain ranges could have been formed only by
the massive “deforming forces” of lateral collisions of continents that thrust the crust upwards
(Frankel 2012).8 That the theory directly threatened textbook principles, and furthermore had a
semblance of catastrophism, was certainly a reason for its ill reception. Consider the way Howard
Baker praised Alexander du Toit’s (1937) Our Wandering Continents: “To get right up and call

8

However, both William H. Pickering (1907) and Howard B. Baker (1912) still proposed theories in line
with George Howard Darwin’s, associating the split of the continents with a catastrophic origin of the moon.
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Lyellian uniformitarianism in question certainly takes something that few geologists in this
country possess. I guess they all like their jobs too well” (Oreskes, 1999). Despite the fact that the
mobilism presented by du Toit and earlier theorists was uniformitarian and gradualist, the theory
was perceived as undermining the mainstream uniformitarianism.
Next, geologists were biased against non-expert status, and used ad hominem arguments to
reject mobilism. Wegener’s personal character was frequently attacked in addition to his theory.
Philip Lake claimed Wegener to be “quite devoid of critical faculty” (Oreskes, 1999, p. 123). His
“delirious ravings” were diagnosed as “wandering-pole plague” and “moving crust disease” and
thereby laughed off (Conniff, 2012). R.H. Oldham, party to the days of debate, sympathetically
explained that the theory was “more than any man who valued his reputation for scientific sanity
ought to venture to advocate” (McCoy, 2006, p. 34). At a Royal Geographical Society meeting,
Lake was applauded for his criticism of Wegener’s theory: “in addition to thanking Mr. Lake for
his clear undermining of the theory, I think we certainly ought to thank Professor Wegener for
offering himself for the explosion” (Lamplugh et al., 1923). Such language conveys delight in
refutation of not only the theory, but of Wegener the human being. The theory was frequently
rejected because Wegener was a non-expert in geology. Geologist Max Semper called Wegener a
“’scientific outsider,’ ‘ignorant of geology,’ a ‘reckless’ mischief-maker ignorant of geological
methods, given to wild speculations, and absurdly unprepared to discuss geological matters”
(Semper, 1917, as quoted by Greene, 2015, p. 368).
Disciplinary bias also played a role in the rejection of continental drift. For years,
geologists found ways to brush off fossil evidence that paleontologists took seriously in favor of
mobilism. Specifically, paleontologists discovered fossils of the same species scattered around the
globe, fossilized tropical climate species in polar regions, and fossilized polar species in tropical
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regions. The latter anomalies could be explained in terms of the migration of climates around the
globe, along with polar reversals. As Henry Frankel (1978, p. 208) put the situation, “Mobilists
moved continents; fixists moved air.” But the same species existing on either side of separated
continents was particularly conspicuous evidence in favor of the view that the continents once
formed a larger landmass, and given the evidence around the globe, mobilism became the simpler
view amongst paleontologists, whose career was to study and understand these fossils—they did
not face the problems that geologists faced, such as the lack of a mechanism by which the
continents could have fractured and separated. Elihu M. Gerson (2002) argues that in other cases
too, we see that what is later called a “premature” discovery is a consequence of a lack of
disciplinary intersection.
Last, there were also professional rivalries at work in rejecting mobilism. For instance,
soon-to-be champions of mobilism, Marie Tharp and Bruce Heezen, were dismissed from the
Lamont Observatory at Columbia due to personal disputes with Maurice Ewing, a fixist known as
“Doc”, who “like nearly everyone else in the scientific world, was violently opposed to drift”
(Tharp, 1999). Tharp recounts:

Our efforts [to map the ocean floor] were thwarted by a long-lasting falling out between Bruce
and Doc. There are two sides to that story, but the result was that Doc banned Bruce from
Lamont ships and denied Bruce access to Lamont data. He tried unsuccessfully to fire Bruce,
who had a tenured faculty position at Columbia, but he did fire me. From then on, I was paid
through research grants that Bruce received from the Navy, and I continued the mapping
working at home. (Tharp, 1999).
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There is no doubt that this slowed down the process that led to the revolutionizing map of the
ocean floor made by Tharp and Heezen.
Based on these observations of biases and the lack of appropriate scientific criticism of
mobilism, it should be clear that the mainstream suffered from theoretical entrenchment in their
rejection of mobilism. Pelligrini (2019, p. 88) suggests that “it was the fear of a new perspective
what [sic.] compelled scientists to remain clinging to their usual explanations.” As geologist
Warren Hamilton (1988, p. 1503) put it: “Before [the late 1960s], mobilistic concepts evolved
slowly, hindered, particularly in the United States, by an obstructionist geoscience establishment.”
This entrenchment was manifested in heated rejection and repugnance toward the unfamiliar view,
including derisive lingo and name-calling in academic settings. “To attack Wegener was…not
always to engage the details of his theory, or even to try to understand him, as much as to express
animosity toward the notion of extensive, varied, and above all, rapid lateral displacements…”
(Greene, 2015, p. 371). The mobilist view was outcast amongst academics and young scholars
were warned not to pursue research guided by mobilist theory. Marie Tharp (1999), recounting her
years plotting by hand, data point by data point, a map of the depth of the ocean floor, wrote that
“believing in the theory of continental drift was almost a form of scientific heresy.” Even Bruce
Heezen—a central figure along with Tharp in developing the mature version of continental
mobilism—initially dismissed Tharp’s interpretation of her map of the mid-ocean ridge as
containing a rift valley as “girl talk.” Hamilton (1988, p. 1504) notes that it was difficult to publish
pro-drift material and easy to publish anti-drift material in the early 1960s. In a review, Vine (1977,
p. 20) notes that there were few publications anywhere on continental drift between 1930 and 1960,
and no publications at all in Nature before 1960—“as though no self-respecting geologist in the
Northern Hemisphere was prepared to risk his reputation by publishing a full-length article on
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continental drift.” Even more likely, the editors of Nature refused to risk the journal’s reputed
distinction by entertaining what expert communities laughed off.

3. Acceptance
It is important to note that a theory can include details that are dispensable while making general
claims that are embraced. This is even the case for mainstream theories. We don’t say that the
theory of DNA and inheritance is altogether wrong following the discovery of evidence for
horizontal gene transfer. Rather, we tweak the theory. The same goes for the theory of continental
drift: details evolved, but the general framework remained intact. The geologist Robert Dietz
(1977, p. 1), a convert to mobilism, states that the concept of plate tectonics is “an integration of,
and a follow-on to, sea-floor spreading, transform faulting, trench subduction and continental
drift.” This suggests that continental drift was taken up by the mainstream and as an important
component of the theory of plate tectonics.
Furthermore, rejected claims that were central to continental drift were embraced with the
uptake of plate tectonics. To name just a few: (1) The separated continents once formed a larger
landmass—specifically, for example, the fossil and stratigraphic evidence indicate that the
continental shelves of South America and Africa were once joined; (2) paleontological evidence
indicates that climates have changed and thus the continents have changed their locations relative
to the poles; and (3) ocean basins are impermanent features of the earth. The mainstream
geoscientists of the early 20th century rejected all of these claims that the fringe mobilists
embraced. Yet, by 1967, these claims were embraced by the majority of mainstream geoscientists.
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As for the reasons for the general acceptance of the mobilist theory of plate tectonics rather
suddenly in 1967, they are not so simple.
Scholars have asked for these reasons under the assumption that mobilism is the correct
theory and conclude that mobilism simply accumulated enough evidence in its favor (e.g. Frankel,
1979; Laudan, 1987; Le Grand, 1988; Hallam, 1983; Newman, 1995; Giller et al., 2004; Doppelt,
2007; cf. Pelligrini, 2019). But that is not so clearly the case: evidence could be interpreted
according to ad hoc hypotheses appended to fixism. There was no piece or set of evidence that
carried the weight to properly commensurate mobilism and fixism. This is evident from the fact
that, in spite of all the research, some geologists remained hard-headed and continued to make
cases against plate tectonics. After statements were made that continental drift and plate tectonics
had been proven, the cause being thermal convection in the mantle, E. N. Lyustikh (1967)
published an article against it, arguing the hypotheses of convection and continental drift needed
a more reliable basis. Even as late as 1977, Dietz stated that plate tectonics had its critics who
maintained a fixist theory. In 1984, Mott T. Greene stated that the “firm resistance” of geologists
to mobilism is still “[shared by] many today, for whom plate tectonics still appears to be a palace
coup against geology by oceanographers and mathematical geophysicists” (p. 760).
I suggest that the biases against mobilism subsided over time; it remains to be asked why
they subsided over time. Certainly the mobilist position became more developed, and the case for
it was made stronger as new data accumulated that could be interpreted in light of mobilism, and
research in light of the theory took off. But, again, this evidence was never fully commensurating
evidence—it was always interpreted according to one theory or the other. Still, some of the new
evidence was able to change minds. Notably, mobilists Lawrence Morley (1963) and Frederick
Vine and Drummond Matthews (1963) developed a hypothesis that was empirically testable. The

18

ocean floor on either side of the mid-ocean ridge—the proposed seafloor spreading center—should
record the earth’s polar reversals. According to the mobilist theory, as new crust emerges from the
mid-ocean ridge, it cools according to the positions of the magnetic poles, which reverse over time.
The prediction was that there should be parallel stripes of normal and polar-reversed crust
spreading out from the mid-ocean ridge. After some finicky initial results that made their
hypothesis look implausible, the research done by 1966 made it clear that their hypothesis was
correct (Oreskes, 1999). This result was so shocking that it won mobilism converts overnight, and,
by the following year, the mainstream majority, as the various pieces of the mobilist theory began
to cohere into plate tectonics. Fixists needed more time to develop an explanation for the polarreversed stripes of magnetized rocks, whereas the mobilist explanation was ready in place. This
clearly played a role in reframing mobilism as an empirically testable theory. Mobilism had long
enjoyed empirical support, so this sudden shift in status may have been more of a tipping point
than it should have been.
A handful of respected geologists began presenting sympathetic accounts as well as their
own versions of the theory, and some began positing more plausible mechanisms for the
continental movement. Geologists better knew their audience than did Wegener, Taylor, and the
other early fringe theorists. They treated the topic in a way that experts could take seriously. This
is evident from the sharp contrast between disdainful responses to Wegener’s book and praiseful
responses to du Toit’s book. Du Toit drew friendly correspondence from adherents to fixism. For
instance, Charles Schuchert wrote: “I like your enthusiasm, and surely you have presented the drift
theory in its best form. I like your honesty, because you now tell us where you stand and why you
prefer to stand on a sliding base” (Master, 2016). Even the renowned Bailey Willis of Stanford
wrote in disagreement: “…I appreciate the courage with which you have set forth the state of the
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problem. You certainly have succeeded in putting the best possible face upon your solution of it”
(Chetty, 2020, p. 174). The opposite sets of responses to Wegener and du Toit may seem to play
into Friedlander’s contention that there was a new theory on offer, but that interpretation fails to
acknowledge the continuity. It is common in science to track theories, such as biological
inheritance, across changing views about mechanisms, and, like other cases, evidential support
sometimes precedes mechanistic understanding. Furthermore, du Toit was still fringe for over two
decades after he wrote his book. Despite all his evidence and the more sympathetic reactions from
fixists, he changed few fixist minds (Frankel, 2012).
Mobilism also enabled certain geological features to be interpreted globally. The various
mountain ranges across the globe could be explained in terms of continents drifting and plates
colliding, while fixists were stuck with the work of treating each mountain range individually. As
Bruce Heezen (1960, p. 100) mentions, earthquake epicenter data came from local reports, and the
Mid-Atlantic Ridge, the Albatross Plateau of the eastern-Pacific, the Carlsberg Ridge in the Indian
Ocean, and the East African Rifts, despite their resemblances, were regarded as isolated geological
features by fixists. Also, the size of earthquakes, as well as the restricted locations of their
epicenters and coincidence with volcanic belts could be explained in terms of the destruction and
creation of sea beds (Ruse, 1978, p. 243). Fixists had not developed a powerful story in regards to
this. Although it may not have been made explicit, I think this indeed is most important: mobilism
offered some important novel predictive powers and efficiencies that fixism did not. It provided a
ready framework for understanding the geographical coincidences of earthquake epicenters and
volcanic activity, and thus, a means for working more efficiently towards prediction of such
activity, as well as towards a tsunami warning system (Isacks et al., 1968). Furthermore, mobilism
made the search for natural resources more efficient. It directed the search for “petroleum
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accumulations on continental margins, porphyry copper deposits associated with subduction
zones, base metal sulfides associated with pillow lavas at fossil rifts, etc.” (Dietz, 1977, p. 1).
Last, but not least, developments in research of the seafloor enabled mobilism to not just
be conceived, but literally seen, and by a wide audience. Marie Tharp and Bruce Heezen (1968)
published in National Geographic the first topographical map of the ocean floor, visually revealing
the mid-ocean ridges and the rifts therein that separated the continents across the globe. Also,
Jacques Cousteau—himself doubtful of mobilism and thus of the rift valley—made a film of the
ocean floor, which he showed in 1969 to the first International Ocean Congress in New York. Both
the map and the film enabled people to actually see this obscure oddity that was the mid-ocean
ridge and rift valley in its full glory. As Tharp (1999) put it, “There’s truth to the old cliché that a
picture is worth a thousand words and that seeing is believing.”
It is not that mobilism had no big problems to solve by 1970s, and not that it finally
uncovered a mechanism for continental movement in convection currents and seafloor spreading.
There was no consensus on an explanation for the forces that underlie tectonic movement. As Dietz
(1977, p. 1) said, “Perhaps the largest gap that remains is in a definitive understanding of plate
driving forces.” Alvarez (1982) said, similarly, “the geometry of plate movements is largely
understood, but the driving mechanism of plate tectonics remains elusive.”

4. Conclusion
While it was on the fringe, mobilism was sometimes based on reasonable conjectures and even
enjoyed evidential support. Nevertheless, such evidential support was theory-laden insofar as it
could be alternatively interpreted according to the mainstream fixist theory. But mainstream
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treatment of a theory as fringe is no guarantee that the theory is deeply flawed. Promising
theoretical directions can be proposed by non-experts or non-specialists in a scientific field.
Fringe theorists are often non-experts or non-specialists at the time of their proposals; this is the
case even when the fringe theory later becomes mainstream. Little philosophical attention has been
given to the fact that Wegener was on the fringes of the geosciences. Thagard (1992, p. 157)
mentions that continental drift “remained on the fringe of geology until the early 1960s,” and
appears to ignore that part of the theory’s history for that reason. Furthermore, Wegener is
sometimes credited as a geophycisist (e.g. Spilhaus, 1984, p. 257). That is misleading. Similar to
Lavoisier, who discovered oxygen after only two years of experimentation into airs (Conant,
1957), Wegener had only been reading up on the geosciences for four months by the time he made
his theory of continental drift public (Hoffman, 2012). Furthermore, he and other mobilists did not
take geophysics seriously (Greene, 2015, p. 367). Wegener’s degree was in astronomy, and the
core of his expertise was in meteorology. While there were no degrees in geology or geophysics
until 1930, respected geoscientists taught lectures on the subject and were members of geological
societies and institutions. Notably, the theorists contemporary to Wegener who independently
described the basic theory of a supercontinent and an earth history of horizontal landmass
movement do not include any geologists or geophysicists. Wegener’s own credits to predecessors,
presented in his 1929 edition include:

Franklin Coxworthy (1924), a chemist of the atmosphere and subversive nuisance to
governmental committees, or so I gather from the introduction to his 1924 work, of whom
next to nothing is known;
Roberto Mantovani (1889; 1909), a violinist by profession (who, in correspondence to
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Wegener, pointed out the fact that he had predecessors, including himself) (Scalera, 2009,
p. 615);
William Henry Pickering (1907), who, like Wegener, was a degreed astronomer (Colby
& Williams, 1918, p. 605);
Frank Bursley Taylor (1910), a privately-financed Harvard University drop-out who
became an expert on the Great Lakes, and prepared the Niagara folio for the U.S.
Geological Survey (Lane, 1944). With Wegener, he shared the honor of being bashed
under the “Taylor-Wegener hypothesis”.

Other early proponents of continental mobilism contemporary to Wegener include:

Arnold E. Ortmann (1902), a malacologist focused on the geographical distribution of
species, who eventually obtained a professorship in physical geography (Smith, 2005);
Eduard Suess (1961), an assistant at the Imperial Museum in Vienna, who hypothesized
Gondwana and the Tethys Ocean and ultimately gained a professorship in geology
(Hobbs, 1914);
Antonio Snider-Pelligrini (1858), a geographer;
Howard Baker (1912), an independent geologist and colleague of Taylor’s (Vine, 1977,
p. 19).

The ability to create and explore a novel and alternative theoretical framework, I would suggest,
generally benefits from a lack of theoretical commitments. Such open-mindedness is a challenge
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for those who are socialized into the current orthodoxy and need to maintain their professional
status.
In the case of mobilism, experts were seen to offer little help with the development of the
alternative theory. That is a misfortune. There were a variety of evolving mobilist theories made
by non-experts. These made overlapping claims that went beyond fixist orthodoxy, and were
united by their fringe status. A theory can be proposed many times and according to different
formulations before any version is given attention by experts. Wegener was unaware that he had
predecessors at the time of his proposal; according to many, he was the first to bring together
evidence from across various scientific fields in favor of mobilism, which gave the theory more
serious academic attention. Still, the majority of geoscientists vehemently rejected it, and did little
to help the theory’s development. They sometimes harmed its development by ignoring or
dismissing alternative interpretations of relevant data. In general, they could have given the theory
more serious consideration.
Mobilism was a promising theory that should have garnered interest and it did not deserve
marginalization. This first case begins to suggest that fringe theories and the non-experts who
propose them should not be dismissed out of hand, and not in light of the interpretations of
evidence that the mainstream theory uses. Mainstream, orthodox theory can be entrenched to the
point of forestalling scientific advances.
Some uncertainty as to why mobilism was ultimately accepted is to be expected. Conflicts
between theoretical frameworks are adjudicated according to units of measurement that can shift,
vary across individuals, and are not always explicit. Sometimes one theory will appear more useful
than another given explicitly-stated desiderata, such as predicting seismic activity, but these are
not fixed. If we had no interest in seismic activity—if it did not affect us or if we did not notice it
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much—it is unlikely we would be making use of a theory that was powerful for predicting it. I
venture that the idea that the continents have split and changed their locations over time is not a
matter of established fact supported by objective evidence, but is rather one of many ways we are
able to organize salient observational information into a clear picture, and thus make use of
elements therein towards ends we want, like avoiding earthquakes. This, fixism, in its day, couldn’t
do.
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CHAPTER TWO

From Fringe to Mainstream: The Germ Theory of Disease

1. Introduction
Various early versions of the germ theory of disease were rejected by mainstream practitioners
from the 1700s until the dawn of the 20th century. The general germ theory of disease, still a
cornerstone of today’s epidemiology, states that some diseases are caused by the invasion of
microorganisms that are germs or pathogens, i.e. infectious agents, invisible to the naked eye, that
can produce disease. While the germ theory has some roots in Antonie van Leeuwenhoek’s 1670s
microscopic investigations of “kleine dierkens” (meaning “tiny animals”, famously translated into
Latin as “animalculae”), it was largely developed in the 19th century. With industrialization and
urbanization, epidemic diseases were prevalent, such as typhoid fever and cholera, and better
microscopes were available to peer into the detailed world of microbes. In the mid-1900s, the germ
theory, or the ‘animalcular hypothesis’, as it was sometimes called, ran against the mainstream
miasma theory1 that had guided epidemiological practices for centuries. Miasma theory, which

1

Epidemiology was rapidly evolving in the second half of the 19th century, and I simplify the situation by
referring to the miasma theory of disease as mainstream. As Dana Tulodziecki (2016, pp. 268-269) shows,
“…there was no one miasma theory, but, rather, a group of views united by the idea that the atmosphere
and environment played a crucial role both in disease causation and transmission.” In reality, there were
debates about specific diseases being contagious or not, and an evolving mainstream theory also included
the zymotic theory of disease. The term zymotic, coined by the British epidemiologist William Farr, is
etymologically linked to fermentation. Originally it was thought that certain diseases impacted the blood in
ways analogous to fermentation. That analogy remained for some time, but by the 1880s the connotation
of the term ‘zymotic’ broadened, and simply referred to the class of diseases that are epidemics—another
evolving term. Zymotic diseases were regarded as caused by poisons and thought to affect the blood. Modes
of transmission were varied and were contested, and included but were not limited to miasmas. For more
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goes back to Hippocrates and was developed during the Roman Empire by Galen (Whorton, 2001,
p. 427), states that diseases are caused by noxious, polluted airs, or miasmas, that emanate from
sewage waste, swamps, rotting organic matter, and anything that emits a foul smell. While miasma
theorists did have a working notion of contagion by the mid-19th century, the idea that microbial
agents were to blame was often rejected with ridicule and without good reason by the most
renowned medical practitioners. Disease-causing agents, or contagions, as far as miasma theorists
were concerned, were emanated by noxious airs, and not person-to-person via microscopic
entities—an idea that the mainstream deemed contemptuous and ludicrous. Miasma theorists of
the 19th century advocated for sanitation reforms and general hygiene to eliminate the cause of
miasmas. Germ theorists, on the other hand, were less immediately concerned about eliminating
noxious airs through general cleanliness, and instead advocated antiseptics and decontamination
techniques that eliminated microscopic disease-causing agents, quarantines to prevent such agents
from contagious spreading, and, by the 1890s, a few effective cures, such as an antitoxin developed
from horse plasma for diphtheria, and a vaccine for rabies.
While there was no single germ theory nor miasma theory during the late 19th century, it is
clear that the early germ theorists were derided and ridiculed for their views. In the famous case
of Ignaz Semmelweis, his germ theory led him to be dismissed from his position at the esteemed
Vienna Hospital. In this case, the rejection of the germ theory was not due to lack of evidence, but
rather due to the biases and theoretical entrenchment of mainstream physicians, as I will show in
Section 2. The route to acceptance was gradual, and, over time, elements of the miasma theory
were replaced by elements of the germ theory. The germ theory gained traction with the
experiments of Robert Koch, who, following Louis Pasteur’s lead, provided evidence in favor of

on the details of the evolving mainstream views, see Eyler, 2004. The theory of germs, however, on the
whole, was rejected by mainstream theorists, whatever their specific evolving epidemiological beliefs.
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the view that microbial entities were sometimes indeed infectious agents that cause specific
diseases. However, I’ll argue that the miasma theory, except insofar as it rejected germs, was never
wholly falsified, but dovetailed with the germ theory (for similar views, see Tulodziecki, 2016;
Tomes, 1997). The idea that the previous era of epidemiology worked with a false view of disease
did not become common until the 1920s, some decades after germs became accepted.
The germ theory had plenty of evidence in its favor, but that evidence did little to sway
mainstream physicians who were invested in the miasma theory and had evidence that it was
practical. For example, Edwin Chadwick’s (1842) sanitation reform movement, which was
developed according to miasma theory, was some decades later followed by a decrease in rates of
cholera, thus supporting the miasma theory. And, yet, at the same time, John Snow (1855)
identified cholera as having a fecal-oral transmission by mapping clusters of cases in an
impoverished area of London, and ultimately tracing the origins of the outbreak to a specific water
pump. Snow persuaded officials to remove the handle of the pump. The immediate decline of cases
of cholera in the area was nevertheless shrugged off as a matter of the unpredictability of epidemic
diseases, rather than attributed to Snow’s meticulous work (for details, see Eyler, 2004).
In light of the practical effects of miasma theory and its ‘sanitary science’, the early pioneers
of the germ theory of disease transmission were vehemently derided. Examples of such pioneers
include, in addition to Semmelweis and Snow, and amongst others:2 Benjamin Marten (1720), who
proposed that tuberculosis was caused by a contagium vivum or living contagion, William Budd
(1859), who proposed that typhoid fever was spread through water, Peter Panum (1847) who
proposed the person-to-person transmission of measles, and Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. (1843;

2

Other examples include Alexander Gordon, Joseph Lister, Frederick Brittan, Joseph Griffiths Swayne, …
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1855) who, like Semmelweis, proposed that puerperal or childbed fever was transmitted personto-person and advocated antiseptic practices.
I will expand on the cases of Semmelweis and Holmes to argue that early germ theories of
puerperal fever were based on sound scientific reasoning according to evidence, and these early
germ theorists were nevertheless ridiculed and rejected by mainstream practitioners. I will then
argue that germ theory was corroborated and accepted amongst the mainstream due to the work of
Joseph Lister, Louis Pasteur, and Robert Koch, but that miasma theory was not directly falsified;
rather, it came to align with the germ theory.

2. Rejection
In 1861, the obstetrician Ignaz Semmelweis published his view that disinfectant handwashing with
chlorinated lime prevented the transmission of an infection of puerperal or childbed fever—a result
that he had determined over a decade before he published. The case of Semmelweis is frequently
discussed, but I will point out some neglected elements, as well as address a burgeoning debate
regarding whether Semmelweis in fact used sound scientific reasoning to draw his conclusion that
a germ of puerperal fever was the causal agent involved in the spread of puerperal fever. A flurry
of debate in regard to the type of reasoning Semmelweis assumed in his testing of hypotheses and
his practical conclusion that disinfecting one’s hands reduced the rates of puerperal fever has led
some to assume he had poor reasoning. There is no consensus here. Carl Hempel (1966) uses
Semmelweis as an exemplar of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Peter Lipton (1991) takes
Semmelweis as an exemplar of inference to the best explanation or eliminative abduction.
Alexander Bird (2010) argues that Semmelweis used eliminative induction, rather than abduction.
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Dana Tulodzieki (2013) and Nicholas Kadar and Russell D. Croft (2020) argue on separate
grounds that Semmelweis actually had poor reasoning, and that was a sufficient reason for his
rejection. I will argue that Semmelweis’s conclusions were based on sound reasoning. Put simply,
Semmelweis made statistical observations that led him to make a general conclusion, which is that
chlorinated handwashing removed causal agents of puerperal fever. He then offered an explanation
for this otherwise odd conclusion, which is that the causal agent of puerperal fever was a germ
(Keim). Let’s look at the reasoning in more detail.
First, Semmelweis’s reasoning is sometimes considered with regards to what the cause of
puerperal fever was (e.g. Kadar and Croft, 2020), and other times in regards to the cause of the
higher rate of mortality in the first clinic than in the second clinic (e.g. Bird, 2010). I think that
Semmelweis had a coherent theory that explained both. But it was his answer to the cause of
puerperal fever—namely, a germ that infested both cadaveric and putrid matter—that, in part, led
physicians persuaded by miasma theory to reject his view.
Semmelweis had a hypothesis that contact with corpses was spreading cadaverous particles
to mothers, leading to their infection and death. If this hypothesis were correct, then disinfecting
handwashing should eliminate the cadaverous particles and thus reduce the rates of puerperal
fever. He implemented this technique in both clinics in May 1847, and in both clinics, the mortality
rates fell drastically: from 11.4% in 1846 to 5% in 1847 to 1.27% in 1848 in the first clinic, and
from 2.7% in 1846 to 0.9% in 1847 to 1.33% in 1848 in the second clinic (Semmelweis,
1983/[1861], p. 53). These statistics corroborated the hypothesis that the variable of disinfected
versus non-disinfected hands made a significant difference in mortality rates.
Here is the basic form that Semmelweis’s reasoning tends to take—but keep in mind that this
was a preliminary conclusion, and not his final one:
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I assumed that the cause of the greater mortality rate was cadaverous particles adhering to the
hands of examining obstetricians. I removed this cause by chlorine washings. Consequently,
mortality in the first clinic fell below that of the second. I therefore concluded that cadaverous
matter adhering to the hands of the physicians was, in reality, the cause of the increased
mortality rate in the first clinic. Since the chlorine washings were instituted with such dramatic
success, not even the smallest additional changes in the procedures of the first clinic were
adopted to which the decline in mortality could be even partially attributed. The instruction
system for midwives is so instituted that pupils and instructors have less frequent occasion to
contaminate their hands with cadaverous matter than is the case in the first clinic. Thus, the
unknown endemic cause of the horrible devastations in the first clinic was the cadaverous
particles adhering to the hands of the examiners. (Semmelweis, 1983[1861], p. 54)

But puerperal fever affected mothers giving birth at home, so to conclude that cadaverous matter—
presumably absent in those homes—was the cause of puerperal fever was not well-reasoned,
except with the ad hoc hypothesis that sometimes internal putrescence could be onset without the
causal agent of cadaveric matter. Crucially, however, this was an early stage in Semmelweis’s
reasoning, and he was well-aware that puerperal fever could affect women giving birth at home or
on the street, albeit at a “significantly lower rate than those who delivered in the hospital” (p. 49).
So this early conclusion didn’t make much sense. If sometimes puerperal fever could be selfinflicted, then why were the rates of puerperal fever lower on the street than in even the second
clinic? They should have been equal.
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Alexander Bird (2010) argues that Semmelweis used eliminative abduction to infer that the
disinfectant handwashing reduced the rates of mortality in the first clinic. But, Bird says, he did
not have grounds to claim that it was “cadaveric matter” that caused puerperal fever, adding, “and
indeed it is strictly false” (p. ) He claims that Semmelweis’s “final hypothesis” was “the parturient
women were being infected with cadaveric matter transmitted by medical students from the
autopsies that they had been carrying out beforehand” (p. 347) In fact, Semmelweis (1983/[1861])
never claims this—cadaveric matter only enters his thinking as a preliminary inference in the very
early part of his story just quoted above. It is not in his final conclusion. Bird (2010, pp. 347-348)
suggests that the reason Semmelweis was rejected by his fellow practitioners was because he did
not distinguish between the following two hypotheses: “Women in Division I were infected during
examination by medical students” and “The infectious agent was ‘cadaveric matter’ imported by
the students after carrying out autopsies.” Bird (ibid.) adds that Semmelweis “argued strongly in
favor of [the latter hypothesis] which was only partly supported by the evidence.” But that is
actually not the case. In fact, two more tragic experiences occurred (the case of a patient with a
discharging medullary carcinoma and the case of a patient with an carious knee whose ichorous
exhalations saturated the air) that led Semmelweis to his conclusion that a germ of future puerperal
fever infested cadaverous matter, putrid matter or ichor, and that this germ could spread through
the air and be resorbed by the uteruses during the birth process (p. 54).
Kadar and Croft (2020) deny that Semmelweis was an exemplar of sound empirical
reasoning, and they attribute this misperception to a lack of contact with primary literature due to
lack of English translation of some pertinent German texts. I suspect that the efforts to show that
Semmelweis demonstrated poor reasoning is motivated by a desire to uphold the reliability of
mainstream science. Indeed, Kadar and Croft (2020) side with the mainstream physicians who
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rejected Semmelweis with the objection that “post hoc did not mean propter hoc”—or chlorinated
handwashing before reduction in mortality rates, did not mean chlorinated handwashing was the
cause of reduction in mortality rates.
The untranslated material that Kadar and Croft refer to includes obstetrician Friedrich
Wieger’s first publication of Semmelweis’s results, and an editorial response in the Gazette
médicale de Paris rejecting the conclusion that hand disinfection caused the reduction in maternal
mortality rates with the suggestion that it could be “due to a completely different circumstance”
given the “capricious and singular fluctuations of epidemics” (editorial in the Gazette médicale as
cited by Kadar and Croft, 2020, p. 391). The Professor at the Vienna Hospital, Dr. Johann Klein,
rejected Semmelweis’s conclusion that disinfectant handwashing prevented puerperal fever for the
same reason (ibid., p. 392). And others did as well. Consider Carl Edvard Marius Levy’s rejection:
…[O]ne must admit that the results of the experiment appear to support Dr. Semmelweis's
opinion, but certainly one must admit no more. Everyone who has had the opportunity to
observe the periodic variations in the mortality rate of maternity clinics will agree that his
findings lack certain important confirmation... In the absence of more precise statistical
information, it is conceivable that the results of the last seven months depend partially on
periodic accidental factors… (Levy, 1848, as quoted by Semmelweis, 1861, p. 184).

I think this reason for rejection is ostensibly ungrounded. Semmelweis explains that he considered
many such accidental factors, and no epidemic conditions were different between the two clinics
to explain the drastic difference in mortality rates between the two clinics.
Little attention has been given to the fact that Semmelweis was a minority in his conviction
that the disease was endemic, whereas mainstream practitioners considered the disease to be
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epidemic. Semmelweis’s reasoning was explicitly rejected because the disease was considered an
epidemic, which, at the time, meant it was “induced by atmospheric-cosmic-terrestrial influences”
(1983/[1861], p. 51). Mainstream practitioners granted that some conditions, such as childbed
fever, have endemic causes—“factors whose operation is limited to a specific location” (ibid.), but
they rejected this view of puerperal fever. In other words, because they considered the disease an
epidemic, mainstream practitioners were convinced the disease was due to random fluctuations in
the “atmospheric-cosmic-terrestrial conditions of Vienna” (ibid.), which should have led them to
conclude that “no remedies were possible” (ibid.). And yet, year after year, commissions were
assigned to investigate the discrepancy in mortality rates between the two clinics. But given that
they considered the disease an epidemic, “the commissions did not have the power to change the
atmospheric-cosmic-terrestrial conditions of Vienna… but they did not draw this conclusion, even
tough they considered the deaths an epidemic” (ibid.). Semmelweis, on the other hand, took the
disease to be endemic—due to “as yet unknown factors…whose harmful influences were limited
to the first clinic” (ibid., p. 49). And certainly, that commissions were assigned in the first place
was an outright contradiction to the fact that they believed the disease to be epidemic. Semmelweis
explains that the disease was believed to be epidemic because of the great number of deaths that
ensued. But number of deaths was not what made a disease an epidemic at the time—it was the
cause of the disease that made it an epidemic or endemic disease.
Another crucial piece of Semmelweis’s reasoning that is often neglected is the fact that he
attributed the death of the newborn infants in the clinics to the same cause as the death of the
mothers: “With the exception of the genital areas, the anatomical lesions in the corpses of such
newborn infants are the same as the lesions in the corpses of women who die from puerperal fever.
To recognize these findings as the consequence of puerperal fever in maternity patients but to deny
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that identical findings in the corpses of the newborn are the consequence of the same disease is to
reject pathological anatomy” (Semmelweis, 1983/[1861], p. 47). Gillies (2005) is the only one who
mentions this fact, though he doesn’t make enough of it, and, in fact, frowns on Semmelweis’s
sloppy use of ‘identical’. In any case, this bit was absolutely crucial in his reasoning. Many point
to the death of his friend Jakob Kolletschka as the crucial piece of evidence that led to
Semmelweis's conclusions. Kolletschka was cut with a knife during an autopsy and died with
symptoms similar to puerperal fever soon after. Without the infants also exhibiting the same
symptoms, Semmelweis would have never inferred the same cause of disease for the infants, the
mothers, and Kolletshka, namely, some kind of germ associated with cadaveric matter.
Semmelweis realized the infants were dying due to the same cause as the mothers early on, but
was a minority in seeing the infant deaths as caused by the same agent (Semmelweis, 1983/[1861]).
To imply that Semmelweis was largely driven by his friend’s death doesn’t do justice to his
reasoning.
Gillies (2005, p. 168) suggests that Semmelweis (1861) dismisses overcrowding as a cause
of puerperal fever because he “made the assumption that puerperal fever has a single necessary
cause, so that having shown that cadaverous particles cause the difference in mortality rates
between the two clinics, he concludes that the cause of puerperal fever in general must be
something of which the cadaverous particles are a special case… [ruling] out overcrowding as a
cause.”
This is somewhat misleading. It is not that Semmelweis claimed that puerperal fever might
not be exacerbated by, e.g., overcrowding, atmospheric conditions, or an anxiety response to the
priest ringing his bell. It is also, pace Gillies, not that Semmelweis assumed puerperal fever has a
single necessary cause. Rather, he landed on an essential causal factor that made a difference, as
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compared to these merely potentially exacerbating conditions. Indeed, during two of the months
of the first year that Semmelweis implemented his chlorinated handwashing, there were zero cases
of mortality due to puerperal fever, with no changes in regards to overcrowding. Even when the
number of obstetrics students examining patients returned to a normal level, thus increasing
crowds, the rates of mortality were still at a minimum with the chlorinated handwashing.
Semmelweis used practical—effective difference-making—causal reasoning, which, contra
the physicians of his day, was legitimate scientific reasoning. Note that, even after Semmelweis
left the Vienna Hospital, the practitioners continued his disinfecting practice, since observation of
mortality rates showed it to be effective. And yet, those same practitioners ridiculed his theory,
and limited his abilities to practice himself, ultimately dismissing him from the hospital. Practical
causal reasoning requires a framework of concepts that pick out observable phenomena, namely,
a theoretical framework, and Semmelweis’s was frequently shifting. One of the hypotheses he
checked off his list was that of the mainstream miasma theory: that any difference in rates of
puerperal fever between the first clinic and the second clinic surely had to do with differences in
atmospheric-cosmic-terrestrial conditions (Semmelweis, 1861/1983, p. 51). But there were no
such differences to test between the clinics, which were adjacent to one another. It is not that he
therefore rejected the hypothesis that miasmas might have some negative effect on puerperal fever,
only the hypothesis that they are what made a difference in mortality rates between the two clinics.
As he says, “…the commissions identified various endemic factors as causes of the greater
mortality rate in the first clinic. Accordingly, various measures were instituted, but none brought
the mortality rate within that of the second clinic. Thus one could infer that the factors identified
by the commissions were not causally responsible for the greater mortality in the first clinic.” (p.
53-54).
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In his search for the cause of the higher mortality rate in the first clinic than in the second
clinic, he landed upon an element that made a difference in the mortality rates, namely, disinfectant
handwashing. It is from this difference-maker that Semmelweis developed his theory of the cause
of puerperal fever: first, cadaverous particles spread from contaminated hands to bloodstream,
second, of putrid matter spread from contaminated hands to bloodstream, and, third, a “germ
(Keim)” for “future childbed fever” spread via contaminated hands or air and resorbed into a
patient’s bloodstream (p. 54).
Furthermore, Semmelweis retrospectively uses his theory to explain various trends in the
mortality rates in the two clinics. For example, the mortality rates for patients in the first clinic
from the months of December 1846 to March 1847 are inexplicably low—an average of 3.5%.
This number suddenly spikes again to 18.27% in April 1847, when Semmelweis took over the
clinic as assistant. Semmelweis takes responsibility for this tragic spike. He explains that during
the early months of 1847, the spread of the puerperal fever germ was at a minimum, due to the fact
that his predecessor Dr. Breit’s visits to the morgue were seldom—in other words, due to Breit’s
lack of assiduousness about anatomical studies. This, paired with the fact that the number of
students was minimized and examinations were restricted to a minimum during these months (by
advisory of a commission assigned to investigate the discrepancy in mortality rates between the
two clinics), makes Semmelweis’s theory explanatory over the reduction in mortality rates during
those months. When Semmelweis took over in late March, the visits to the morgue with students
to conduct autopsies resumed with frequency each morning. After the visits to the morgue,
Semmelweis explains, they then went to the labor room to examine all the patients as was his
obligation. Thus, his contaminated hands came into contact with the genitals of so many women
in labor that the death rate drastically increased.
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Semmelweis adds that when he was no longer assistant, many of these facts were denied,
including that there was a significant difference in mortality between the clinics (p. 49).
Gillies (2005, p. 177) argues that “the principal reason why Semmelweis’s theory of the
causes of puerperal fever was largely rejected by his contemporaries was that it contradicted the
then dominant paradigm in medicine.” While there may not have been a dominant paradigm, as I
mentioned Tulodziecki argues, it is clear that Semmelweis’s early germ theory contradicted
general mainstream beliefs and practices. Specifically, the idea that a material substance, invisible
to the naked eye, could be absorbed, seemed fantastical to a generation raised on the repugnant
stink of miasma. There was more to it than just theory entrenchment, however. Owning up to
Semmelweis’s theory meant that practitioners had to take responsibility for the thousands of deaths
that had occurred before Semmelweis’s implementation of chlorinated handwashing. Semmelweis
himself took credit for this ignorance, and attempted to impugn this guilt. But many practitioners
would sooner die than accept his theory that their gentlemanly hands could carry fatal-diseasecausing agents. It wasn’t until the next generation of scientists rose, some decades later, that germ
theory would become accepted.
Similar to Semmelweis, Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. (1843; 1855) of Harvard Medical School
took up the line of Alexander Gordon (1795) that the cause of puerperal fever was a specific
contagion or infection, and that erysipelas and puerperal fever co-occurred as epidemics. He
warned that a doctor who attended or performed an autopsy on a patient that had puerperal fever
or erysipelas should meticulously cleanse and change his clothes before attending a healthy
obstetrical patient. His recommended precautions were “severely criticized” (Spink, 1978, p. 14).
A leading obstetrician, Charles D. Meigs, dismissed Holmes with status bias. Meigs (1854,
p. 93) calls William P. Dewees “our celebrated townsman…whose writings on obstetricy gave him
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a world-wide fame as a well-informed member of the medical profession.” Given this high status,
Meigs then proceeds to quote Dewees as his first objection to Holmes: “In this country, under no
circumstance that puerperal fever has appeared hitherto, does it afford the slightest ground for the
belief that it is contagious” (Dewees, 1833, p. 420; as quoted by Meigs, 1854, p. 93). In fact, he
five times cites the status or reputation of a physician, as, e.g., “distinguished” or a “well-informed
member of the medical profession” (Meigs, 1854, p. 94), in order to use that physician’s words
against contagion theory and reject Holmes’s empirical findings. Towards the end of his volume
on puerperal fever, Meigs asks,

And shall we now go back again to the capabilities of a Celsus, or an Avicenna, or an
Avenzoar? Or shall we rather disregard the jejune and fizenless dreamings of sophomore
writers, who thunder forth denunciations, and would mark, if they might, with a black and
ineffaceable spot, the hard-won reputation of every physician, who, in the Providence of God,
is called upon to content with rage of one of the most destructive of epidemics, and pay an
ungrateful service. (Meigs, 1854, p. 113)

Such elaborate and moving rhetoric paired with ad hominem arguments in attempt to reject the
contagiousness of puerperal suggests that Meigs is here grasping at straws. He would rather
disregard the evidence than accept that a gentleman physician’s hands could ever be sullied with
something so ungodly as a contagious germ of puerperal fever.
The lack of acknowledgement fringe theorists receive during their lifetimes has been called
the ‘Semmelweis reflex-effect’. As Mortell et al. (2013, p. 206) put it, “the Semmelweis reflexeffect is characterized by rejection of new knowledge because it contradicts entrenched norms,
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beliefs and paradigms.”3 In Semmelweis’s case, it wasn’t mere theory entrenchment. It was that
respected practitioners felt slighted, and could not bear to accept the fact that, for years, they,
unbeknownst to themselves, were the ones responsible for spreading a fatal disease.

3. Acceptance
Germ theory is now mainstream; fringe figures who were rejected in the early days are now
celebrated. For example, the surgeon Joseph Lister was early on rejected by Americans especially,
most famously by the renowned dean of American surgery, Samuel D. Gross. Gross argued that
simple cleanliness might attain similar results to Lister’s carbolic acid antiseptic technique.
Consider the following slur uttered by Gross against Lister: “Little, if any faith, is placed by an
enlightened or experienced surgeon on this side of the Atlantic in the so-called carbolic acid
treatment of Professor Lister” (Edmonson, 1977, p. 71). Lister was clearly an eccentric, and was
“one of the only medical students of his time to carry a microscope alongside his velvet-lined
amputation kit, much to the chagrin of his instructors, who ‘believed the microscope was not only
superfluous to a study of surgery but also a threat to the medical establishment itself’” (Barry,
2018).
Even Pasteur, who in his day was generally well-respected, was resisted. Felix A. Pouchet
failed to reproduce his results demonstrating that the air contains microbes that contaminate broth
cultures, which led to some years of debate (1859-1864) in the French Academie des Sciences
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Remarkably, Mortell et al. (2013, p. 206) demonstrate that healthcare providers wash their hands about
one third as often as required, and, furthermore, handwashing hygiene compliance is inversely related to
status, such that nurses are more compliant than doctors. As late as 2013, rates of healthcare acquired
infection in hospitals due to the transmission of pathogens from one patient to another through healthcare
providers who have not washed their hands is devastatingly high, with two million cases of infection and
90,000 cases of mortality per year in the US.
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(Roll-Hansen, 1979). In response, Pasteur designed experiments that offered significant evidence
that the air contains microbes, which showed that the theory of spontaneous generation was not
needed to explain broth contamination (Berche, 2012, p. 3). Pouchet continued to argue that the
atmosphere could not contain sufficient amount of germs to produce Pasteur’s results. In spite of
Pasteur’s beautiful experiments and results, the miasma-humoral theory remained mainstream
until the 1890s. Consider that the quote above from Gross resisting Lister (who worked on
antiseptic techniques following Pasteur’s theory) is dated to 1977, a decade after Pasteur’s famous
experiments were conducted.
William Farr, who initially rejected John Snow’s work, acknowledged that miasma theory
of cholera was wrong in 1866 through his statistical analysis of the death rate. But the rest of the
mainstream continued to resist germ theory for decades to come.
In 1905, Robert Koch received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on
tuberculosis. So at least by then, the germ theory was mainstream. But after Koch (1890, p. 891)
published his postulates (formulated in 1884) that established a “causal relationship between
pathogenic bacteria and the infectious diseases associated therewith” the theory began to gain
mainstream acceptance. I quote the frequently misquoted Koch as he himself stated them:

First, that the parasite is met with in each individual case of the particular disease and under
conditions which correspond to the pathological changes and the clinical course of the disease;
secondly, that in no other disease is it found as an accidental non-pathogenic guest; and, thirdly,
that if completely isolated from the body and cultivated in pure cultures with sufficient
frequency, it can reproduce the disease-then it can no longer be considered an accidental
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accompaniment of the disease, but in that case no other relation between the parasite and the
disease can be admitted than that the parasite is the cause of the disease. (Koch, 1890, p. 891)

One might think that Pasteur’s 1860-64 experiments could have made the competing theories
commensurable, but nevertheless, miasma theory remained mainstream until the 1890s. What
seemed to do the work to convince physicians of the existence of pathogenic microbes was Koch’s
establishment of a causal relationship between bacteria and disease in the specific cases of
tuberculosis, cholera, and anthrax.
The germ theory was largely rejected until this time due to the sanitation movement, which
stemmed from the miasma theory. Even Florence Nightingale, still renowned for her work on
hygiene, many times attacked the claims of germ theorists (but perhaps rightly—it is an urban
legend that she outright rejected it): “.. the doctrine of ‘disease germs’, in the sense in which it may
lead to considering ‘infection’ inevitable, must not be taught as a principle of sanitary nursing”
(Nightingale, 1894, in McDonald, 2011, p. 738). Germ theory suggested that killing the infectious
agents was the only means to prevent disease. That suggested that the atmospheric-cosmicterrestrial influences did not have a crucial role in disease etiology. That assumption thus pitted
miasma theorists, advocating general hygiene and sanitation to reduce noxious fluctuations in the
environment, against germ theorists, advocating antiseptics and decontamination. When it was
discovered that decaying matter was infested with microbes, the two theories aligned, and it
became clear that sanitation as well as antiseptics and sterilization were both useful means towards
the same desiderata of public health.
My view is that the miasma theory was never wholly falsified. The association of decaying
matter with microbes helped convince miasma theorists who were part of the sanitation movement
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to believe in germs. The two theories ended up aligning to some extent, insofar as sanitation was
a productive measure under both theories. For example, according to miasma theory, the draining
the swamps led to a reduction in cases of malaria because of the reduction of bad air. According
to germ theory, mosquitoes were carriers of malaria, and so draining the swamps where mosquitoes
breed led to reduction of cases of malaria. Miasma, or bad air attributable to swamps, in this case,
is just a framework placeholder for mosquitoes-carrying-malaria. Miasma theory enabled the
sanitation and hygiene movements, which led to the reduction of disease and mortality, well before
the use of vaccines and antibiotics became widespread.
The identification of plasmodium as the parasitic cause of malaria solidified the acceptance
of germ theory, and made the two theories commensurable. That is to say, the identification of
specific germs offered competing-theory neutral evidence in favor of germ theory. However, it did
not necessarily offer competing-theory neutral evidence against the theory that noxious airs were
causative agents in disease spread, but, in a sense, actually corroborated that view.
Some practices associated with miasma theory were maintained even as germ theory was
adopted. But germ theory offered some practical services and potentials that miasma theory did
not. Examples include antiseptic surgery, decontamination, quarantines, vaccines, and, later,
antibiotics. Miasma theory, on the other hand, sometimes advocated techniques that were less
practical and sometimes more dangerous, such as bloodletting to maintain humoral balance.
Though one might be surprised to learn that even bloodletting is still used today in mainstream
medicine (see Chapter 6 for more details).
In response to antibiotics and vaccines, bacteria and viruses often gradually evolve into
strains that are resistant. Similarly, washing too frequently with antiseptics depletes the
microbiome, which protects an individual from foreign microbes. In such cases, the miasma
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theory’s advocating of general cleanliness may in the long run show itself to be effective, as Gross
suggested, since it reduces the environment for pathogens to develop in the first place without
targeting the pathogens themselves, and therefore, providing no environmental influence against
which pathogens can develop into resistant strains.4 General sanitation, which is still today thought
to be beneficial, could be allowed to remain in practice while the less effective or risky techniques
and practices fall to the wayside as better ones develop. On one interpretation of the situation, this
is exactly what happened, since sanitation and hygiene continue to be part of public health ethics.

4. Conclusion
There are some clear parallels from this case to the case of continental drift. Both early mobilists
and early germ theorists were resisted with contempt and some bias, especially in regard to status
or reputation. Also, both mobilists and germ theorists were resisted due to the lack of a clear
explanatory mechanism to fulfill the claims of their theories. Once some form of a mechanism
became clear enough for everyone to see given developments in experimental techniques, mobilist
and germ theories both were accepted. For acceptance, mobilism needed tectonic plates to be seen
clearly, with, e.g., the rift in the mid-Atlantic ridge and the coincidences of volcanic activity, island
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Indeed, a germ theory denialist camp exists today on the fringe—but actual positive accounts of disease
causation are various. Simple denialism of germ theory is unhelpful and even in some cases harmful. What
would be helpful would be demonstrating the effectiveness of some practices other than and in addition to
those used in germ theory, which might lead some less effective practices in germ theory to be left to the
wayside if those new practices turn out to be more practical and effective. It is not hard to see how the use
of antibiotics and vaccines may have an ill effect, insofar as research suggests that these techniques lead
new resistant strains to develop. Developing alternative means remains a challenge, since fringe researchers
are often are not paid for their work, and since an idea that generates skepticism about germ theory is
automatically marked with a red flag. The case of HIV-AIDS denialism is treated in the final chapter.
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arcs, and seismic activity; germ theory needed microbes to be seen clearly, with, e.g., the use of
better microscopes paired with experiments like Pasteur’s and Koch’s.
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CHAPTER THREE

From Fringe to Mainstream: The Garcia Effect

1. Introduction
John Garcia’s work challenged fundamental principles of the 20th century’s mainstream
behaviorist learning theory. A Spanish-American farm worker, mechanic, soldier, and G.I.-Bill
funded UC Berkeley dropout, Garcia was entirely unknown and without a Ph.D. in 1955, when his
first publication demonstrating the conditioned taste aversion effect entered the mainstream
generalist journal Science. He and his colleagues found that rodents that drank a saccharin-flavored
liquid (conditioned stimulus, hereafter CS) and were exposed to radiation (unconditioned stimulus,
hereafter US) that caused noxious effects subsequently came to exhibit an aversion to the saccharin
liquid. In other words, the animals learned to associate a taste with radiation illness, despite the
delay between the taste and the onset of illness, and after only a single pairing.
These results were not just anomalous to the behaviorist learning theory; they contradicted
its central principles. No one seems to have noticed or cared, perhaps in part due to the fact that
Garcia himself explicitly tried to fit the results into a conditioning paradigm. It was long believed
that repetitive spatiotemporal contiguity between a CS and an US is required to produce a
conditioned association, which strengthens with the frequency of CS and US pairings and becomes
extinct without subsequent recurrence of CS and US pairings (Garcia, McGowan, & Green, 1972,
p. 24). This idea had been around since the time of Locke. As Hume (1739/1896, pp. 10-13, 282284; Treatise I.i.4; II.i.4) put it, learned associations between cause and effect must have
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“contiguity in time or place” and “succession” and the strength of such an association depends on
repetition or “constant conjunction.” In other words, CS-US pairings must be (1) contiguous and
(2) repeated in order for an animal to form a conditioned association. Garcia’s CS-US pairing
surely was neither contiguous nor repeated, and yet an association was formed.
It wasn’t until 1966, when Garcia succeeded in publishing two groundbreaking papers in the
little-known “maverick” (Lubek & Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 73) and “nonrefereed” (Revusky, 1977,
p. 63) journal Psychonomic Science, that the ears of young learning theorists beginning to make a
name for themselves perked up. This pair of papers (Garcia & Koelling 1966; Garcia, Ervin, &
Koelling, 1966) took a turn by making a proclamation of the taste aversion effect and its
consequences for behaviorist learning theory. Garcia and his colleagues claimed that visual and
gustatory stimuli are differentially associable with pain from a shock and gastric illness from a
toxin. This called into question a third principle of the traditional behaviorist learning theory,
namely, (3) stimulus equipotentiality—that all classes of stimuli have equal potential to become
conditioned.
Garcia encountered resistance, especially from psychologists of his own generation.
Throughout the 60s and 70s, he was continuously refused publication from mainstream journals,
including Nature, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology (JCPP), Psychological
Review, Psychological Bulletin, and Journal of Experimental Psychology (Lubek & Apfelbaum,
1987). He frequently received personal attacks from reviewers. This saga went on for about two
decades before, with much ado, he became the award-wining psychologist we know him to be
today for his discovery of the Garcia effect.

47

2. Garcia’s Deviant Experimental Results
By the mid-20th century, behaviorist learning theory dominated psychology. It stated that learned
behaviors are the result of forming direct associations between an unconditioned stimulus and
conditioned stimulus, as in classical conditioning, or between a response and reinforcement, as in
operant conditioning. In other words, learned behaviors can be explained simply in terms of
association between stimuli and responses, or responses and reinforcements, without any need to
posit intervening unobservable internal states. Behaviorist learning theory denied the biological
organism of any instinct by asserting that all behavior—even breathing—becomes conditioned
shortly after birth. In John B. Watson’s (1924) Behaviorism, he put this bluntly: “There are for us
no instincts—we no longer need the term in psychology…” (as quoted by Gould & Marler, 1987,
p. 4). In B. F. Skinner’s (1953, p. 157) Science and Human Behavior, he stated that instinct is a
“flagrant example of an explanatory fiction” and “an appeal to ignorance” because “If the instinct
of nest-building refers only to the observed tendency of certain kinds of birds to build nests, it
cannot explain why the birds build nests.” Evolutionary considerations were thus cast out of
psychology.
Garcia’s work on conditioning grew out of the successful work he’d done on radiation’s
effects on the brain. After enlisting in the Army Air Corps during WWII, Garcia used a G.I. Bill
to pay for his college tuition at Santa Rosa Junior College, and later his tuition for his Master’s
and Ph.D. degrees (1965) from UC Berkeley. He left Berkeley without finishing his doctorate after
failing a statistics exam (Bolles, 1993, p. 333) and when his advisor Edward Tolman left (Lubek
& Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 67). He took his first research position at the U.S. Naval Radiological
Defense Lab, where he studied the effects of radiation on the brain. He discovered the taste
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aversion effect by chance when studying the reaction of ionizing radiation on the rat brain. During
these experiments, he noticed that rats avoided water from the plastic bottles in the radiation
chambers, and hypothesized that the rats associated the taste of the water with the radiation illness.
The experimental results of that hypothesis constitute the initial findings Garcia, Kimeldorf,
and Koelling published in Science in 1955, “Conditioned Aversion to Saccharin Resulting from
Exposure to Gamma Radiation.” Garcia & Donald Kimeldorf (1957) then published “Temporal
relationship within the conditioning of a saccharine aversion through radiation exposure” in JCPP.
Both of these studies showed that the taste aversion effect could be established in a single trial.
The anomalous results went against the behaviorist principle of repetition.
But the authors didn’t say so explicitly. In fact, they said quite the opposite. In this earlier
paper that was accepted by JCPP, Garcia and Kimeldorf (1957, p. 182) safely said that their results
were “consistent with accepted concepts of conditioning despite the differences in stimulus
duration required by low-intensity radiation experimentation.”
By 1966, Garcia had his Ph.D. and changed his tune about behaviorist learning theory. Garcia
and Koelling (1966, p. 124) explicitly rejected the principle of stimulus equipotentiality: “It seems
that given reinforcers are not equally effective for all classes of discriminable stimuli. The cues,
which the animal selects from the welter of stimuli in the learning situation, appear to be related
to the consequences of the subsequent reinforcer.” Then, in the same year, Garcia, Ervin, and
Koelling (1966) rejected the principles of repetition of and contiguity between CS-US pairings,
saying, “It is considered axiomatic in theory and practice that no learning will occur without
immediate reinforcement.... However, our data indicates that immediate reinforcement is not a
general requirement for all learning” (p. 121) and add that, “These data indicate anew that the
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mammalian learning mechanisms do not operate randomly, associating stimuli and reinforcers
only as a function of recency, frequency and intensity” (p. 122).
Garcia and his colleagues struggled to publish these 1966 papers, which were both rejected,
for example, by Science and JCPP. The association of taste with radiation illness was made more
robust in Garcia & Koelling’s (1966) paper.1 These results challenged the principle of stimulus
equipotentiality—that any neutral perceptible stimulus (any visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory,
or touch cue) can become associated with an unconditioned stimulus or response through
conditioning. Pavlov (1928; as quoted by Garcia, McGowan, & Green, 1972) emphasized the
equivalence of conditioned stimuli:

if our hypothesis as to the origin of the conditioned reflex is correct, it follows that any natural
phenomenon chosen at will may be converted into a conditioned stimulus… . Any visual
stimulus, any desired sound, any odour, and the stimulation of any part of the skin, whether by
mechanical means or by the application of heat or cold…

But Garcia and Koelling demonstrated that at least some perceptible stimuli have a selective
effect on what is learned and that not all stimulus elements in an acquisition situation always
become conditioned stimuli. Shock to the feet (US) produced avoidance of a sight cue—bright,
noisy water—but not a taste cue—sweet water—whereas illness caused by X rays (US) produced
avoidance of sweet water, but not bright, noisy water. This suggests that rats are prepared to form
associations between flavor and illness but not between sound and illness. Garcia called it the
“belongingness”—the selectivity—of certain stimulus pathways. The equipotentiality of stimuli

1

This was a product of Garcia’s dissertation work at UC Berkeley (Lubek & Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 68).
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would predict that flavor and sound should have equal potentials to become conditioned stimuli.
Garcia’s interpretation was instead that there are selective pathways involved, as with taste (CS)
and illness (US). These results showed that evolutionary considerations as well as internal states
needed to be reintroduced into behaviorist psychology.
In Garcia, F. R. Ervin, and Koelling’s (1966) paper, they demonstrated the same effect with
a long delay between taste and illness. Again, visual and gustatory stimuli had selective potential
to become conditioned stimuli. Garcia and his colleagues demonstrated that immediate (seconds
or fractions thereof) and repeated pairings or reinforcement is sometimes unnecessary for an
animal to learn an association, and for that association to become relatively resistant to extinction.
Rather, an animal can develop a conditioned taste aversion even with a relatively long delay
(hours) between a CS (taste) and an US (gastric illness).

3. Rejection
In the 1960s, Garcia was sometimes able to publish his studies on conditioned taste aversion, but
not in APA journals, which represent the mainstream in psychology. His findings were not heavily
cited and did not overturn the principles of learning theory that they contradicted. According to
Gould and Marler (1987, p. 4), one investigator who had worked for many years on delayed
reinforcement publicly stated of Garcia’s results, “Those findings are no more likely than birdshit
in a cuckoo clock.” Why did learning theorists resist Garcia’s refutation of two core principles?
Ian Lubek and Erika Apfelbaum (1987) treat Garcia’s results in a Kuhnian vein “as a case
study of a mainstream, ‘normal science’ paradigm’s supporters’ attempts to block, marginalize, or
reject a deviant set of scientific ideas anomalous enough to merit a paradigmatic shift” (p. 60). On
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a Popperian view, the original theory was to blame, and Garcia’s results offered a straightforward
falsification of learning theory, and should have been graciously accepted as such. I won’t now
weigh in on the debate between Kuhn and Popper. What matters here is that the results did not
lead to revision as smoothly as one might expect if the scientific community were receptive to
straightforward falsification. Instead there was dismissal, neglect, and resistance.
Garcia himself, during his 1980 acceptance speech for the APA’s prestigious Distinguished
Scientific Contribution Award, diagnosed the rejection of his papers as the “neophobia” of
journal editors and editorial consultants (Garcia, 1981, p. 149) and admonished the disparaging
feedback he received as “pseudocriticism” (ibid., p. 152). Garcia’s acceptance speech, titled
“Tilting at the Paper Mills of Academe”—a reference to his troubles getting his papers
published2—was his first publication on taste aversion learning in an APA journal since 1962.
Before 1962, he published “some 20 papers in prestigious journals and volumes without a single
rejection” (Garcia, 1981, p. 149). These successful papers contained novel results, but were
carefully framed in the language of the dominant behaviorist learning paradigm (as also noted by
Lubek & Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 68).
This success took a turn in 1965, when Garcia decided to take a stand against the traditional
learning theory that saw the animal as an unbiased tabula rasa. As noted, he challenged the
equipotentiality of stimuli by showing that some conditioned stimuli are easier to associate with
negative consequences than others (sounds with shock and tastes with illness): “given reinforcers

2

“Paper mills” is a play on Don Quixote’s demonization of the “threatening…multiple arms” of giant
windmills and Sancho Panza’s milder view that “They are only windmills.” In the speech, Garcia
allegorically embodies Sancho Panza, and satirically presents evidence for the view that journals are not
“governed by Janus-faced demons” but actually “operated by timid but tractable organisms” (p. 149). The
speech is brilliantly funny and easy-going in spite of Garcia’s palpable resentment. Garcia included nine
illustrations poking fun at the unwarranted criticism he received by mainstream learning theorists (Lubek
& Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 60); the APA removed five of these before publishing the speech in American
Psychologist (see Garcia, 1981).
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are not equally effective for all classes of discriminable stimuli” (Garcia & Koelling, 1966, p. 124).
Moreover, he provided an evolutionary interpretation: “natural selection may have favored
mechanisms which associate gustatory and olfactory cues with internal discomfort since the
chemical receptors sample the materials soon to be incorporated into the internal environment”
(Garcia & Koelling, 1966, p. 124). This explicit denial of stimulus equipotentiality seems to have
gone too far, and Garcia found it difficult to publish. His groundbreaking findings were rejected
by leading journals, including the APA’s Journal of Experimental and Physiological Psychology
(JCPP) and Science. This was the first rejection from a mainstream journal that Garcia had
received in the past decade. An abbreviated version of this paper was ultimately published in
Psychonomic Science: Garcia and Koelling’s (1966) “Relation of cue to consequence in avoidance
learning.” Psychonomic Science was a generalist physiological psychology journal that had more
concern for psychometrics than for learning theory and animal behavior.
Following this first rejection, his work on conditioned taste aversion was frequently refused
publication by mainstream journals—up until his 1980 award. To understand this, it will help to
get a flavor of the reasons given for rejection.
These rejections were not particularly pleasant according to Garcia (1981, p. 149) himself:
“Often, the critique is embellished with gratuitous personal insults. One consultant, in an illworded passage, informed the editor that one of our recent manuscripts would not have been
acceptable even as a term paper in his or her learning class.” He (1981, p. 150) recalls, “Some
editorial consultants said we used too many treatments. Some said we used too few,” indicating
that reviewers may have been floundering to find something wrong with this study. According to
the reviewer of one of his submissions to Science, the results were “interesting,” but provided no
explanation for “how the X-ray reinforcement produced its effect” (as quoted in Lubek &
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Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 73), and thus, the paper was rejected. Garcia (1981, p. 150) rebuffed,
“Apparently, this consultant was satisfied that we all know how shock reinforcement works.”
Neither was there an explanatory mechanism for classical and operant conditioning. As late as
1976, there still was no accepted mechanism for the Garcia effect: “There is at present no clearly
correct explanation of the mechanism of long-delay learning” (Rozin, 1976, p. 38).
Another rejected paper showed that rats acquired an association between a taste (CS) and
radiation illness (US) even when these were presented hours apart (sans contiguity), and after a
single pairing (sans repetition). This paper was also ultimately published in Psychonomic Science:
Garcia, Ervin, and Koelling’s (1966) “Learning with prolonged delay of reinforcement” after being
rejected by mainstream top-tier journals where Garcia’s work had been previously accepted—
again, JCPP and Science.
The editor of JCPP, William Estes, promptly sent a rejection letter citing complaints from
an anonymous reviewer about the methodology used in the radiation-induced aversion study.
Specifically, the reviewer complained about the “unsuitability of experimental design, lack of
temporal control of stimuli, lack of pseudoconditioning controls, and an alternative explanation of
conditioned nausea” and said that the results lacked “general theoretical relevance” (Lubek &
Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 72). As Garcia pointed out in a reply to the rejection, there was an
inconsistency in rejecting the paper for theoretical reasons when all the specific remarks related in
the rejection letter were related to methodology. To this, “Estes promptly responded, defending
his consultant as someone well versed in the literature of conditioning and aware of relevant Polish
and Russian studies, ‘although I’m not sure you are’” (ibid., p. 73). This is blatantly a pro and ad
hominem argument, for the reviewer, and against Garcia.
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Indeed the methodology implemented by Garcia in this study ran against paradigmatic
expectations. As Lubek and Apfelbaum (1987, p. 67) detail:

As the conditioned stimulus in this study, Garcia chose not to use the narrow range of
traditional stimuli (tone, light, air-puff, or electric shock) but instead employed long-duration
ionizing radiation. Also, Garcia did not focus on the usual motor responses used by Pavlovian,
Skinnerian, or neo-behaviorist conditioners (running, jumping, blinking, pressing, etc.) but on
the organism’s alimentary and olfactory response systems. The novel choice of stimulus
combined with an unusual response system helped highlight behavioral anomalies not seen in
other studies.

This isn’t entirely accurate, since Pavlov didn’t focus on motor responses, but used conditioned
salivation responses. Either way, this study conveyed no clear-cut unconditioned response: “while
it is reasonable in a strictly operational sense to designate X ray as the US it is difficult to point to
an unconditioned response (UR)” (Garcia, McGowan, & Green, 1972, p. 28). Garcia conceived
the radiation-induced noxious effects not as an UR, but rather suggests, “This ‘radiation sickness
syndrome’ is the most likely reinforcing stimulus (US),” but notes, “this formulation leads to still
other theoretical difficulties” (ibid., p. 30), though he doesn’t say what these are. In other words,
it was difficult to fit the experimental design of the radiation-induced taste aversion studies into
the conditioning paradigm.3

3

In his 1950s papers, Garcia designates radiation itself as the unconditioned stimulus, perhaps as an attempt
to fit the experiment into a conditioning paradigm: “The processes through which radiation is capable of
operating as an unconditioned stimulus are unknown” (Garcia, Kimeldorf, & Koelling, 1955, p. 158);
“These effects were described as conditioned aversions or avoidances, and it was suggested that gamma
radiation acted as an unconditioned stimulus” (Garcia & Kimeldorf, 1957). Allowing the radiation rather
than the radiation illness to be the unconditioned stimulus might have enabled the experiment to pass as

55

Indeed, Garcia’s experimental techniques were not viewed as particularly rigorous when
weighed against the dominant standards. He was not trained in traditional learning theory nor its
methodologies and the effect was that his experiments made use of relatively simple techniques
(Revusky, 1977, p. 63): “Garcia's original techniques involved production of flavor aversions by
means of x-irradiation and measurement of the aversion by a simple test of consumption: weighing
bottles. This meant that elaborate learning methodologies were not necessary and hence reduced
the value of the educational investments made by members of the in-groups.” And, as the JCPP
editor mentioned, Garcia did not assume the need to use pseudoconditioning controls—namely,
unpaired control trials in which the CS (saccharin water) was not paired with the US (radiation
illness) or vice-versa. The famous learning theorist, Morton Edward “Jeff” Bitterman (1975, p.
708) saw the lack of pseudoconditioning controls as a red flag, and conveyed this in the well-read
pages of Science:

Problems of control abound in these aversion experiments, perhaps because they are not always
uppermost in the minds of the investigators. The view actually has been expressed that it
“doesn’t matter” whether a food aversion is the product of conditioning or pseudoconditioning,
that what is important is that “behavior shows astonishingly organismic properties.”

classical conditioning, since radiation illness could then be designated the unconditioned response (although
this is a bit odd, since in classical conditioning experiments, the unconditioned response is the same as the
conditioned response). By 1966, Garcia was less clear about what the US was. Garcia & Koelling (1966)
mention “the reinforcer, i.e., radiation or toxic effects” (p. 123) and say, “Apparently when gustatory stimuli
are paired with agents which produce nausea and gastric upset, they acquire secondary reinforcing
properties which might be described as ‘conditioned nausea’” (p. 124). But in the next article, Garcia, Ervin,
& Koelling (1966, p. 122, italics mine) designate the illness as the US: “The omnivorous rat displays a bias,
probably established by natural selection, to associate gustatory and olfactory cues with internal malaise
even when these stimuli are separated by long time periods.”
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On this point, Bitterman cited Garcia, McGowan, and Green (1972), but said nothing of why these
controls do matter. Revusky and Bedarf (1967) did not use pseudoconditioning controls in their
replication study either, in which they used a novel food instead of saccharin liquid (Revusky,
1977, p. 55). Perhaps Bitterman’s reputation as an accomplished psychologist was enough to
convince readers that it was an embarrassing oversight to exclude a pseudoconditioning control,
but this display of incredulity looks excessive on reflection. A pseudoconditioning control would
be needed if there was a chance that sweet water might cause aversion without irradiation—that
is, it could rule out the possibility that the animals would have avoided the water even if it hadn’t
seemed to make them sick. But there is no reason to take that possibility seriously, since rats prefer
sweet water under normal circumstances. Bitterman seems to find the very idea of an organismic
contribution preposterous, but, instead of explaining why in careful detail, he simply presents the
authors own words as if it will be obvious that such an idea should be rejected out of hand as
absurd.4
These methodological departures do not mean that Garcia’s work was shoddy, or lacking in
scientific merit. Recall that his early work, too, had gone through peer review, and his critical
results were replicated multiple times by him and his colleagues (e.g. Garcia, McGowan, Ervin, &
Koelling, 1968; Garcia, Ervin, Yorke, & Koelling, 1967; Garcia & Ervin, 1968) and, later, by
others (Smith & Roll, 1967; Revusky, 1968; Rozin, 1969; Revusky & Garcia, 1970; Seligman,

4

It is worth noting that Bitterman (1975, p. 708) provides an alternative theoretical interpretation of the
results of Garcia et al.’s (1968) taste aversion studies:
The results for irradiation may be attributed to the fact that gustatory stimuli persisted in the interval
between irradiation and illness whereas visual stimuli, of course, did not. The results for shock may be
attributed to the fact that the visual stimuli antedated shock by a short interval favorable to conditioning
(since the animal saw the food before taking it), whereas the gustatory stimuli were at best simultaneous
with shock and may have even followed it (since the animals were shocked immediately upon taking
the food). Testing conditions also were confounded with modality; since the visual stimuli antedated
the criterion response (eating) and the gustatory stimuli followed the response, it should not be
surprising that the visual group hesitated much longer than the taste group before taking the food.
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1970; Seligman et al., 1970; Shettleworth, 1972). Garcia just deviated from prevailing
methodological designs. Garcia joked, “It should not be surprising that I employed this hackneyed
learning design. After all, my professors at Berkeley, Tolman, Ritchie, and Krech, insisted that I
take elementary experimental design and statistics courses, despite all rumors to the contrary”
(Garcia, 1981, p. 153).
Sam Revusky (1977, p. 63), a student of JCPP editor Estes and well-versed in traditional
learning theory, mentions hearing the gossip on multiple occasions that “Garcia indeed discovered
the effect but did not know how to do a rigorous experiment to prove it” and that “Paul Rozin
and/or Sam Revusky allegedly did the definitive experiments” after Garcia. Rozin’s (1969)
“Central or peripheral mediation of learning with long CS-US intervals in the feeding system” and
Revusky’s (1968) “Aversion to sucrose produced by contingent x-irradiation: Temporal and
dosage parameters” replicating Garcia and Koelling’s (1966) results were both published in JCPP.
Revusky himself awards Garcia the credit for both discovering the effect and doing the definitive
experiments to prove it. When Revusky first became acquainted with Garcia’s work, he wrote to
Estes with the excitement that Garcia’s results had “fundamental and revolutionary” implications
(Lubek & Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 73). According to Rozin, Garcia did the critical study, and he
realized that it was a solution to a set of problems he was facing in his own work on vitamin
deficiency and food choice (personal communication, June 2021).5 Rozin’s work on the effect
contributed a line of research on how long-delay learning might work through adaptive

5

Learned specific hungers (e.g. during vitamin deficiency) conflicted with basic learning principles well
before the discovery of long-delay taste aversion learning. Basically, a rat is deficient in some vitamin and
feels sick, and encounters a food containing that vitamin and starts feeling better. The rat is reinforced for
eating the food containing the vitamin. Rozin says, “In spite of experiments by Harris et al. (1933) and
Scott and Verney (1947) demonstrating something like this, the conflict with basic learning principles was
too great to convince psychologists that some specific hungers were learned” (Rozin, 1976, p. 40).
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specialization and specific, penetrable modules (Rozin, 1976). He provided a feasible mechanism
for the effect.
As argued by Revusky, (1977, p. 62), Garcia’s results were “too threatening to bear” and
“…there certainly was an atmosphere of fear of obsolescence on the part of many concerned with
animal learning, and I conjecture that it was a factor in suppressing a new discovery.” Garcia’s
work may have appeared to undermine the establishment insofar as it made the educational and
methodological investments of the older generation of mainstream learning theorists seem
obsolete, not to mention the high prestige enjoyed by its leading practitioners. In this period,
figures such as Skinner were world famous, and regarded as authorities across a wide range of
domains, including child rearing, pedagogy, industrial psychology, and cultivating societal wellbeing and success. Rozin (1969, p. 421), who was one of the first to recognize the undeniable
revolutionary implications of Garcia’s work, says,

While the notion of specialized long-delay learning mechanisms as a consequence of natural
selection is very appealing to biologists (after all, there is every reason to assume that special
types of learning can be selected for by special environmental pressures), such an idea has been
somewhat offensive to psychologists, whose experimental data and theories highlight the
critical importance of close temporal contiguity between CS and US.

A challenge to the ideas that behavior is malleable in any direction and training requires contiguity
and repetition was heretical, and threatened to undermine entrenched beliefs and practices.
Revusky (1977, p. 64) says,
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(1) When the Garcia effect was finally recognized, Paul Rozin was invited to address the
convention of the American Psychological Association about it instead of John Garcia. (2) In
1967 and in 1968, with only one or two published papers on food aversion learning, I was
invited to contribute chapters to two prestigious volumes on learning instead of Garcia. (3) The
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, which regularly prints a list of its guest
reviewers, has never, as far as I know, asked Garcia to review a paper for it in spite of
publishing many papers in taste aversion learning. Indeed, as I remember, Garcia told me in
1974 that he had only been asked once to review a paper for a journal of the American
Psychological Association.6

In addition, it’s not unlikely that Garcia suffered marginalization from being a firstgeneration Spanish-American (Skagit Valley Herald, 2013). This is another way in which he may
have been perceived as an outsider, during a time when there were no prominent Hispanic
psychologists. Rozin recalls that some of his colleagues went to visit Garcia at his office, and
thought he was the janitor (personal communication, June 2021). Ian Lubek mentioned to me that
one editor saw Garcia as a “Chicano outsider” (personal communication, June 2021). Lubek and
Apfelbaum (1987, p. 79) also report hearing some other similar anecdotes, though present no view
on the matter given the lack of systematic data about whether any of the resistance to Garcia’s
results was due to bias.

6

By this time, Garcia had completed his PhD, without which he ordinarily would have been legitimately
disqualified from those kinds of assignments, such as acting as a peer reviewer or writing chapters for
anthologies.
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4. Acceptance
In 1978, Garcia was elected to the highly prestigious Society of Experimental Psychologists and
was the recipient of the 44th H. C. Warren Medal for Outstanding Research in Psychology (Lubek
& Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 59). Even while Garcia’s papers continued to be rejected by mainstream
journals, including the APA’s JCPP, the APA awarded him the Distinguished Scientific
Contribution Award in 1979 (Lubek & Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 59). His acceptance speech appeared
in print in the APA’s American Psychologist, which, at the time, was “the most widely distributed
mainstream psychology journal” (Lubek & Apfelbaum, 1987, p. 60; though this is a bit misleading,
since all members of the APA received a copy of this journal). By 1983, Garcia was elected to the
National Academy of Sciences. Paul Rozin reported to me in personal communication that Estes
admitted that his rejection of Garcia’s 1966 papers was the biggest mistake he ever made as an
editor of JCPP. So what was the turning point?
While behaviorist learning theorists thought the effect might be an artefact—given that it
was one study from an unknown person—it was confirmed within the next five years by respected
psychologists Paul Rozin (Rozin, 1969; Rozin & Kalat, 1971), Martin Seligman (1970), and Sara
Shettleworth (1972). Notably, all of these psychologists are from a generation younger than
Garcia, Bitterman, and Estes. I would conjecture that their youth, and therefore relative lack of
theoretical entrenchment, played a role in their ability to hear out the novel findings. As Kuhn
(1970, pp. 301-302) quotes Max Planck: “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing
its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and
a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”
While Garcia’s work showed that contiguity and repetition were not necessary for all
conditioned learning, Leon Kamin’s work showed that contiguity and repetition is not sufficient
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for learning. Kamin (1969) showed that a classically conditioned association between a CS (tone)
and a US (shock) blocks an animal’s learning of an association between a second CS (light) and
the same US (shock) when the second CS is presented following the first CS. He began by training
rats to press a lever for food. Then, tone and shock were presented, and fear was conditioned to
the tone, and this suppressed the lever-pressing for food. But when a both a tone and a light were
presented paired with a shock, the rats did not learn to associate the light with the shock, i.e. the
light on its own did not suppress the lever-pressing. Kamin concluded that the previous
conditioning of fear to the tone blocked the conditioning of fear to the light. In other words, two
stimuli presented contiguously to one another repeatedly is not enough for an animal to form an
association between a second CS (light) and the US (shock). The tone already makes the animal
expect shock. So when the shock is presented with both the light and the tone, the occurrence of
the shock is not surprising enough for the animal to form a new association between the light and
the shock. Thus the animal does not present the conditioned fear response to the light.
Robert Rescorla furthered Kamin’s findings. He showed that the change in the association
between a CS and an US depends on how surprising the US is—to what extent the animal doesn’t
predict the US. Animals only learn associations when those associations violate their expectations.
In Rescorla’s (1968) conditioning study, different control groups of rats each had a fixed chance
of being shocked in the presence of a CS when lever-pressing for food, and fear was conditioned
to the CS in each of these groups. The experimental groups had a fixed chance of being shocked
in the presence of the CS, but also had a chance of being shocked without the CS. For the
experimental groups, the CS was not associated with shock—i.e. there was no conditioned fear
response to the CS—since shock occurred whether or not the CS was present. Again, the results
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showed that contiguity was not sufficient for conditioning. If the animal doesn’t predict a US based
on a contiguous CS, then the animal does not learn to associate the CS with the US.
During this time, too, the Brelands famously established Animal Behavior Enterprises, a
business in which they conditioned behaviors in various animals using operant conditioning
techniques. Behaviors were conditioned across a wide range of animals, from reindeer to whales,
and were exhibited at zoos, storefronts, fairs, on television shows, and in commercials. Rabbits
and ducks were conditioned to play the piano. Cats were conditioned to dial an old telephone. And,
by accident, chickens were conditioned to turn on a jukebox and dance:

In the attempt to create quite another type of demonstration which required a chicken simply
to stand on a platform for 12-15 seconds, we found that over 50% developed a very strong and
pronounced scratch pattern, which tended to increase in persistence as the time interval was
lengthened… However, we were able to change our plans so as to make use of the scratch
pattern, and the result was the “dancing chicken” exhibit… (Breland & Breland, 1961, p. 682)

This venture, although successful, taught that operantly conditioned animals will sometimes revert
to their instinctual behaviors. Some behaviors could simply not be operantly conditioned, namely,
those contrary to a species’ instincts. For example, they attempted to condition a raccoon to pick
up coins and deposit them in a “piggy bank.” Raccoons are relatively easy to condition, but the
Brelands encountered a problem. First, they conditioned the raccoon to pick up the coin, then the
metal container was introduced into which the raccoon had to drop the coin to get his reward.
However, “he seemed to have a great deal of trouble letting go of the coin. He would rub it up
against the inside of the container, pull it back out, and clutch it firmly for several seconds… he
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would finally turn it loose and receive his food reinforcement” (ibid.). When they tried to condition
the raccoon to pick up two coins and put them in the container, things got even worse:

Not only could he not let go of the coins, but he spent seconds, even minutes, rubbing them
together (in a most miserly fashion), and dipping them into the container. He carried on this
behavior to such an extent that the practical application we had in mind—a display featuring a
raccoon putting money in a piggy bank—simply was not feasible. The rubbing behavior
became worse and worse as time went on, in spite of nonreinforcement. (ibid.)

In other words, some animals are contra-prepared to learn certain associations. This called the
Pavlovian principle that all perceptible stimuli are equally malleable into question, as did Garcia’s
work. Regarding the assumptions of traditional learning theory, Keller Breland and Marian
Breland (1961, p. 684) concluded:

Three of the most important of these tacit assumptions seem to us to be: that the animal comes
to the laboratory as a virtual tabula rasa, that species differences are insignificant, and that
all responses are about equally conditionable to all stimuli. It is obvious, we feel, from the
foregoing account, that these assumptions are no longer tenable. After 14 years of continuous
conditioning and observation of thousands of animals, it is our reluctant conclusion that the
behavior of any species cannot be adequately understood, predicted, or controlled without
knowledge of its instinctive patterns, evolutionary history, and ecological niche.

Furthermore, Martin Seligman, who was rising to fame for his work on learned helplessness
(Seligman & Maier, 1967)—and would later serve as the president of the APA—was enthusiastic
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about Garcia’s work. In a 1970 Psychological Review article, “On the generality of the laws of
learning”, which was read by both Garcia and Rozin in manuscript, Seligman criticizes
equipotentiality. He cites Garcia’s work five times (more than any other author), details and
defends Garica and Koelling’s (1966) findings at length (pp. 409-410), using the work of Rozin
(1967, 1968), amongst others, to show that the Garcia effect is indeed “remarkable.” He also cites
Breland and Breland (1966) as challenging the “general process view of learning” (Seligman,
1970, p. 408)—insofar as they demonstrate the contra-preparedness of animals to learn specific
conditioned associations that go against what is evolutionarily advantageous to them. He sums up
the ideas under his “preparedness continuum:”

organisms are prepared to associate certain events, unprepared for some, and contraprepared
for others. A review of data from the traditional learning paradigms shows that the assumption
of equivalent associability is false: in classical conditioning, rats are prepared to associate
tastes with illness even over very long delays of reinforcement, but are contraprepared to
associate tastes with footshock. In instrumental training, pigeons acquire key pecking in the
absence of a contingency between pecking and grain (prepared), while cats, on the other hand,
have trouble learning to lick themselves to escape, and dogs do not yawn for food (contraprepared).

Shortly thereafter, Seligman and Joanne Hager included four of Garcia’s papers in their seminal
1972 volume Biological Boundaries of Learning. Garcia is clearly the star in this volume, and
listed amongst names like Jean Piaget and Edward Thorndike. This certainly gave Garcia’s work
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a professional boost. As a result of all of this, learning theorists were forced to accept that animals
are biologically prepared and contra-prepared to learn certain associations.
There is evidence that Garcia’s work surfaced even prior to this, however. Sara Shettleworth,
also an author included in Seligman and Hager’s (1972) volume, and frequently cited alongside
Garcia, notes that profound intellectual changes were beginning to take place during her first year
in graduate school in the Psychology department at the University of Pennsylvania, presumably
1966.7 Shettleworth (2010) says:

My first year in grad school (at the University of Pennsylvania) coincided with the
appearance of a handful of seminal findings that would deeply change how we think about
‘animal learning’ and its relationship to the rest of behavioral biology. The most important
was the ‘Garcia effect’…

There was a general shift taking place away from behaviorist animal learning principles. The
idea that animals are completely malleable to make conditioned associations was put into question
by the ethology movement that was taking place in Europe. Ethologists emphasized the instinctual
nature of species’ behaviors as prepared by evolution by natural selection. Karl von Frisch,
Nikolaas Tinbergen, and Konrad Lorenz won the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for
“discoveries concerning organization and elicitation of individual and social behaviour patterns”
(Nobel Media AB, 2021). Lorenz’s (1937) work investigating the mechanisms of imprinting, for

7

Shettleworth would have begun her graduate studies at Penn before 1967 (she transferred to the University
of Toronto in 1967)—so presumably in 1966. Interestingly, Seligman, now at Penn, also received his
Psychology Ph.D. from Penn, and Rozin was teaching in the Psychology department beginning in 1963.
Though the two knew each other, they did not suspect each other of working on it, and happened to both
replicate Garcia’s findings unbeknownst to each other. Bolles (1993, p. 341) points out that Kamin,
Seligman, and Rescorla were all students of Richard Solomon who was at Penn for many years.
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example, made famous that a gosling will form an attachment to the first large moving thing it sees
upon hatching, rather than to its mother. This demonstrated that animals can be pre-prepared to
learn certain associations, at least during the critical period after birth, and is also an example of
one-shot learning—not unlike Garcia’s rats that experienced only one pairing between taste and
illness and formed an association. Although there was no temporal gap, Lorenz’s work called into
question the core assumption of learning theory that repetition or constant conjunction is necessary
to form a conditioned association.
A more speculative factor that contributed to the acceptance of Garcia’s work was the
broader shift happening in the sciences of the mind. At the same time Garcia was publishing, the
cognitive revolution was taking place (Neisser, 1967; Gardner, 1987). One might even argue that
he was active in its precipitation. Fields such as artificial intelligence and cybernetics were
providing a vocabulary for internal processes. Garcia and Garcia y Robertson (1985, p. 191) even
mention George Miller’s (1956) The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two on memory span
as demonstrating a “psychobiological” fact about humans. Miller’s work proved that there are
ways to observe and measure inner states. Rozin (1976) was developing a modular mechanism for
the Garcia effect in terms of ‘programs’ and ‘circuits’. Noam Chomsky’s (1959) review of
Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behavior was a general critique of the behaviorist position, and laid the
foundation for his later (1980) “poverty of the stimulus” argument—that language learning
required domain-specific resources, and that the mind supplied structure to learning beyond the
surface form of linguistic inputs.8 It is clear that the intellectual landscape was changing within

8

Chomsky was also at the University of Pennsylvania. Rozin is still there. Rescorla was there before leaving
for Yale, where he trained Garcia’s collaborator Robert Koelling, and then later went back to Penn.
Although Rozin didn’t know Seligman was working on it at the time, these close institutional ties between
the key players involved in the reception of Garcia’s work is noteworthy. Perhaps there was a shared attitude
of openness for the new frontier amongst them.
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the United States towards recognition of internal cognitive states and processes. There was a new
emphasis on inner representations, and also on innate mental structures (as opposed to the tabula
rasa view). Both of these ideas conflicted with the behaviorist paradigm.
It seems likely that the development of computing and information storage provided a
language and framework for understanding cognitive processes. We can see this in Seligman’s
work, for example. He argues for a “cognitive representation” between stimulus and response, and
refers to training contingencies as “information” (Seligman, 1975, p. 47). Similarly, Rescorla
started talking about the changing representation of an US during the course of extinction
(Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978).
Within animal studies, computational language may have been less popular, but there was
nevertheless a move towards thinking about cognition rather than just conditioned behavior.
Shettleworth (2010) says that the traditional animal learning theory broadened in scope to include
new problems that concern the previously-set-aside cognition, while also becoming more
specialized:

The biggest change has been the transformation of ‘animal learning’ into the contemporary
interdisciplinary study of comparative cognition. Of course this has happened along with
tremendous changes in all the rest of the biological and cognitive sciences, including the
development of cognitive psychology and neuroscience, behavioral ecology, and genetic and
evolutionary studies of behavior. There continue to be worthwhile research programs on
limited problems confined to single fields, but unlike the days when the study [sic.] nonhuman
species was kind of a backwater in psychology, it seems to me a broad integrative approach to
cognition and behavior is very much in the atmosphere.
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In other words, the behaviorist paradigm of animal learning theory, once restricted by classical
and operant conditioning methodologies, expanded to include cognition. However, Shettleworth
insists that the Garcia effect had nothing at all to do with the cognitive revolution (personal
communication, June 2021). But this could be a product of professional divisions, given she left
the University of Pennsylvania, and her specific focus on animal studies, whereas the cognitive
revolution was focused on humans. Rozin, on the other hand, believes that Jerry Fodor’s (1983)
Modularity of Mind reveals a correspondence between the cognitive revolution and what Garcia
was doing in psychology (personal communication, June 2021). Even before Fodor’s seminal
book, Rozin suggested that Garcia discovered a module or functional “program” that works to
solve a specific problem (Rozin, 1976)—namely, learning to avoid foods that cause
gastrointestinal upset.
Any reference to belief, expectation, or anticipation had been dismissed from behavioral
learning theory, which, again, worked according to the assumption that there were no intervening
states between stimulus and response. Exposure to these various new theoretical developments
may have made Garcia’s results more palatable. These researchers were preparing a groundwork
for the revolutionary view in psychology that learners are the products of evolution by natural
selection, and thus adapted and predisposed to respond differently to different stimuli, and can
store information about stimuli without emitting an immediate response.
Garcia’s results were unjustly dismissed. The ideas developing during this time, however,
enabled the Garcia effect to be taken up along with the broader story that there was more to learning
than simple association between stimuli, namely, there were intervening states that impacted
whether and how an animal can learn. The Brelands’ widespread impact opened the way for the
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ideas that there are biological constraints on animal learning and that conditioning isn’t a simple
associative phenomenon, but rather is more cognitive and involves predictive anticipation.
Seligman’s endorsement, along with replications demonstrating the taste-aversion effect gave
Garcia’s ideas professional respectability, enabling his work to be widely recognized, accepted,
and ultimately celebrated.
I would suggest that rather than one theory displacing another, Garcia’s novel experimental
procedures wedded the traditional behaviorist learning and ethological paradigms of research. It
did not lead to the abandonment of classical and operant conditioning, but only overturned the
imperialism of their central principles of learning: (1) repetition, (2) contiguity, and (3) stimulus
equipotentiality. Prior to the celebration of Garcia’s work, Barry Schwartz (1974, pp. 183-184), in
his review of Seligman and Hager’s Biological Boundaries of Learning, said:

Ethology and the experimental analysis of behavior are both fundamentally concerned with the
origins of adaptive behavior, and they should be able to contribute to each other’s development.
Fortunately, a rapidly growing set of laboratory observations over the last few years may
provide the basis for a new dialogue between ethologists and psychologists. These observations
suggest a significant contribution by species-specific behavioral characteristics to the
phenomena obtained within the context of the experimental analysis, and help bridge the
methodological gap by providing a substantial data base for the interconnection of ethological
principles with the principles derived from the experimental analysis.

Schwartz (1974, p. 185) says that the “hallmark study” in this area is Garcia and Koelling’s (1966)
study on taste-aversion learning, which demonstrated differential associability and the biological
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preparedness of associations. Garcia used learning theory’s experimental analysis to demonstrate
an ethological principle: that organisms have evolved to associate illness stimuli selectively with
gustatory and olfactory stimuli—the modalities used to sense food. Garcia’s ideas brought with
them the ethological merit of recognizing there was more to the objective picture of learning
behavior than classically and operantly conditioned associations. In Seligman’s (1970) article, he
speculated that the laws of learning vary with the organisms degree of biological preparedness for
an association. In James Gould and Peter Marler’s (1987, p. 4) letter in Scientific American, they
argue that Garcia’s work was a “severe blow” to the Skinnerian behaviorist paradigm, and
“welcome the new synthesis that is now developing between ethology and modern psychology.”
This is a reply to James Todd’s (1987) letter, which recognizes that Watson and Skinner were more
open to instinct than appears to surface, and argues that behaviorism has earned its keep, and that
the synthesis is occurring between behaviorism and ethology. Indeed, through Garcia’s
experimental results, the behaviorist’s experimentalist tactic merged with principles of ethology.
But also the two core principles of behaviorist learning theory—that conditioning required
contiguity and repetition—were rejected in light of the Garcia effect.

5. Conclusion
As in the cases of continental drift and the germ theory of disease, Garcia was not an expert in the
field that his work revolutionized. In fact, when he first made the observation that landed him his
hypothesis, he was without a Ph.D., was working as an assistant at a naval research laboratory, and
was not trained in traditional learning theory (Revusky, 1977, p. 62)
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The case of Garcia demonstrates that theories on the margins can suddenly become embraced
due to transformations of thought in adjacent subfields that make the marginalized theory more
welcome. I support Garcia’s ‘neophobia’ interpretation. Mainstream learning theorists resisted
Garcia’s results because his results were unexpected and new: they contradicted central tenets of
mainstream learning theory. It is not just that Garcia was ahead of his time. His findings clashed
with his times, and the intellectual environment needed to evolve, under other pressures, before a
receptive audience could be found. For younger researchers with less entrenched ideas, Garcia’s
break from behaviorist orthodoxy seems to have met with less resistance, and their efforts to extend
his work with more professional polish clearly made a crucial difference. Garcia’s rejection of
behaviorist assumptions in 1966 produced only a trickle of citations initially, mostly from
emerging researchers, but, with their endorsements and extensions, the following decade would
see a steady rise of interest, and by 1980, Garcia was recognized as a trailblazer.
Mainstream learning theorists suffered from theory-entrenchment to the extent that they
generally failed to acknowledge evidence that ran counter to their theoretical expectations. As
Revusky (1977, p. 54) put it in his case study of M. E. Bitterman’s resistance to Garcia’s results,
“If a need to disbelieve radically new findings which extends far beyond rational conservatism can
be demonstrated in one leading scientist, it becomes tenable to suppose that similar needs are
common among influential scientists and tend to interfere with scientific progress.” This
supposition is especially tempting given the alignments with the cases of continental drift and the
germ theory of disease, but further investigation into the various episodes of theory-change in the
history of science is required to establish it.
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CHAPTER FOUR

A new plea for tolerance in matters epistemological1

1. Introduction
Several further examples of initially-rejected fringe theories becoming mainstream make it clear
that the silencing and dismissal of fringe theories can sometimes delay scientific advancements.
While the number of such cases may come as an unwelcome surprise, it is uncontested that fringe
theories do sometimes break their way into orthodoxy (cf. Friedlander, 1998). Nevertheless, that
is not taken as a reason for tolerance towards the fringe—at least not in post-Kuhnian or ‘secondwave’ science studies. As Carl Sagan (1974, p. 75) famously put it, “They laughed at Fulton, they
laughed at Columbus, but they also laughed at Bozo the Clown.” There are reasons for the
marginalization of the fringe that have been thought to outweigh the benefits of tolerance. In
addition to the scientific reasons for silencing the fringe, tolerating fringe theories is said to cause
various harms, especially physiological, environmental or ecological, and sociopolitical harms.
However, silencing the fringe inadvertently exacerbates the risk of those harms occurring.
Silencing begets mistrust. This deepens fringe convictions and undermines productive dialogue—
a vicious cycle that leads only to increasingly aggressive silencing. I argue that our hostility
towards fringe theories is misdirected, and that such energies can be reserved for the subset of
fringe theories constructed with the intention of fraud or harm. Against Sagan, we should
remember that Bozo the Clown wanted to be a clown; no serious fringe theorist wants to be a
Inspired by Feyerabend’s (1963) “How to be a good empiricist—a plea for tolerance in matters
epistemological”.
1
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pseudoscientist. If we take inductive argumentation seriously, as we clearly do in mainstream
science, then we would be wise to question the inference in Sagan’s quip. Fringe theories
developed around uncharted anomalies do—with striking regularity—become mainstream. That
is not to say that most do or ever will, if science were left to run its course, but it is enough to
conclude that corrections are required. Following Feyerabend, I advocate the virtue of tolerance
towards fringe theories. I identify the best scientific reasons for the marginalization of fringe
theories and show that, even in the hardest cases, these reasons are inadequate and interfere with
our interests in advancing our understanding and making progress towards wellbeing.
The marginalization or exclusion of perspectives departing from prevailing scientific
orthodoxy is disadvantageous not only to the proponents of such perspectives, but to the scientific
enterprise itself and its dependent public. This affects all of us, including active marginalizers—
individuals or groups who invest their resources into keeping fringe theorists silent and their
theories impotent, or who explicitly and publicly deride unorthodox theories.

2. What is Marginalization?
Marginalization is a silencing process that restricts an individual’s or group’s access to the rights,
privileges, opportunities, social engagements, resources, and powers that are normally and
normatively available to researchers. This work leads to the condition of being marginalized. When
an alternative theory is publicly denounced as pseudoscience or its proponents as crackpots it has
a silencing effect, which leads to disempowerment and disenfranchisement with regards to
directing funded research and affecting the public. It also leads to alienation from the scientific
community. Marginalization stagnates or delays a young theory’s development by encouraging
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the scientific community’s negligence towards it. Continental mobilism was for practical purposes
heresy amongst academics throughout the first half of the 20th century, and young scientists were
discouraged from exploring it. This led to significant delays in the theory’s maturation.
Developments to marginalized theories tend to come about randomly and incidentally, or thanks
to the few individual mavericks who invest their own resources into a fringe theory’s development.
The discovery of the rift in the mid-ocean ridge just so happened to support mobilism by
corroborating the seafloor spreading hypothesis. Had continental drift and the corollary seafloorspreading hypothesis been taken seriously amongst mainstream scientists from the get-go, the
discovery of this rift valley might have been more forthcoming.
Marginalization is effectively supported by those who wield power and have a credible voice.
Examples of active marginalizers include various members of the scientific community, such as
physicist Michael Friedlander, psychologist Barry Beyerstein, the doctors of quackwatch.org, and
philosopher-biologist and demarcation problem revivalist Massimo Pigliucci. We also find active
marginalizers facing the public sphere, including, for example, popular scientists like Martin
Gardner, Richard Dawkins, and biologist-blogger Jerry Coyne, but also journalists like Michael
Shermer. Historians and sociologists on the whole seem to have more interesting things to say
about the fringe than to directly promote their marginalization, though it is also not in their project
to advocate or promote more tolerance towards the fringe in their study of science (cf. Gordin,
2021).
Editors also play a significant role in marginalization by refusal to publish unorthodox ideas,
but perhaps even more so by promoting and publishing the work of active marginalizers. We also
frequently see news outlets with alarmist headlines, using localized cases in which harm is being
done and drawing out implications for fringe theories broadly: “The Antiscience Movement Is
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Escalating, Going Global and Killing Thousands” (Hotez, 2021) and “Pseudoscience is taking
over social media – and putting us all at risk” (Vijaykumar, 2019).
Social media platforms also promote silencing of fringe theories. Fringe theorists can be
banned from Twitter, and YouTube reserves the right to remove videos that violate their policies,
especially those that lead to harm, such as “fake cures” for COVID-19 (Olsen, 2021). At the same
time, YouTube’s CPO, Neal Mohan, recognizes that tech companies making decisions about
where to draw the line between information and misinformation is problematic:

Removals are a blunt instrument, and if used too widely, can send a message that controversial
ideas are unacceptable. We’re seeing disturbing new momentum around governments ordering
the takedown of content for political purposes… And I personally believe we’re better off as a
society when we can have an open debate. One person’s misinfo is often another person’s
deeply held belief, including perspectives that are provocative, potentially offensive, or even
in some cases, include information that may not pass a fact checker’s scrutiny. (Olsen, 2021)

Platforms for making science public also play a role in silencing fringe ideas under the guise of
curation. The media organization TED (for ‘Technology, Entertainment, Design’) has banned
some of the independent ‘TEDx’ talks from their webpage and YouTube channel for the reason
that they conflict with mainstream views. The official guidelines for TEDx talks state that scientific
claims promulgated on a TEDx stage should “Have been published in a peer-reviewed, respected
journal,” “Be based on theories that are also considered credible by experts in the field,” “Not fly
in the face of the broad existing body of scientific knowledge,” and “Be presented by a speaker
who has the right scientific qualifications,” and should not “Be considered ridiculous by credible
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scientists in the field” (TED, n.d.). It should be clear from the previous three chapters that these
are not good criteria for silencing, since continental mobilism, the germ theory of disease, and
conditioned taste aversion all once failed to meet these criteria. According to these guidelines, a
novel theory whose development has already been thwarted by gatekeeping procedures like peerreview can’t make the stage. This further counteracts productive discourse that might shed light
on a theory’s promise. That TED reserves the right to ban a talk as pseudoscience for the reason
that credible scientists consider the fringe theory presented to be ridiculous also reinforces the
transmission of mainstream scientific theories to the public as uncontestable dogma. TED is aware,
however, that what scientists count as science today might not count as science tomorrow, and we
should be optimistic that they note that their guidelines are likely to change as the course of science
changes.
Unconscious factors also play a role in effecting marginalization, such as collective attitudes
of neophobia or xenophobia, and institutional systems and policies that solidify theoryentrenchment. This can lead to self-censorship. Consider that fringe theorists whose views depart
from scientific orthodoxy do not have the right to create entries for their theories on Wikipedia
without explicitly mentioning the theory’s pseudoscientific status. This single policy against the
fringe has a global impact: Wikipedia has been in the top 20 most widely viewed websites in the
world since 2007. Given the silencing effect of the derogation ‘pseudoscience’ and its cognates, a
fringe theorist is discouraged from even creating an entry.
The exclusion of fringe proponents from various social engagements stifles the growth and
development of fringe theories. Many fringe theorists lack an institutional affiliation (academic,
medical, governmental, etc.), and for the reason that they have unconventional views. This
prevents the productive conversation that can happen between colleagues, to be sure, but also leads
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to other disadvantages, like material deprivation. Working privately involves privately obtaining
financial support. Consider Harvard-dropout Frank Bursley Taylor, a proponent of continental
mobilism contemporary to Alfred Wegener, whose private funding enabled him to publicly
maintain his position while also becoming the expert on the Great Lakes. It is rare for an academy
to continue supporting a fringe theorist, but it does happen. Peter Duesberg of the HIV-AIDS
denialist camp has managed to maintain his post at UC Berkeley. Alien enthusiast Abraham “Avi”
Loeb failed to interest NASA in funding his research into UFOs, but was able to secure private
funding from Silicon Valley’s Harvard alum Eugene Jhong. Loeb has since unleashed the Galileo
Project in the spirit of the fringe, and has even enlisted some ufologists to help with the project.
These efforts have been controversial:

…[Some scientists] say Loeb is tarnishing astronomy and undermining the search for
extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) just as that effort has started to acquire a veneer of
respectability. In particular, [scientists] are bothered by the outspoken UFO zealots with no
science background whom Loeb has welcomed into the project. “He’s intermingled
legitimate scientists with these fringe people,” says Caleb Scharf, an astrobiologist at
Columbia University. “I think you lose far more by doing that.” (Kloor, 2022)

If the veneer of prestige is what he has sacrificed for inclusivity, then Loeb is a hero of science,
and he maintains his distinguished position at Harvard University. Lately he indulges other fringe
theories as well, such as panspermia. In Loeb’s case, this hypothesis involves the transfer of life
from Earth to other planetary systems (Siraj & Loeb, 2020), while the panspermia hypothesis more
traditionally involves the transfer of life to Earth from other planetary systems (discussed below).

78

The lack of an institutional affiliation also limits participation in conferences during which
pertinent knowledge is exchanged. Given this alienation, fringe theorists often host their own
conferences and engagements, deepening epistemic and social divisions. Consider, for example,
the Ozark Mountain UFO Conference that has been meeting since 1988, or the conventions hosted
by members of the International Flat Earth Research Society since 1956. This lack of integration
begets distrust between groups. Mainstream researchers and leading institutions like NASA ought
to be in open dialogue with flat-earthers. There should be a yearly conference. Careful attention
and honest response to the concerns of flat-earth theorists would reduce the hostility that breeds
the various conspiracy theories sometimes used to defend flat-earth theories. Successful dialogue
might actually be revelatory—perhaps there really is a noteworthy anomaly behind all the fuss,
whether or not that means the earth is flat—and we might even discover that not all flat-earth
theories are laughably stupid, founded on paranoia, and actually posit a flat earth. Creating venues
that encourage understanding, humility, and conversation between fringe and mainstream
researchers could certainly moderate mutual hostilities. Silencing practices, on the other hand, can
only exacerbate hostilities.
The education pipeline also promotes silencing of alternative theories. Institutions with the
highest prestige breed theory-entrenched experts with unvarying methods. These in turn are the
people called in by journals for peer review. They are also the people who secure funding
institutionally or through grants so that their research prevails. Given the need to get tenure, young
researchers are especially discouraged from pursuing alternative theories. I plead with Feyerabend:

This, I think, is the most decisive argument against any method that encourages uniformity, be
it now empirical or not... It enforces an unenlightened conformism, and speaks of truth; it leads
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to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities, of the power of imagination, and speaks of deep
insight; it destroys the most precious gift of the young, their tremendous power of imagination,
and speaks of education. (Feyerabend, 1963, in Cover & Curd, 1998, p. 922)

3. Marginalization is pervasive
The frequency with which marginalized fringe theories become mainstream may come as a
surprise. Indeed, a fringe theory becoming mainstream is by no means exceptional. This is not to
deny that many, if not most, fringe theories are either still fringe, or have been lost and forgotten.
Here I show that the marginalization of theorists with promising but unorthodox views has been
pervasive. I focus on three groups that tend to experience marginalization: (1) fringe scientists, (2)
women, and (3) indigenous peoples. We might find a similar trend of marginalization for other
individuals and groups, such as psychiatric patients and underrepresented ethnic or racial groups.

3.1. Fringe scientists
The marginalized unorthodox theorists that succeed in breaking their way into the mainstream are
often degreed scientists with expertise in domains adjacent to the domain of their proposed
theories. This lack of specialized expertise clearly contributes to their marginalization.
Few theorists who entirely lack professional scientific degrees ever actually succeed in
changing mainstream discourse. One might point to Gregor Mendel (1822-1884), who had a
university education but was only a monk when he ran his revolutionary experiments on peas
demonstrating principles of heredity, which were neglected until after his death. That said, in the
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mid-19th century, there were few doctoral degrees anywhere other than Germany, and most notable
scientists gained their expertise through apprenticeship.
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) might be considered a better example of a nonexpert. Privileged
and upper-class though he was, the teenage Darwin flunked out of medicine at the reputed
University of Edinburgh. At the age of 20, his father enrolled him at Cambridge University, by
which he was awarded a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1831. This degree qualified Darwin for
priesthood—and to be gentleman’s companion to Captain Robert FitzRoy (1805-1865) on board
the Beagle, which set sail at the tail end of the year Darwin was awarded his degree. FitzRoy
regretfully reported of his first Beagle voyage that “no person in the vessel was skilled in
mineralogy, or at all acquainted with geology” and that he only wished that there had been
someone with the “talent and experience required for such scientific researches, of which we were
wholly destitute” (FitzRoy as quoted by King, 1836, p. 385, as quoted by van Wyhe, 2013, p. 3).2
Along the way, Darwin clearly impressed FitzRoy with an incomparable collection of natural
specimens, and the rest is history. With Darwin, we do have a case of an unqualified individual
without any scientific standing exceeding expectations, becoming the expert, and changing the
establishment.

2

To say that Darwin was the naturalist on board the Beagle was accepted without question until 1969, when
Jacob W. Gruber (1969) published his groundbreaking theory that Darwin’s supposed role as naturalist was
actually played by Robert McCormick (1800-1890), the Ship’s Surgeon. Since then, it has been variously
said that McCormick was aboard “for the express purpose of making natural history collections” as the
official naturalist (Burstyn, 1975, p. 62). There is currently little evidence to support this view, however,
from any report other than McCormick’s. Though it was commonplace for a Ship’s Surgeon to also play
the role of naturalist—an essential feature of Gruber’s original argument—it seems from FitzRoy’s
statement above that McCormick didn’t make the cut. A bit of a cantankerous curmudgeon (van Wyhe,
2013; also according to FitzRoy and Darwin; see Steel, 2011), though perhaps not for bad reasons (he was
clearly both underprivileged and undervalued; see Stone, 2020), McCormick tromped off the “small,
miserable…ten-gun brig” as an invalid as if to save his name (as quoted by Stone, 2020). He apparently
saved it quite well, deceiving historians up to Gruber, and even his first biographer (Keevil, 1943; as noted
by Stone, 2020).
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Consider another more recent case: that of Judith Rich Harris (1938-2018), who was
dismissed from her Ph.D. at Harvard for not demonstrating enough “originality and independence”
(Harris, 2006, p. 155). Although she did receive a Masters from Harvard before leaving, even this
wasn’t enough to assuage members of the scientific community when her provocative book The
Nurture Assumption hit the stands. In it, she provides extensive and compelling evidence that peers
have a bigger influence on a child’s behavior than parents—going against an entrenched
orthodoxy. Though some tried to discredit her, it was widely regarded to be a groundbreaking
book. Around the time of its release, she received the George A. Miller Award for a paper. George
Miller, ironically, was the one who signed the dismissal letter.
The demand for accreditation introduces a class dimension as well, and disadvantages people
in less affluent communities. A scientific degree affords a kind of privilege that is inaccessible to
many in the US, not to mention those abroad. A 2016 collection of articles in Nature asks “Is
science only for the rich?” and eight authors survey eight different countries in attempt to answer
the question. Nature says,

Researchers like to think that nothing matters in science except the quality of people’s work.
But the reality is that wealth and background matter a lot. Too few students from disadvantaged
backgrounds make it into science, and those who do often find that they are ill-prepared owing
to low-quality early education. (Nature, 2016, p. 466)

The most honest data appears to come from the United Kingdom, where the wealthy are
significantly over-represented in science and medicine. With class and country impacting
accessibility, scientific discourse can narrow, becoming an internal conversation of people with a
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similar pedigree. Those outside this conversation may be more likely to arrive at fresh
perspectives, but they are also less likely to obtain the degrees needed to be taken seriously.
At the other end of the spectrum, it must also be noted that marginalization is not restricted
to those who lack credentials. Even Nobel Laureates, while proposing unorthodox theories in their
domains of expertise, can still experience marginalization and fail to infiltrate the mainstream
despite their credibility. A 2016 volume of Skeptical Inquirer was titled “The Nobel Disease:
When Intelligence Fails to Protect against Irrationality”. One recent example of the Nobel Disease
is Luc Montagnier (1932-2022), who won his Nobel Prize for his co-discovery of HIV. Montagnier
now questions the efficacy of vaccines and conducts his research according to the theory of water
memory, which states that at high dilutions, water retains information of exactly what complex
molecules were dissolved in it. Water memory was originally developed by Jacques Beneveniste
(1935-2004) and was taken up enthusiastically by those practicing homeopathy. Rather than
wonder whether he’s onto something, colleagues think he went off the deep end. But the number
of Nobel Laureates who have since tied themselves to fringe theories suggests that there is a disease
that looms much larger than in the minds of distinguished individuals. One forgets that a number
of Nobel Laureates won their title because they tied themselves to fringe theories and lived long
enough to see their day. Consider two examples (I discuss one more, Barbara McClintock, in the
next subsection).

1. Peyton Rous’s 1911 discovery of the first tumor virus. Rous (1879-1970) was a virologist
whose Nobel Prize was won in 1966 for his discovery of the first tumor-causing virus
published way back in 1912 (Rous & Murphy, 1912). He showed that “some spontaneous
chicken tumors, to all appearances classical neoplasms, are actually started off and driven
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by viruses which determine their forms as well” (Nobel Media, n.d.). The idea that cancer
could be transmitted by a virus was rejected by experts in pathology and virology, and
Rous, then a newcomer to pathology, lacked credibility, and, given the lack of
encouragement, he stopped working on trying to isolate the virus (for an thorough
treatment of this case that suggests that Rous’s ideas could not be incorporated into medical
theory before 1950, see Becsei-Kilborn, 2010).

2. Barry Marshall and Robin Warren’s 1984 theory that stomach ulcers are caused by
bacteria. The medical community dismissed Marshall’s research for years. Yet, the
bacterium H. pylori has been confirmed as the major cause of stomach ulcers, and can
typically be treated with antibiotics. To corroborate his claim, he drank H. pylori,
developed ulcers, and then cured his ulcers with antibiotics. Both Marshall and Warren
were awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2005—two decades after their
original proposal (Marshall & Warren, 1984).

There are also cases of scientists with fringe views who have been bypassed for Nobel Prizes.
Consider Fred Hoyle (1915-2001), who was involved in a prize-winning discovery, but not named
as a prize recipient.

3. Fred Hoyle’s 1954 hypothesis for the origin of heavy elements. Hoyle (1946; 1954)
proposed nucleosynthesis, namely, that the heavy elements were synthesized in stars. For
this to work, he calculated that carbon must exist inside stars in an unknown state of the
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isotope of carbon-12 (the 7.65 MeV state) in order for nucleosynthesis of the elements to
occur. Hoyle’s path to discovery was unconventional:

If [the 7.65 MeV state] did not exist, Hoyle reasoned, the universe would contain no
carbon. And if there was no carbon, there would be no human beings. Thus Hoyle was
saying – and nobody had ever used logic as outrageous as this before – that the mere
fact he was alive and pondering the question of carbon was proof the 7.65 MeV state
existed. (Marcus Chown, 1999, as quoted by McKie, 2010).

Such reasoning was confirmed when E. Margaret Burbidge (1919-2020) and her colleagues
(1957), including Hoyle, found the 7.65 MeV state of carbon. Still, Hoyle remained on the
fringe for his refusal to accept the big bang theory (which he named; Horgan, 2020), and,
as detailed below, for his controversial astrobiology work with Wickramasinghe (1977)
that called Darwinian evolution into question. When a Nobel Prize was awarded to William
Fowler for related research, both Hoyle and Burbidge were passed over.

Hoyle’s status as a fringe scientist is also relevant to another case:

4. Chandra Wickramasinghe’s 1970s hypothesis that interstellar dust is mostly organic.
Wickramasinghe, along with astrophysicist Fred Hoyle (1977), claimed to have identified
complex organic molecules in space. The collaborators also claimed that many common
diseases have extraterrestrial origins (Wickramasinghe & Hoyle, 1979), hypothesized
interstellar and interplanetary insects, and proposed the panspermia hypothesis, which
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states that life has extraterrestrial origins. Many of these ideas came under attack by Robert
Ernest Davies (1919-1993) and his colleagues (1984), who gathered evidence to conclude
that the claims of identifying organic molecules in outer space made by Wickramasinghe
and Hoyle were unwarranted. One chemist wrote off their work as “shameless
pseudoscience” (Silver, 1998, p. 250). While most of these hypotheses are still fringe, there
is now substantial evidence recognized by the mainstream that corroborates the hypothesis
that complex organic molecules exist in interstellar dust. Indeed, just as Wickramasinghe
proposed, observations suggest that most of the molecules in space are organic (Klemperer,
2011). Furthermore, Howard et al. (2013) showed that biomass can be preserved in
meteorite impacts, thus keeping the panspermia hypothesis on the table.

In addition to these cases, many other degree-holding scientists have been marginalized because
their views depart from prevailing orthodoxy. Consider some more examples.

5. Wolfgang Wiltschko’s 1960s experiments demonstrating magnetoreception in nightmigrating songbirds. Perhaps still fringe in the popular imagination, and still lacking a
definitive mechanism in most species, magnetoreception has been demonstrated across
organisms from bacteria to humans. The case for human magnetoreception, pioneered by
R. Robin Baker beginning in 1976, is only just emerging from its fringe status thanks to
geophysicist Joseph Kirschvink (Hand, 2016). Kirschvink was among the scientists who
failed to replicate Baker’s human magnetoreception results in the 1980s (Jaekl, 2019), but
ultimately has corroborated the human magnetoreception hypothesis, for example, by
finding magnetite in the human brain (Kirschvink et al., 1992), and demonstrating the
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effects of earth-strength magnetic fields on human brain activity (Wang et al., 2019). Baker
stopped his investigations by the 1990s, and left academia in 1996, impacting research in
the area.

With this departure, the field lay fallow for years. But at least one investigator remained
intrigued. ‘We had no evidence of fraud, no evidence of fudging the data. It looked, for
intents and purposes, like a real effect. But we were unable to replicate it,’ Kirschvink
explained to me by phone. Indeed, Baker had laid down a foundation for the discovery
of human magnetoreception that, despite the many failed replication attempts, was too
strong to be ignored. Kirschvink aimed to transcend the problems dogging Baker’s
work with an entirely new, robust approach. (Jaekl, 2019)

This included a dismissal of Baker’s idea that dowsing is a related phenomenon, likely an
attempt to steer magnetoreception towards credibility (Kirschvink, 1985). Around the time
Baker got started, Carl Sagan (1979, p. 173) provided his oft-quoted and influential
“antidote for pseudoscience.” This was a series of scientific findings that not only ‘evoke
wonder’, but also have the “important virtue—to whatever extent the word has any
meaning—of being true” (Sagan, 1979, p. 176). His list includes pigeon sensitivity to
magnetic fields, but he took care to qualify magnetoreception as “a sensory modality
glimpsed by no human being who ever lived” (Sagan, 1979, p. 174). That was four decades
ago, when Kirschvink could safely claim that the status of magnetoreception in nonhuman
animals was beginning to change:
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For the past century or so, the study of magnetic effects on animals has been far from
the mainstream of biological research. Many active scientists have scornfully treated
this field as a pseudoscience at best, often with good reason. During the last 20 years,
however, a variety of discoveries have slowly but radically changed this status.
(Kirschvink, 1982, p. 160)

The first hypotheses that animals—namely, birds—can sense the Earth’s magnetic field for
directional orientation and navigation were proposed in the 19th century (von Middendorff,
1859; Viguier, 1882), and rejected as absurd and even magical. August Weismann (18341914; Newton & Weismann, 1879, p. 580) argued so in Nature:

…supposing it certain, that these young birds, which go forth alone, also actually find
the route of the species with the same certainty as if they had known it long before,
would these facts be explained by the supposition of magnetic sense? I think not. For
in that case, what must have been born with the young bird? Merely this magnetic
sense? i.e. the power of directly perceiving external direction in its own body? By no
means. There must also be born with the young bird the consciousness of what angle
to the magnetic meridian it must shape its flight at. But much more than this. It has long
been known that birds, so long as they are migrating over land, frequently alter their
direction; hence, supposing the young bird to be guided by a magnetic sense, there must
be born with it the tendency to fly (say) twenty miles at an angle of 45° to the magnetic
meridian, then 100 miles at an angle of 27°, and so on. That this is a physiological
absurdity, no one would deny.
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In other words, Weismann thinks that birds would have to be able to consciously calculate
their trajectories in order to track magnetic north, and positing such cognitive prowess
strikes him as absurd.
In the same entry, Alfred Newton (1829-1907; Newton & Weissman, 1879, p. 580)
claimed, “[I had] no need to declare my disbelief in Dr. von Middendorff’s magnetic
hypothesis… I considered it had been set at rest for ever by Prof. Baird…” This
conclusiveness reverberated into the 20th century, when investigating magnetoreception
was thought to be on par with investigating dowsing or telepathy (Hand, 2016). By the time
of Wiltschko’s revolutionary investigations in the 1960s, the magnetoreception hypothesis
had been quite properly excluded as an explanation for migratory activity. Failures to
experimentally demonstrate a behavioral response to changing magnetic fields—for
instance, by giving a carrier pigeon a magnet!—had by then accumulated (e.g. Casamajor,
1927; Stresemann, 1935; Griffin, 1952; Sauer, 1957; Perdeck, 1963; Wallraf, 1966).
Moreover, still no known mechanism could explain how magnetic field information could
be converted into electrical impulses detectable by a nervous system; not to mention that
the geomagnetic field—100,000 times weaker than a MRI—was thought to be too weak
for detection by any kind of biological equipment in the first place. According to Roswitha
Wiltschko and Wolfgang Wiltschko, “it was hard to believe that birds would have a sensory
capacity alien to us humans” (2021, p. 9). Birds also seemed to have no need to sense the
earth’s magnetic field, since the sun compass and nocturnal orientation by stars—both
discovered in the 1950s—could explain birds’ super-abilities. In 1966, Wiltschko, then a
doctoral student, along with his professor Friedrich Wilhelm “Fritz” Merkel (1911-2002),
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published results demonstrating that the migratory behavior of European robins (Erithacus
rubecula) was sensitive to a change in their surrounding magnetic field. Helmholtz coils
were used to deflect geomagnetic north, and the robins reoriented their migratory activity
accordingly. The claim that these night-migrating birds could orient themselves without
the help of stars was met with “great skepticism” (Wiltschko & Wiltschko, 2021, p. 9).

6. Franck Goddio’s 1990s underwater archaeological investigations and discovery of
Thonis-Heracleion in 2000. Goddio, a degreed statistician and once an economic adviser
to the United Nations, managed to get funding from the Hilti Foundation in 1996 to
undertake underwater archaeological investigations in Abukir Bay, a few miles off the
Egyptian shore. His search was inspired by Herodotus’s account of Thonis-Heracleion,
which many believed to be myth, and motivated by a 1933 report from a Royal Air Force
pilot who had seen conspicuous dark shadows in the water when flying over the bay
(Hodges, 2016). After three years of surveying the ocean floor using side-scan sonar and a
nuclear-resonance magnetometer and finding nothing, Goddio’s team finally discovered
the sunken city of legend (Robinson and Goddio, 2014). Several archaeologists declined
to attend a conference hosted by Oxford University on Goddio’s findings “because of their
concerns about Oxford’s ties to a private underwater archaeologist…arguing that
contracting out the leadership of maritime digs to non-scientists sets a poor precedent”
(Lawler, 2005, pp. 1192-1193). The refusal to engage indicates that maintaining fringe
marginalization is sometimes valued over and above scientific research itself. A founder
of maritime archaeology, George Fletcher Bass (1932-2021), stated, “Archaeology should
be conducted by proven and trained archaeologists” (Lawler, 2005, p. 1193). Another
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maritime archaeologist, Jon Adams, said, “I’d be wary of parceling out one of the links in
the chain of science” (Lawler, 2005, p. 1193-1193). Despite his lack of institutional training
in archaeology, Goddio became a Visiting Professor in Maritime Archaeology at Oxford
in 2018.

3.2. Women
Women’s voices continue to be underrepresented in mainstream science. Even as numbers
improve, women are still working within the confines of theories that have been developed by
men. They must work according to the strict system of logic already in place. Simone de
Beauvoir’s midcentury explanation of the woman’s situation remains apt:

Not only is [masculine logic] inapplicable to her experience, but in his hands, as she knows,
masculine reasoning becomes an underhand form of force… in yielding to him, he would have
her yield to the convincingness of an argument, but she knows that he has himself chosen the
premises on which his rigorous deductions depend. As long as she avoids questioning them,
he will easily reduce her to silence; nevertheless he will not convince her, for she senses his
arbitrariness. And so, annoyed, he will accuse her of being obstinate and illogical; but she
refuses to play the game because she knows the dice are loaded. Woman does not entertain the
positive belief that the truth is something other than men claim; she recognizes, rather, that
there is not any fixed truth. (Beauvoir & Parshley, 1949/1953, p. 581, italics in original)

91

As Beauvoir so acutely articulated in the midcentury, many women did (and still do) see nature in
a way that is misaligned with the dogmatic, one-sided or “loaded” observations of men.2
It should come as little surprise that it is also women (along with members of other
marginalized groups, e.g. indigenous philosopher Shelbi Nahwilet Meissner, 2019) who have
advocated a multiple-perspectives approach to science, pointing out that the fewer perspectives we
value, the more deprived we are of science—i.e. of the objectivity we seek. Helen Longino (1990)
and Elizabeth Lloyd (1995), for example, argue that science sans multiple perspectives has been
inadequate for reaching our epistemic desiderata.

1. Angelique Arvanitaki’s 1942 ephaptic coupling of nerve cells. Ephaptic coupling, as
distinct from synaptic transmission, occurs when one nerve fiber stimulates activity in
another nearby nerve fiber. Neurophysiologists of the midcentury were mostly focused on
synapses. “Arvanitaki was one of those women scientists whose work appears to have been
somewhat underrated—perhaps because of gender, perhaps because it seemed out of step
with the main directions of the time, perhaps both…” (Godfrey-Smith, 2021, p. 188).

2. Barbara McClintock’s 1950 jumping genes. McClintock won the 1983 Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine 33 years after she published her paper on transposable genetic
elements, “The origin and behavior of mutable loci in maize” (McClintock, 1950).
Commenting on this, Comfort (2008, p. 139) writes, “McClintock’s late Nobel has been

Beauvoir’s “dice are loaded” might be interpreted as something like the theory-ladenness of observation,
since ‘dice’ are a common metaphor for ‘evidence’; 20th-century gambling trials in the US were sometimes
closed if there were no dice to provide as evidence.
2
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seen simultaneously as the legitimation of a scientific iconoclast and as proof of her
marginalization.”

3. Marie Tharp’s 1950s discovery of the rift valley in the mid-ocean ridge. Single-handedly
and data-point by data-point, Marie Tharp (1920-2006) mapped the seafloor. While
plotting the Atlantic, she noticed that a rift seemed to be appearing in the mid-ocean ridge.
Her claims of a rift valley were dismissed. Tharp’s (1999) essay recounting her discovery
includes a story of gender-based marginalization:

When I showed what I found to Bruce [1924-1977], he groaned and said, “It cannot
be. It looks too much like continental drift.” At the time, believing in the theory of
continental drift was almost a form of scientific heresy. Almost everyone in the
United States thought continental drift was impossible. Bruce initially dismissed my
interpretation of the profiles as “girl talk.”

4. Jocelyn Bell Burnell’s 1967 discovery of pulsars. Bell Burnell, a graduate student at the
time, discovered the first two pulsars. Antony Hewish (1924-2021) initially thought these
were either cues from an extraterrestrial civilization or otherwise just interference noise
(Tretkof, 2006); nevertheless, it was Antony Hewish who won the 1974 Nobel Prize in
Physics for his “decisive role in the discovery of pulsars” (Nobel Media, n.d.). Her
contemporaries even called it the “No-Bell prize”; half a century after her discovery, she
was awarded the 2018 Special Breakthrough Prize in Fundamental Physics (Feder, 2019).
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5. Lynn Margulis’s 1967 endosymbiosis hypothesis. Margulis (1938-2011) defended the
endosymbiosis hypothesis for the origin of eukaryotic cells. This hypothesis stated that
some organelles, including mitochondria and chloroplasts, characteristic of eukaryotic
cells, originated from free-living prokaryotic cells that were ingested by protozoans, which
formed a symbiotic relationship with the prokaryotic cells. The theory was proposed well
before Margulis’s seminal paper “On the Origin of Mitosing Cells” (published under her
married name Sagan), which was rejected by about 15 journals before it was accepted in
1967 by the Journal of Theoretical Biology (Knoll, 2012). Others had previously
formulated a symbiogenesis hypothesis, including Konstantin Mereschkowski (18551921) in 1910. Following Margulis’s paper, endosymbiosis was largely ignored for another
decade. It was fringe for the larger part of the 20th century. The hypothesis was accepted
once genetic evidence accumulated in its favor.

6. Vera Rubin’s late-1970s discovery of dark matter. Rubin (1928-2016) observed that the
Andromeda Galaxy seemed to be violating Newton’s Laws of Motion—the material at the
edges of the galaxy was moving at the same rate as the material near the center of the
galaxy. According to physics of the day, these galaxies could not exist, since “they are
rotating with such speed that the gravity generated by their observable matter could not
possibly hold them together” (CERN, n.d.). Although Rubin wasn’t the first to employ the
concept of dark matter, she was the first to provide the data that ultimately convinced the
mainstream to take it on in 1985. Rubin, who was once “people’s choice” for the Nobel,
never received one, in spite of the consequences of her work. Thanks to Rubin’s work,
mainstream theory now suggests that dark matter outweighs visible matter roughly six to
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one; this has revolutionized astronomy, astrophysics, cosmology, and even research in
quantum mechanics.

3.3. Indigenous peoples
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK)—intimate knowledge of nature endowed by millennia
of ancestral experiences with the land and typically passed down by elders through oral histories—
is still often dismissed as unscientific spiritual mythology. Massimo Pigliucci (2021, p. 207) claims
that insofar as TEK purports to provide scientific and theoretical understanding of the world while
also invoking “spiritual, mystical, supernatural, or transcendental explanations,” it is
pseudoscientific. At the same time, settlers and their descendants have picked apart, extracted, and
appropriated TEK for scientific purposes for centuries. The obscuration of the origins of this
scientific knowledge induces the ignorance that undergirds the view that TEK is either unscientific
or else it is pseudoscience. It is an injustice for a mainstream non-indigenous scholar and scientist
to find it his place to claim that TEK does not belong in the science classroom (e.g. Pigliucci,
2021), while simultaneously—if ignorantly—permitting the knowledge mainstream science has
extracted from TEK to be disseminated in that context. This kind of ignorance exacerbates the
marginalization of indigenous peoples in science and perpetuates the dominance of those already
in power.
Emmalon Davis (2018, p. 705) theorizes that epistemic appropriation is a double-edged
sword, in terms of “epistemic detachment,” in which the knowledge is extracted from the
marginalized knowers who produced it while obscuring that origin, and “epistemic misdirection,”
in which that detached knowledge is then used to disproportionately benefit those already in power.
This has been the case with the majority of medicinal plants that have been generously passed
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down from indigenous peoples to settlers in the United States. Furthermore, “Insofar as epistemic
appropriation constitutes a persistent and unwarranted ‘epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s
contribution to knowledge production,’ it is a form of epistemic oppression” (Davis, 2018, p. 705).
In these terms, TEK has undoubtedly been epistemically appropriated by the mainstream to the
degree of epistemic oppression. The mainstream extracts and distills marginalized peoples’
knowledge towards scientific ends while failing to respect them as knowers in the way of science.
Pigliucci’s view, which is not uncommon, exemplifies that. In the examples that follow, names
and dates are excluded for the reason that these indigenous theories are based on millennia of
collective oral histories.

1. Deforestation causes disease. The indigenous belief that the destruction of nature through
deforestation, climate change, and biodiversity loss leads to disease continues to be
neglected by industries informed by mainstream science. The Bribri people of Costa Rica
hold the view that Sibo, their God, locked up bad spirits when he created the world, which
are unleashed when nature is not protected and respected. Recent research corroborates this
spiritual theory: land-use changes like deforestation of areas rich in biodiversity heightens
the risk of the emergence of infectious zoonotic diseases, which often cause pandemics
(Allen et al., 2017). When their habitats are destroyed, animals wander into more densely
human-populated areas, increasing the risk that a human will contract a disease.

2. Companion planting and the origins of permaculture. The indigenous idea that species of
plants can be companions that love each other has been dismissed as anthropomorphism
and pseudoscience. Indigenous peoples in North America historically planted beans, corn,
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and squash together, which actually do form symbiotic and mutually beneficial
relationships. Beans, which make their surrounding soil nitrogen-rich, in turn thrive by
climbing corn stalks, while large squash leaves prevent evaporation and weeds. Indigenous
peoples have been using place-based polycultural practices like these to sustain on their
lands for tens of thousands of years while settlers have used monocultural farming
techniques. Monocultural techniques can deplete the land of the nutrients that support
fertility. Bill Mollison, father of permaculture as we know it today, credits indigenous
cultures from around the world, and especially of the rainforests of Tasmania, for his
knowledge that formed the basis of permaculture. Mollison defines permaculture, from
‘permanent agriculture’ as follows:

the conscious design and maintenance of agriculturally productive ecosystems which
have the diversity, stability, and resilience of natural ecosystems. It is the harmonious
integration of landscape and people providing their food, energy, shelter, and other
material and non-material needs in a sustainable way. (Mollison, 1988)

Stewardship and respect of nature, as well as living in harmony with it, is a widespread
indigenous philosophy that permaculture appropriates for a Western audience.

3. Medicinal plants. Hundreds of drugs used in mainstream allopathic medicine come from
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), such as Aspirin (Cajete & Little Bear, 2000).
Medicinal plants traditionally used in Asia have frequently contributed to the approval of
natural pharmaceuticals, while traditional medicines from elsewhere around the globe have
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not been researched by mainstream academics. That is currently changing. For example,
the Samoan remedy of ‘matalafi’ involves ingesting leaves from the tropical tree
Psychotria insularum to cure fevers, aches, swellings, incontinence, infections, and
vomiting. In a recent multidisciplinary collaboration and data sovereignty–driven study led
by indigenous scientists, the anti-inflammatory mechanisms behind the effective
Psychotria insularum treatment are elucidated without stripping the plant of its traditional
metaphysical properties—i.e. without using the typical reductionist approach of purifying
a ‘bioactive principle’ of the plant (Molimau-Samasoni, 2021). This new research model
aims to respect indigenous science and culture while effectively communicating a
mechanistic explanation to mainstream scientists working under an exclusively-allopathic
medical regime.

4. Firebirds. Inuit people claim that firebirds, which are represented in sacred ceremonies,
carry and drop flaming sticks to intentionally spread fires. In tropical Australian savannas,
Mark Bonta et al. (2017) recently corroborated that, indeed, some kites and falcons carry
sticks of fire in their talons or beaks and drop them in unburned areas, in solo or collective
attempts to spread wildfires. This is advantageous for them, since insects, rodents, and
reptiles, which they eat, are dispelled in high quantities from a burning forest.

5. Olfaction in whales. Whales, which are a central form of subsistence for Arctic and
subarctic Inuit peoples, play a role in diverse cosmologies, and are at the heart of their
spiritualties. The Alaskan Iñupiat people claim that the smell of wood fires on land repel
baleen bowhead whales from the coast, which the Iñupiat hunt (Langlois, 2018). For many
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years, biologists rejected the hypothesis out of hand that any whale could smell so well—
toothed whales (odontocetes) do not have olfactory systems, and there seems little need for
sensing airborne entities given the majority of a whale’s life is spent underwater. That is,
until J. G. M. “Hans” Thewissen and his colleagues (Armfield et al., 2011) dissected a
baleen bowhead skull and showed that these whales have a complex olfactory bulb, the
size of which, relative to the rest its brain, indicates that the animal can smell even better
than humans. They also corroborated the Iñupiat view that whales can smell by showing
that 51% of olfactory receptor genes of the bowhead whale were intact (unlike toothed
whales, which have less than 25% of these genes). This suggests that scientists were too
quick to dismiss the hypothesis, and indeed, theory, of the Iñupiat, who put out the fires
they keep for warmth when they hunt for a whale. The Iñupiat’s knowledge is based on
thousands of years of collective experience, transmitted within a tight-knit community
through hearing, in the sense of ‘understanding’ (as in the French sense of entendre, both
‘hearing’ and ‘understanding’).

6. Whales have land-dwelling ancestors. Even more surprising is the Yupik people’s claim
that beluga whales were once land-dwellers, and long for the land. They hunt the whales,
and ceremoniously set up the bones, and believe whales offer themselves to be harpooned
to return to land. According to evolutionary theory, 50 million years ago, the whale
ancestor was a land animal—and whale fetuses briefly develop the beginning of forelimbs
and hindlimbs before losing them again (Fordyce and Muizon, 2001; Thewissen and
Williams, 2002; Thewissen et al. 2009).
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4. Scientific reasons for marginalization
It should be clear that the initial marginalization of promising unorthodox theories is not
uncommon. Of course, there remains plenty of room for cases in which the reasons for silencing a
theory might be deemed legitimate; even the aforementioned and controversial Kirschvink
suggested that often the scientific mainstream had good reasons for rejecting the research guided
by the magnetoreception hypothesis as ‘pseudoscience’. Here I wish to explain why the common
reasons used to justify the marginalization of a fringe theory, despite appearances to the contrary,
are not good. Even when those reasons align with our current scientific norms of good reasoning,
they can be seen to work against our epistemic and practical interests. This is so even when the
marginalized theory in question has thus far failed to advance to mainstream status.
I suggest we set aside a category of fringe theory from this study. The silencing that occurs
in response to demonstrably fraudulent or intentionally harmful fringe theoretical claims is,
without question, grounded in legitimate reasons. We should silence theories that claim tobacco is
safe, but only when lack of concern for public health is present, or when the intention is to deceive
the public in order to support financial gains amongst members of the tobacco industry. I am here
distinguishing ‘intentionally harmful’ from ‘harmful’ theoretical claims, which are more
problematic to exclude. Ideas that were once judged harmful were later deemed beneficial. The
smallpox vaccine developed in the late 18th century involved infecting a lesion with pus from a
cowpox blister. Controversy ensued as Edward Jenner (1749-1823) popularized the treatment,
from which the term ‘vaccination’ emerged from vaccinia, Latin for ‘cowpox’. An 1802 cartoon
depicts a vaccinated crowd sprouting cow heads from various limbs, highlighting the public fear
of contamination by bovine matter. The mainstream medical community that practiced inoculation
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using smallpox—a far riskier practice by contemporary lights—deemed Jenner’s vaccination
dangerous, emphasizing the “immeasurable horror at the profanation to humanity by injection with
bovine disease” (Porter & Porter, 1988, p. 242) and arguing that “…the cowpox matter produces
foul ulcers, and in that respect is a worse disease than the mildly inoculated smallpox” (Creighton,
1889, p. 89). This suggests that judgments of physiological harm are historically indexed and can
in some cases change. We would thus be too quick to exclude the marginalization of inadvertently
harmful theories from treatment in this section. A theory that is constructed with the intention of
harm, however, can be decisively excluded. Although an intentionally harmful theory could
unwittingly turn out to be beneficial, we should discourage deceptive and intentionally-harmful
theorizing for the reason that it intends to deceive or cause harms. I adhere to the normative
Baconian claim that scientific theory construction should be done with a focus on collective wellbeing, broadly construed. It also must be done in earnest. Whether we have a case of deception or
intentional harm can continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis, though it is important to
note that not all proponents of a theory always have the same motives.
There are also cases of fringe theories that are sociopolitically harmful, for example, when
they have adverse effects on people with underrepresented sociopolitical identities. There are
theories that are explicitly racist and sexist, such as Richard J. Herrnstein (1930-1994) and Charles
Murray’s (1994) theory that the black-white and female-male discrepancies in IQ are real, and
based on genetic factors rather than environmental pressures. The white-male authors discourage
affirmative action and oppose welfare. They even indicate advocacy of eugenics by expressing
fears that immigration is damaging the gene pool and that people of lower intelligence have more
offspring.
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In archaeology, there is Erich von Däniken’s (1969) ancient aliens theory. Däniken’s theory
that aliens have visited and shaped ancient human cultures is founded on racism. He speculates
that the “negroid race” was a failure, and aliens genetically engineered white people as an
improvement. He also implies that people of color could not have developed technologies
advanced enough to enable the incredible feats of precision and might that we witness in megalithic
ruins of the ancient world, such as the Egyptian and Aztec pyramids, while excluding comparable
sites from ancient European cultures, like Stonehenge. Notably, not all versions of an ancient aliens
theory need have these racist undercurrents. For example, there are hypotheses about contact
between aliens and kingdoms in Mesopotamia, such as the Sumerians.
These are just a few examples of problematic fringe theories. While such theories may be
sociopolitically harmful to marginalized groups, that does not mean they are not empirically
defensible, however. These cases are complicated, and I treat theories that violate the norm of
collective well-being further in Chapter 7.

4.1. What makes a theory pseudoscientific?
Many fringe theories continue to be denounced as “pseudoscientific” and their proponents as
“pseudoscientists”—Wikipedia’s “List of topics characterized as pseudoscience” contains nearly
200 theories as of April 2022. There is some consensus that these terms lack interesting content
(cf. Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013), but they nevertheless remain operative for their silencing and
disempowering effects. The terms are useful to us here in that they serve as markers for what
theories have been subject to marginalization. According to Google N-gram, since its 1783
introduction, the unhyphenated ‘pseudoscience’ has seen an exponential rise in usage, outrunning
the original hyphenated ‘pseudo-science’ (c. 1773) in 1976.

102

In that very year, Kendrick Frazer (1976) announced that “there is something new on the
scene” to confront what Paul Kurtz (1925-2012) called the “enormous increase in public interest
in psychic phenomena, the occult and pseudoscience” (p. 346). According to Frazer (1976), “Many
scientists consider efforts at debunking beneath their dignity” (p. 346). Thus, to make up for the
lack of oversight, an international organization was launched to begin addressing the rise of
pseudoscience on April 30, 1976. It was the Committee to Scientifically Investigate Claims of
Paranormal and Other Phenomena (CSICOP), which now runs under the title Committee for
Skeptical Inquiry (CSI) as part of the Program of the Center for Inquiry launched in 2015. Here is
Frazer’s (1976, p. 346) statement of the organization’s purpose:

The committee hopes to function like a consumer information group, serving the public and
the news media by providing access to facts by which they can judge the validity of unusual
claims. They will establish a network of people interested in examining such claims, prepare
bibliographies of published materials that examine such claims, encourage and commission
research by objective and impartial observers in areas where needed, publish articles and books
examining claims and convene conferences and meetings.

Marcello Truzzi (1935-2003), a sociologist at Eastern Michigan University, served as co-chairman
along with Kurtz, and Truzzi’s skeptical journal Explorations became CSICOP’s official journal.
It was renamed The Zetetic. Truzzi used the term ‘zetetic’ in attempt to depart from ‘skeptic’, since
he believed in the rise of ‘pseudoskeptics’, whose guise of scientific skepticism shrouds dogmatist
motives to preserve mainstream theory. Truzzi served as the editor until August 1977, when the
Executive Council of CSICOP made of a vote of no confidence against him, and he left the

103

committee. Frazer took over the journal, and to cut ties with Truzzi, CSICOP renamed it Skeptical
Inquirer, as it is still called today. The lack of confidence in Truzzi rested on the fact that he wanted
to publish pro-paranormal research and include pro-paranormal investigators as part of CSICOP.
They wouldn’t have it. They were founded in the first place with the intention to respond to the
rise of paranormal investigations. Indeed, his peers had that air of dogmatism from which he hoped
the endeavor to test extraordinary claims would steer clear. CSICOP made it known: their project
was to debunk, not to defend, extraordinary claims that were inconsistent with mainstream
theories, and thus, they really were skeptics in Truzzi’s pseudoskeptic sense. Frazer’s
announcement of CSICOP in 1976 was written under the assumption that any claim inconsistent
with mainstream science—i.e. pseudoscience—must be shown to be false. Frazer (1976, p. 346)
quotes Kurtz: “Many individuals now believe that there is considerable need to organize some
strategy of refutation,” and adds that, “The time and effort required to systematically point out the
errors in fact and logic in a complex pseudoscientific theory are not trivial” and “any attempt by
scientists to tell why a popularly held idea or theory is not valid inevitably leads to complaints
from the wounded of authoritarianism and scientific elitism” (Frazer, 1976, p. 346).
The outcast Truzzi went into a field of research directed at investigating anomalies known
as anomalistics, which before long became synonymous with ‘pseudoscience’. Henry Bauer
(2000)—an interesting character who pops up again and again as a critical voice against fringe
theories, but whose many forays into demarcation eventually turned him into a fringe advocate
himself (taken with HIV-AIDS denialism and the Lochness monster, for example)—equates the
two terms, noting that ‘anomalistics’ is more politically-correct. He argues that the various areas
anomalistics investigates, for example, on the basis of eye-witness reports of UFOs or
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cryptozoological beings, do not exist, since scientific laws make them impossible. This is ironic
reasoning, given that Bauer rightly notes that meteorites were also once thought to be impossible.
The attempts at silencing the fringe are usually made with the intention of ameliorating
“public neglect of genuine science” (Thagard, 1978, p. 230), protection and fortification of the
scientific enterprise and its mainstream theories, maintaining power over policy-making that
affects society at large, preventing harms brought to the public by so-called quacks, and keeping
out the amateurs whose lack of expertise could lead to wasted resources and funds.
While I have shown earlier that biases and non-scientific reasons can play a significant role
in the marginalization of fringe theories, my focus here is on the scientific reasons used to support
the marginalization of fringe theories. These reasons are (1) the theory’s inconsistency with
established theories or facts, (2) its failed predictions or lack of reproducible evidence, including
its cherry-picking of evidence, ad hoc tweaks, theory-laden observations, or its unfalsifiability by
evidence, (3) its lack of a satisfactory explanatory mechanism, (4) its lack of coherence, (5) its
lack of parsimony or its ontological profligacy, including invocation of magical or supernatural
posits, (6) a proponent’s use of improper methodology or experimental designs, and (7) a
proponent’s lack of relevant expertise. Beyerstein (1995, p. 1) captures a number of these:

The roots of most pseudosciences are traceable to ancient magical beliefs, but their devotees
typically play this down as they adopt the outward appearance of scientific rigor. Analysis of
the perspectives and practices of these scientific poseurs is likely to expose a mystical
worldview that has merely been restated in scientific-sounding jargon. Pseudosciences are
characterized by non-reproducible findings that are allegedly mediated by forces unmeasurable
by conventional scientific methods.
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The frequent and important reason that a particular fringe theory is harmful to the public, while
cast in sociopolitical terms, is grounded in the scientific reasons just mentioned. Climate change
denialism, even when proposed in earnest, is claimed to be harmful, but that claim is based on its
inconsistency with the established theory that climate change is caused by humans. One might also
wish to add ‘a proponent’s isolation from the scientific community’, but I think the lack of
communication and resistance to criticism significant in that reason are the upshot of other reasons
on the list. The theory’s inconsistency with established theories, cherry-picking or reinterpretation
of evidence, positing of supernatural forces, and the proponent’s lack of expertise and refusal to
use proper methodology are factors that contribute to isolation, lack of communication, and
resistance to criticism. In many cases, isolation from the scientific community could be said to be
a result of marginalization by the term ‘pseudoscience’, rather than a reason for it. The significance
of ‘a proponent’s revolutionary intent’ I think can be cast in terms of the first reason.
Many fringe theories that became mainstream were subject to marginalization in terms of
these scientific reasons. Scientific reasons might be thought to be the best reasons to reject a theory.
However, according to the view that states that our current mainstream theories are true or
approximately true (to the exclusion of inconsistent alternatives), these very reasons have again
and again betrayed our top experts, leading them to neglect research for decades. These reasons
have led us to delay discovery of the epistemic and practical promise of theories, and all in the
name of ‘scientific fact’. Theories that are now mainstream once violated laws of nature, failed to
countenance scientific facts, lacked reproducible evidence, had no mechanism, were incoherent or
unparsimonious, were based on inadequate methods, and were proposed by non-experts.
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Let’s take, for example, the theory of magnetoreception outlined in Section 3.1 above. Since
it’s late-1800s inception, the theory that some animals have a magnetic sense has been fringe. Only
in the last few decades has it become mainstream. Most, if not all of the reasons above have been
used against research into magnetoreception, which gives us the opportunity to see that the
scientific reasons for silencing do not necessarily improve for being cumulative.
Magnetoreception was derided early on by Weismann for the first reason: it was a biological
fact that birds, like humans, have only five senses at their disposal. In the mid-20th century, too,
magnetoreception was denied for the reason that there already were theories that were said to
sufficiently explain migratory activity—sun compass by day, visual star orientation by night.
Over half a century later, the magnetoreception theory was still a pseudoscience for the
second reason: the experiments corroborating magnetoreception in birds were not reproducible.
Even as late as 1985, there was a lot of skepticism, and many results could not be replicated:

A strong case can be made for the magnetic detection abilities of pigeons based on field
experiments, yet laboratory conditioning studies have rarely supported a magnetic
detection hypothesis. These few supportive experiments have proven difficult to replicate.
(Bauer et al., 1985, p. 493)

Up until the 1970s, “…the experimental evidence of biological influences of weak magnetic fields
was…often contradictory” leading scientists to ignore the hypothesis that animals are sensitive to
magnetic fields (Skiles, 1985, p. 86). Recall, too, that there was cherry-picking and theory-laden
interpretations of evidence, insofar as proponents had to explain away the results of the studies
that in those days proved that the magnetoreception theory was false.
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Like telepathy today, magnetoreception was dismissed for the third reason: there wasn’t a
mechanism to explain how this novel type of perception could work. In fact, mainstream studies
demonstrated that the possibility of such a mechanism was ruled out; birds don’t contain metals
sensitive to magnetic fields in sufficient quantities for a nerve cell to detect them, and thus it was
deemed impossible that any neural pathways could be sensitive to magnetic fields.
I haven’t found anyone dismissing magnetoreception explicitly for the fourth reason, namely,
its incoherence, but Weismann (1879, p. 580) comes pretty close in claiming that a magnetic sense
called for a “physiological absurdity.”
Magnetoreception was also dismissed for the fifth reason, its lack of parsimony—indeed,
even for its invocation of a once-magical and unnecessary posit: a magnetic sixth sense. As
Weismann (1879, p. 579) asked rhetorically,

Are we therefore compelled to make the assumption…of a sixth sense, which informs the
bird which direction is north? Is there no simpler explanation of the fact? Obviously, we
should only be warranted in accepting such a purely hypothetical sense, if it were clearly
proved, that we could never get to understand the facts without it.

Weismann adds that the phenomenon of migration, although wonderful, “cannot ultimately depend
on magic,” but must be explained in terms of the “known physical and mental properties of
birds”—namely, the five senses.
The sixth reason was also used to dismiss magnetoreception, namely, that evidence in favor
of it was gathered from inadequate scientific methods. Early on, avian magnetoception was largely
based on testimony that young starlings soared towards the north pole on their first migrations,
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and without the help of adults who had previously made the journey. Later, too, there were
complaints about methods. Once the news hit the mainstream that animals, from birds to bees,
could magnetoreceive, zoologist R. Robin Baker dared to think that humans, too, might be
endowed with the sixth sense. “[Baker’s] critics lambasted him over issues of experimental
design…” (Greshko, 2014, p. 3). In his famous Manchester experiments, blindfolded and
disoriented students were able to point in the direction of home, but those with magnets attached
to their blindfolds were not (Baker, 1980). Just as Baker seemed to be rising to fame, Princeton
biologist James Gould published his rebuttal of Baker’s claim to evidence that humans had a
magnetic sense. Gould was initially enthusiastic when he heard about Baker’s results, but before
he attempted to reproduce the Baker’s test, he noticed that Baker had only used sleep masks to
blindfold his participants. These, he determined, would be unreliable during the day, and were not
fitted enough to entirely obstruct subjects’ visual fields. Gould turned to James Randi—wellknown for “debunking charlatans claiming paranormal powers” (Greshko, 2014, p. 17)—to make
masks that would block out all light. Furthermore, there was no indication that Baker had covered
the large bus windows during the disorienting ride into the countryside, and Gould thought that
the participants might have been able to figure out where the sun was by simply feeling its heat on
their faces. Gould fitted his masks, hooded his participants, and wrapped his windows in aluminum
foil. He did not get Baker’s results. Experimental psychologist Tom Dayton, too, had his qualms
about Baker’s methods—specifically his lack of controls to avoid biases that might be confounds:
“No way did he adequately control his experiment… Here’s what I thought was a really crap
article. How’d that get published, for God’s sake?” (Greshko, 2019, p. 19)
Thanks to Dayton’s involvement, the seventh reason—a lack of expertise—was thus also
used against Baker. Though Dayton himself only had a Bachelor’s degree in experimental
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psychology, Baker, a zoologist, was apparently less trained in experimental psychology. “From an
experimental psychologist’s perspective—even that of a college student—Baker had taken some
missteps, failing in Dayton’s eyes to control for every possible influence that might have steered
subjects astray” (Greshko, 2014, p. 19). Even Joseph Kirschvink, too, once contributed to Baker’s
demotion to the fringe:

“To get Baker’s results, you’d have to be a really sloppy scientist” Kirschvink said to [Paul]
Jacobs [of the Los Angeles Times]—a denunciation that still perturbs Baker three decades
later… [T]he media had started lumping him in with the very fringe he thought researchers of
his ilk had escaped. In one email he sent me, Baker recounted a cringe-worthy appearance he
made on a German television show in 1984, where he was unwittingly put on a panel filled
with “dowsers [and] telepathists.” (Greshko, 2014, p. 20)

Although we can now see human magnetoreception today becoming part of mainstream
research, Baker, who left academia in the 1990s, is still not celebrated for giving this group of
scientists the impetus to test human magnetoreception themselves. Michael Greshko, whose 2014
Master’s degree from MIT was awarded for his thesis on the replication crisis featuring Baker
himself, casts a sad, sorry image:

In remaining defiant, Baker is waiting for his own vindication, whether or not it comes. In fact,
at first glance, it might seem like Baker was onto something… Since Baker was seemingly on
the right track with mice, does this mean that time will be kind to his human trials? Probably
not. Baker was explicit in his efforts to treat humans just like any other animal, and they are.

110

But humans are incredibly clever animals, extremely sensitive to all sorts of cues that Baker
arguably failed to fully appreciate and account for. There will always be an asterisk of doubt
placed next to Baker’s human studies, even if someone else steps up and reproducibly
demonstrates that humans have a magnetic sense. As of now, though, nobody is eager to take
up his mantle. (Greshko, 2014, pp. 26-27)

Greshko, inspired by Nobel Laureate Langmuir’s idea of ‘pathological science’, adds, “Baker also
seems to have fallen victim to a parental love of his own work, keeping him too committed to his
own ideas in the face of uncomfortable evidence to the contrary” (Greshko, 2014, p. 27). Now to
Greshko’s own chagrin, the same year he submitted his thesis, new work by Kirschvink and his
colleagues (2014) demonstrating human brain sensitivity to a changing magnetic field has actually
brought Baker potential vindication. Before Kirschvink added a Faraday cage—a layer of
aluminum—to block out electromagnetic contamination during his experiment, the results were
uninteresting:

Indeed, lack of such a shield might have precluded attempts to replicate Baker’s results. During
the years that Baker ran the Manchester experiments, AM radio broadcasts were common
throughout the US, where replication attempts were most frequent, but nearly nonexistent in
the UK. If humans, like pigeons, use a mechanism for magnetoreception that can be jammed
by AM frequencies, it explains why so much time and effort put into replicating Baker’s
finding ended in failure. (Jaekl, 2019)
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It looks like Baker may, after all, live to see his day. Even if his samples of human nose bones
were contaminated with magnetite, and even if his blindfolds were initially inadequate, with what
sense would we forever place this “asterisk of doubt” upon Baker’s research? This skeptical
attitude towards the brave heretic—willing to risk it all—and without whose work Kirschvink
would not have had the incentive to do his own research into human magnetoreception—itself
becomes subject to skepticism.
We have seen that all of our best scientific reasons were used to deny magnetoreception. It
should be clear that these reasons fail us and that we should not use them to guide us on how to
tell science from ‘pseudoscience’, ‘pathological science’, ‘bunk’—not if our aim in science is, at
least in part, discovery.

4.2. Velikovsky’s Global Catastrophism
Immanuel Velikovsky’s (1950) once-infamous but mostly-forgotten theory of global
catastrophism claims that massive cataclysms occurred during relatively recent human history.
Velikovsky himself insisted that his catastrophism was a reconstruction, rather than a theory: “it
is built upon studying the human testimony as preserved in the heritage of all ancient civilizations”
(Velikovsky, 1974). These included Earth’s two near-collisions with Venus. The first took place
when Venus was ejected from Jupiter, whose scar is the Great Red Spot. The second took place
when Mars displaced the Venus comet around 700 BC.
The term ‘pseudoscience’ continues to make regular appearance in reference to Velikovsky’s
work, alongside the majority of the above-mentioned scientific reasons for marginalization. The
suppression in this case was once active, explicit, and vigorous. Esteemed academics, most notably
Howard Shapley, threatened to boycott Velikovsky’s first publisher, Macmillan, if they continued
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publishing Worlds in Collision. As a leading academic publisher, Macmillan began to fear the loss
of textbooks and their sales, and swiftly passed Velikovsky’s book over to Doubleday (Gordin,
2012). Early on, the worry was expressed that this event of scientific suppression would “haunt
the scientific community” for years to come (Friedlander, 1976, p. 477). Considering how few
people today recognize the name Velikovsky, the gatekeeping story itself seems to have been
successfully suppressed as well. Let’s look at some of the best ‘scientific’ reasons for Velikovsky’s
marginalization:

(1) Inconsistency with established theories and facts. Velikovsky’s catastrophism asked
for major reforms of established theories in a number of disciplines, including physics,
biology, geology, astronomy, paleontology, archaeology, and ancient history. Einstein
laughed in the early years that Velikovsky had, “the stuff to thoroughly disprove even the
table of multiplication” (Einstein to Velikosky, 1951, as quoted by Velikovsky, 1976, IVP
40:7, p. 31, as quoted by Gordin, 2012, p. 119). Velikovsky’s theory clashed with the
mainstream in numerous ways: the planetary movements that Velikovsky proposed were
ruled out by celestial mechanics; Velikovsky’s electromagnetic Venus mechanism for
global catastrophes broke two laws; Velikovsky invoked electromagnetic forces to explain
the erratic planetary movements; he also called Darwinian evolution by natural selection
into question via his rejection of a uniformitarian and gradualist framework (Gordin, 2012,
pp. 23-24).

(2) Failed predictions and lack of evidence. Velikovsky and his followers have claimed a
number of successful predictions, though mainstream astronomers have not always agreed.
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Perhaps most famously, Velikovsky predicted the presence of hydrocarbons in the
Venusian atmosphere: this prediction was announced corroborated after Mariner II’s visit
to Venus in 1962 (James, 1963). By 1977, however, thanks to Sagan, this was
misinformation. Historian of science Michael D. Gordin (2012, p. 131) points out that the
so-called error originated with a press conference hosted by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
at Caltech; according to a private 1963 letter penned by the Lab’s Lewis Kaplan, the more
obscure ‘hydrocarbons’ were named instead of ‘organic compounds’ in attempt to deflect
the layperson implication that this meant life on Venus—and hydrocarbons they were not,
but organic they were.

(3) Mechanism. Velikovsky’s claims of global catastrophes may have been hard to
swallow, but according to Gordin (2012, p. 5), “the greatest sticking point was his
mechanism for their occurrence.” In Velikovsky’s bestseller Worlds in Collision, he
claimed that during the time of Exodus, Jupiter ejected a comet that nearly collided with
Earth, and it became locked in gravitational or electromagnetic interaction with Earth,
causing the various fantastical phenomena recorded in ancient texts across cultures. John
O’Neill, a critic of Velikovsky’s mechanism, reported in the Herald Tribune that “A correct
scientific explanation of the cataclysmic events…is not essential to acceptance of the data
establishing the reality of the events themselves” (as quoted by Gordin, 2012, p. 30).

(4) Lack of Coherence. Sagan makes note of an inconsistency in Velikovsky’s theory. I
quote at length:
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Velikovsky’s account of the history of the Earth’s rotation is difficult to follow. On
page 236 we have an account of the motion of the Sun in the sky which by accident
conforms to the appearance and apparent motion of the Sun as seen from the surface of
Mercury, but not from the surface of the Earth; and on page 385 we seem to have an
aperture to a wholesale retreat by Velikovsky—for here he suggests that what happened
was not any change in the angular velocity of rotation of the Earth, but rather a motion
in the course of few hours of the angular momentum vector of the Earth from pointing
approximately at right angles to the ecliptic plane as it does today to pointing in the
direction of the Sun, like the planet Uranus. Quite apart from extremely grave problems
in the physics of this suggestion, it is inconsistent with Velikovsky’s own argument,
because earlier he has laid great weight on the fact that Eurasian and Near Eastern
cultures reported prolonged day, while North American cultures reported prolonged
night. In this variant there would be no explanation of the reports from Mexico. I think
I see in this instance Velikovsky hedging on or forgetting his own strongest arguments
from ancient writings. (Goldsmith & Sagan, 1977, p. 65)

(5) Lack of Parsimony and Ontological Profligacy. Many critics called Velikovsky out for
his unabashed profligation of electromagnetic forces that had not been corroborated by
mainstream science. For example, Walter S. Adams stated that Velikovsky was attempting
to explain “one miracle by another miracle”—namely Venus’s erratic movement with
electromagnetic forces (Walter S. Adams to Velikovsky, July 28, 1950, IVP 69:4, as quoted
in Gordin, 2012, p. 108)
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(6) Methodology. Velikovsky’s methods for determining the course of astronomical events
were completely misaligned with those of astronomers of his day, to the extent that some
wondered whether he even intended the theory to be scientific. Velikovsky relied heavily
on comparative mythology and ancient historical and scriptural sources to determine his
theory about the course of the astronomical events that impacted Earth during human
history. He also reinforced his theory with the psychoanalytic claim that humanity suffered
collective amnesia as a result of these historical traumas. He took the aggressive resistance
to be corroborating evidence for his theory, which predicted a “Velikovsky Affair” akin to
the Galileo affair. Velikovsky fastidiously archived the responses to his theory for future
historians of science, who he hoped might bring him vindication one day; he even tried and
failed to interest Kuhn in this material (see Gordin, 2012).

(7) Expertise. Velikovsky was a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst by training, but was
engaging historians, astronomers, geologists, physicists, biologists, and theologians.

With these seven points in hand, we can now ask whether it is right to dismiss Velikovsky as
pseudoscientific. I think not. Even if we think his views are wrong or highly speculative, there
remain reasons to take him seriously. For example, one of Velikovsky’s predictions—that Jupiter
emits radio frequencies—seems to have been borne out, and rather impressively at that, according
to Einstein (Gordin, 2012, p. 133). Even if he was imaginative and eccentric, Velikovsky was
propounding views that deserved inquiry and investigation.
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Einstein’s mixed support of Velikovsky is suspiciously missing from all of Wikipedia.3 At
that, Einstein surely would have laughed—even if, along with Velikovsky, he would have also
been completely incensed. When I did a Google search in attempt to uncover this fact from any
source other than Gordin’s book, I got multiple hits whose content had been deleted. After Bernard
Burke and Kenneth Franklin just so happened to detect radio frequencies from Jupiter in 1955—a
crucial test for which Velikovsky had only then recently implored Einstein to lobby—Einstein told
Velikovsky he would advocate for any test of his theory that he liked. Velikovsky chose
radiocarbon dating, but Einstein died before he penned a letter. When Burke and Franklin
discovered they had carelessly corroborated Velikovsky’s mechanism, they retorted, “It is not
surprising that an occasional near miss should be found in the large number of wild speculations
that Dr. Velikovsky has produced, but such a coincidence could never be regarded as a true
prediction” (Gordin, 2012, p. 130). This dismissal is uncharitable. Velikovsky was not generating
random predictions; his views are based on principled reasons. As with mainstream science, these

In attempt to uncover what is going on behind the scenes, I added Einstein’s mixed reception of
Velikovsky’s work to the ‘Reception’ section in the ‘Immanuel Velikovsky’ Wikipedia entry,
along with the claim that Einstein had a copy of Velikovsky’s manuscript on his desk when he
died, all with proper citations from historian Michael Gordin’s (2012) book published by the
University of Chicago Press. In retrospect, I would have been wise to exclude that last fun fact,
since Einstein’s acknowledgement of Velikovsky’s ideas turned out to be outrageous enough to
ignite the attention of internet trolls. I didn’t expect that my additions would last, but my jaw
dropped when they were all removed within 24 hours, without comment. Gordin’s reaction:
“Seriously: who cares anymore? (I do, but that’s pretty limited.) The most amazing thing about
this is… EINSTEIN HAD MORE THAN ONE DESK! Yes, it is true” (personal communication,
May 2022). When I inquired about the removal, this editor provided a blog post (contra
Wikipedia’s guidelines) to serve as evidence against that presented by Gordin (2012) in his book.
Gordin is, to my knowledge, the only person who has made extensive use of Princeton University’s
Velikovsky Archive. My brief correspondence with this censor is available on the Wikipedia
‘Immanuel Velikovsky:Talk’ page; salient is the utter lack of engagement with actual facts. Again:
Wikipedia is number four amongst the most-viewed websites in the world. Velikovsky may be
irrelevant to most of today’s readers, but this is not an inconsequential quibble. An hour spent
reading the ‘Talk’ pages linked to other ‘pseudoscientists’ reveals that this kind of censorship is
the norm on Wikipedia.
3
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reasons are not always airtight, and his predictions do not always pan out, but his project was a
serious effort at explanation.
Moreover, it is wrong to imply that Velikovsky had just one good guess, and the rest was off
base. The story is much more nuanced. Velikovsky’s theory predicted moonquakes as due to the
havoc of the planetary encounters, which were later detected by a seismometer. However,
Velikovsky suggested that moonquakes should be strong enough to be felt by astronauts, which
they are (so far) not. He also predicted that Venus would be hot relative to Earth at a time when
most scientists thought it would be earthlike due to its cloud cover. The purported success of this
prediction has been variously called into question due to its vagueness (Vickers, 2013, p. 196).
Like many scientists before him, we see a mix of success and failure. This mix is not ground
for dismissal. It suggests that Velikovsky took intellectual risks, and this sometimes paid off. That
is one of many fruitful strategies for making discoveries in science.
In response to such an assessment, Sagan (1979, p. 58) said, “Where Velikovsky is original
he is very likely wrong; and where he is right the idea has been preempted by earlier workers.
There are also a large number of cases where he is neither right nor original.” This seems unfair.
Unless Sagan has proof that Velikovsky stole the predictions of others, this statement is ad
hominem, even libelous. The fact that his predictions were also made by others only testifies to
their validity. Scientists often converge; this has been well-known since Robert K. Merton’s
hallmark 1961 paper highlighting discoveries made by multiple researchers working in isolation
from one another. Plus, Sagan’s claim that Velikovsky is “very likely wrong” where his views
remain unconfirmed is itself without confirmation. The bottom line remains: however outlandish
he seemed or still seems to mainstream scientists, Velikovsky did defend some views that turned
out to be on target, even though they were controversial at the time. Again, these were not random
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guesses, but consequences of serious cross-cultural historical research and the construction of an
elaborate theory. Catastrophism—albeit without every Velikovskian detail—has gained
mainstream respectability in recent decades.
Calling Velikovsky a pseudoscientist exposes the problem with that label. Often the truth is
more complicated. Heterodox thinkers may go out on a limb, but that sometimes yields ripe fruit.
If we dismiss them, we treat them unfairly and may miss out on what they have to teach us. This
can include both successful predictions and instructive failures. Either way, there can be reward in
tending to fringe theories, and the use of pejorative labels like pseudoscience imply fakery or
nonsense, when the theories being advanced are serious, carefully developed, and potentially
insightful.

5. Conclusion
It should be clear that the same kinds of strategies have been used to deny the fringe that succeeds
and the fringe that is still fringe. It follows that we cannot use unsuccessful cases as exceptions
that deserve marginalization.
So what makes the difference between the unsuccessful cases and the successful cases? Are
there still cases of theories that should be marginalized? One might think there are just really bad
fringe theories that should be subjected to these methods of silencing. But having shown that these
methods have betrayed us in the past, if anything, the successful cases show we still have to take
these theories seriously and that they have been dismissed for inadequate reasons. We currently
lack a meaningful way to separate the good cases from the bad cases. I will address the demarcation
problem further in Chapter 7. For now, however, we cannot infer anything from the fact that the
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vast majority of fringe theories have failed, since the vast majority of mainstream theories fail as
well. This suggests we ought to work on our tolerance towards strange ideas.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Theory-Informity and Theory Evaluation

Nothing is so fatal to the progress of the human mind as to suppose our views of science are
ultimate; that there are no mysteries in nature; that our triumphs are complete; and that there are
no new worlds to conquer.
—Humphry Davy (1810), lecture

1. Introduction
I draw and apply a distinction between the typically-discussed observational condition of theoryladenness, and what I call the principle of theory-informity.1 This principle states that, necessarily,
all observations—from subjective ordinary to objective scientific—are ordered and interpreted
through concepts inherent in theoretical systems or frameworks, without which there is no
observational information. This basic observational principle continues to be conflated with the
theory-ladenness of observation. However, I take theory-ladenness to be only one of two
contingent modes that theory-informity can take. Theory-ladenness only applies to cases in which
observational uptake is laden—burdened—by theory, such that incommensurability is the result.
But theory-informity can also be seen to enable logic-based adjudications. Specifically, it enables
logic-based adjudications in the case that the theory that informs the observational evidence in

1

J.D. Greenwood (1990) coined the term ‘theory-informity’ in a paper called “The Theory-informity of
Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis”—foundational to my development of the ‘principle of theoryinformity’, and my distinction between that principle and ‘theory-ladenness’.
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question is neutral to competing theories. I call this latter contingent mode of theory-informity
competing-theory neutrality.
That theories inform observation is well-accepted in the current literature (cf. Chang,
2005). I apply it to all observations from the most basic and ordinary to the most scientifically
advanced. I then distinguish between the two modes that theory-informity can take: theoryladenness, which entails incommensurability, and competing-theory neutrality, which enables but
does not entail commensurability and, thus, logical observation-based adjudications. Next, I apply
my analysis to historical cases to show that a single set of competing theories can experience both
incommensurable periods and commensurable moments over time, and that incommensurable
periods can follow commensurable moments. A history of oscillating adjudications suggests, and
I argue, that adjudications are never final, but are historically indexed. There is, in principle, no
end to the accumulation of observational evidence that can revise and even reverse a historical
adjudication. I call this relatively uncontroversial principle the no-end principle. The upshot, which
is controversial, is that competing-theory adjudication may at times be an obstacle to efficient
exploratory investigation and discovery. Theoretical pluralism arises as a worthy alternative to
competing-theory adjudication.

2. Background
The question of whether or not theory plays a crucial role in observation has captured the interest
of philosophers of science for the greater part of the last century. So much seems to hinge on the
answer. Specifically, if the observational evidence that is used to test a prevailing theory is ordered,
gathered, and interpreted on the basis of the posits and structure of the very theory in question,
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how can it be used to objectively adjudicate between that theory and its competitors? The class of
views that says it can’t can be characterized as taking on the thesis that competing theories are
necessarily incommensurable in effect of their theory-ladenness. Originally proposed as a thesis
regarding theoretical semantics, incommensurability is also the thesis that there is no observational
measure neutral to competing theories that could enable their logic-based adjudication. The
consequence of incommensurability is that socio-psychological conversions must ensue on the
basis of prejudice, rather than on a basis of a logical decision according to observational fact. On
the other hand, the class of views that denies the incommensurability thesis tends to also deny that
theory plays a crucial role in all observation. In other words, observation can be used to objectively
and logically adjudicate between or amongst competing theories.
In recent decades of scholarship, a new approach is emerging from this Kuhnian-Popperian
dialectic. Resistance to theory-ladenness has let up as the original assumption that it leads to the
incommensurability thesis has been called into question. Nora Mills Boyd and James Bogen (2021)
characterize this new approach as follows:

Why think that theory ladenness of empirical results would be problematic in the first
place? If the theoretical assumptions with which the results are imbued are correct, what is
the harm of it? After all, it is in virtue of those assumptions that the fruits of empirical
investigation can be ‘put in touch’ with theorizing at all.

However, the very reason that the “theory ladenness of empirical results would be problematic in
the first place” is that we assume that “the theoretical assumptions with which the results are
imbued are correct.” Furthermore, in that case, the concept of ‘correctness’ has lost its use; a la
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Wittgenstein, we have no criterion in place for its application, and, thus, a la Feyerabend, anything
goes. If it even makes sense to apply the concept of ‘correctness’ to theories in this way (i.e.
‘correct’ as opposed to some competing theory that is presumably ‘incorrect’), then we have
overwhelming historical evidence to support the view that our theoretical assumptions are not
correct.
I do find this new attitude towards the problem most welcome, however. One might have
expected me to bring us back into the original dialectic, but my goal here is to help clarify this new
approach and what it entails. I am on board with the view that theory informs all observation. What
I am not on board with is that all observation is theory-laden. But, indeed, some of it is, and we
put ourselves in a limited epistemic position when we presume that our prevailing theoretical
assumptions—as opposed to alternative theoretical assumptions—must be correct.

3. Theory-informity as a continuum from basic to scientifically advanced posits
All basic, ordinary observation is theory-informed, and more advanced scientific observations
inherit their theory-informity from the metaphorical use or reappropriation of basic theoryinformed observational concepts.
The degree of theory-informity required for the observational uptake of information is a
continuum from the most basic to the most scientifically advanced theories that inform
observations. I advance two claims in defense of a theory-informity continuum: (1) we are theoryinformed at the most basic level given our idiosyncratic human biology; and (2) the observational
concepts of scientific theories are a product of basic theory-informing concepts and thus follow
the rule of the first claim.
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Put simply, a theory is a conceptual organization of our view of some domain, typically
explanatory for functional ends, but not always (e.g. string theory). This organization has the form
of a theoretical framework, an abstract space of interconnected dispositional concepts that together
are explanatory over the relevant domain and expectant of certain correlations.
Ordinary perceptual observation is sometimes called ‘pre-theoretical’. But even ordinary
observations are imbued with theoretical concepts that function within an organized framework. I
thus advocate for dropping ‘pre-theoretical’ in favor of degrees of theory-informity.2 It is only
when an observation is interpreted through concepts, i.e. forms, that are interconnected in an
organized theoretical framework that they become in-formation at all. Without those recognizable
theoretical concepts at hand, observation remains form-less.
Note that one cannot readily theory-neutrally report the observation of the daily sunset, as
famously articulated by Hanson (1958, p. 5). The description of the phenomenon accords with a
conceptual framework at work to make it such. A geocentric theorist will report the sun as
revolving around the earth in its setting beneath the horizon, just like the moon; a heliocentric
theorist will report not the sun actively setting, but the earth’s horizon shifting according to its
daily rotation, unlike the moonset.
A degree of theory-informity is required for even the most basic observations to become
useful information. Our human-specific biological equipment instills our observations with theory
down to our most basic, seemingly-irrevocable concepts. Without our eyes, ‘sunset’ would be an
entirely different observational report—the cooling of our skin, the silencing of bird-song—not to
mention we wouldn’t have developed telescopes, developed a lunar theory of tides, explained

2

I do not here invoke a strict sense of ‘continuum’ and thus say nothing about whether there is a transfinite
cardinality to the set of theory-informed conceptual frameworks. I maintain use of ‘continuum’ over
‘spectrum’ only to invoke that this set is not cleanly discrete.
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rainfall in terms of cumulous clouds, theorized about other planets in our solar system, much less
known of a spherical sun, nor made use of star charts for navigation.
The observational concepts of scientific theories are a product of basic or ordinary
observational concepts, like ‘color’, ‘space’, ‘time’, and so on, which are theory-informed.
Observations in meteorology and astronomy, for example, are informed by the concepts of more
foundational or basic theories. That is the case even considering that scientific theories and
innovations enable us to expand our scope of observation. We still must use and adapt our familiar
concepts to explain what we see. No meteorological program proceeds by denying that basic
theory-informed observations like ‘clouds’ and ‘rain’ are legitimate concepts; it rather provides
details for developing better forecasting techniques by expanding, precisifying, or delineating subconcepts within those basic concepts according to further observations and by analogy to other
familiar concepts. That clouds are the effect of evaporation and formed in accordance with
atmospheric pressure, or that clouds and rain are composed mainly of hydrogen and oxygen, are
expansions, not retractions, of the basic theoretical concepts we make use of in ordinary
perception.
One might say this is not so in the case of ‘sunset’: our current cosmic model no longer takes
the sun to ‘set’, but the earth to rotate. But ‘sunset’ is not a basic theoretical concept once
observation of it is laden by a geocentric model that can compete with a heliocentric one. ‘Sunset’
is only basic when it indicates no competitive explanatory cosmic model: the basic phenomenon
that happens in the evening, in which colors change and objects move, which is already theoretical.
So, while scientific theories may enhance our ordinary observational capabilities, they do not
proceed against our basic theoretical concepts, but frequently make use of them. Even when
advanced explanatory theories can be said to undermine more basic theory-informed observations,
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that need not involve complete destruction of ordinary theoretical concepts. Newton’s and
Einstein’s theories might undermine or reconstruct aspects of ordinary theoretical observation, but
both theories still make use of the basic theoretical concept of a ‘second’.
The details of time-expansive or time-condensed changes escape our ordinary notice. The
novel observations gained by scientific innovations expand our basic concept of time and deliver
insight into its perceptual and subjective nature, but they have not eliminated our own basic
concept of time that we went in with—we adapt and expand the original familiar theoretical
concept in attempt to make the alien part of our own familiar, theory-captured world. For example,
we say that the clock ticks seconds more slowly in dilation, or more quickly in time-lapse
contraction.
That more advanced scientific concepts are themselves grounded in theory is evidenced by
etymological investigations: ‘nucleus’, for instance, is a concept that functions in various
theoretical frameworks and comes to scientific theory originally from a more basic theoretical
framework. Observations of ‘nuclei’ scale the continuum from basic to advanced degrees of
theory-informity; this example is evidence of the continuum as well as of the use of basic
theoretical concepts to explain theoretically advanced phenomena in observation. In astronomy,
the nucleus is the solid part of a comet’s head; in biology, it is an organelle integral to the cell that
carries genetic information; in physics, it is the central core of the atom; in sociology, it is the core
of the family that is extended by relatives. These are all analogies to the original meaning of
‘nucleus’, from Latin nux, meaning “nut”, from which derived Latin nuc- and nucleus, to mean
“core” or “kernel”. That already-theoretical concept in turn only gains its meaning according to
connections with other concepts in a theoretical framework: there is no ‘physical core’ without
‘spatial extension’ of some kind. That distinction and organization in itself is theoretical. We can
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only apply our familiar theoretical frameworks and their basic concepts to theoretically explain
and capture unfamiliar observational realms.
No matter if we coin novel terms for novel phenomena, we understand observations of novel
phenomena through our familiar, basic theory-informing observational concepts. Consider that
metaphors and analogies from basic theory are frequently used by scientists in their attempts to
explain otherwise wholly alien phenomena. Planets were first ‘wandering’ stars. This too
evidences that scientific observational concepts are always theoretical, insofar as they are built by
analogy out of other already-familiarized theoretical concepts.
Consider some other examples.
Galileo already had ‘mountains’ in his geological framework, without which he could not
have reported their familiar presence on the moon. The ‘mountains on the moon’ are no less
theoretical than our basic theoretical concept of ‘mountains on earth’. Had there been no mountains
on earth to develop a theoretical, dispositional concept of ‘mountain’ as, for example, ‘disposed to
create shadows when light is cast’, the unfamiliar appearance of mountains on the moon could not
have been readily familiarized and used as a basis for taking the steps towards a theory of a
spherical earth-like moon.
The ‘wave’ theory of light was constructed based on an understanding of the more basic
theoretical concepts that apply to ocean waves and ripple effects.
Niels Bohr’s ‘planetary model’ of the atom was theoretically explained based on another
scientific theory, the heliocentric model of the solar system: the ‘nucleus’ like ‘sun’, and the
‘electrons’ like ‘planets’, with ‘spin’ mirroring the familiar ‘rotation’ of the planets. Darwin’s
theory of evolution by natural selection was based on the idea that nature could select in the way
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that humans have selected traits through animal and plant husbandry. So in this case, a familiar
practical theory was used to construct a grander explanatory theory.
Without theory-informity, there is no scientific observational information, much less
evidence, and we are theory-informed in scientific observation only given our idiosyncratic human
biology. As Protagoras still resounds: “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that
they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not” (DK 80B1). This goes for basic
observational concepts and advanced scientific observational concepts: all observation is theoryinformed.

4. Competing-theory adjudication: Incommensurability vs. commensurability
The two accounts of theory evaluation here considered diverge on whether or not theory-informity
entails that competing theories are incommensurable, and, in turn, diverge further on the
consequences for theory evaluation through adjudication. I call incommensurable competing
theories and their alogical, intuition-based adjudications conversions, and commensurable
competing theories and their logic-based adjudications commensurations. Consideration of
accounts of the incommensurability and commensurability theses side-by-side enable the
identification of a necessary condition for commensurability in light of theory-informity.

4.1. Incommensurable adjudications
Incommensurability is typically understood as the view that competing theories are not
intertranslatable; this entails that there is no non-theoretical language that could enable their
adjudication, and that thus, insofar as adjudication occurs, it must be a conversion rather than a
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logical decision. For my purposes, I take the incommensurability thesis to be the inference from
theory-informity to the conclusion that competing theories cannot be adjudicated according to a
neutral observational measure. The consequent is thought to be granted insofar as theory-informity
does not permit theory-free observations. Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1962), and Feyerabend (1970)
argue that historical cases reveal that adjudications occur through conversions based on alternative
theoretical constructions of domain-specific observational data.
Hanson (1958, p. 4) describes microbiologists with competing theories observing the same
cell on the same slide: one microbiologist sees an “organ”—Golgi’s 1898 internal reticular
apparatus—where the other sees a “coagulum resulting from inadequate staining techniques.”
These observation-reports preclude commensurability. To expand on Hanson’s case: one
competitor rejects Golgi’s black reaction silver-staining technique as improper, while Golgi
himself uses it to adduce evidence of an unknown structure in a nerve cell. The microbiologists
have no theory-neutral standard to commensurate their observations informed by their competing
theories. They observe the same raw data but they interpret it each according to their respective
theory. Incommensurability is not merely a matter of divergent theoretical explanations for an
observation; observational evidence itself is not theory-free.
Feyerabend (1970) argues that Copernicus recruited no novel evidence to construct his
revolutionary view. He quotes Copernicus as stating that we must “hold fast” to the observations
of the Greeks: “And if anyone on the contrary thinks that the ancients are untrustworthy in this
regard, surely the gates of this art are closed to him” (p. 140). Copernicus himself saw alternative
theorizing as an art, not a logical choice based on recalcitrant observations. That fits historical fact.
Copernicus rejected the geostatic theory even though no observational evidence indicated a
moving earth. Stellar parallax, a crucial consequence of his theory, was not observable with the
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naked eye, nor even with early reflecting telescopes. The lack of stellar parallax in observation
was, on the other hand, a direct consequence of the foregoing geostatic theory. Copernicus
proposed an ad hoc hypothesis to accommodate the lack of observed stellar parallax as ‘beyond
the limits of observation’. The hypothesis stated that the earth’s orbital radius around the sun is
significantly tiny in comparison to the earth’s distance from the stars. ‘No stellar parallax’ was
therefore insufficient to overturn Copernican theory, which began to reign in astronomy before
1838, when Bessel first used a heliometer to successfully measure and observe the parallax of
stars. As Kuhn (1962, pp. 163-164) also argues, it could only have been a socio-psychological
conversion of allegiance that favored the Copernican theory before observation logically
corroborated it; no logic-based adjudication ruled out the Ptolemaic view, as befits the
incommensurability thesis.
If not logic, what then provokes an adjudicatory shift in cases of incommensurability? As
Feyerabend (1970, pp. 160-161) says, “science is much more ‘sloppy’ and ‘irrational’ than its
methodological image” and progresses only through “deviations” that dismiss reason: our theories
exist “only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion; because these things as
opposed to reason, and because they were permitted to have their way.” Allegiance to an
alternative theory must be brought about not by logical arguments but “by irrational means such
as propaganda, emotion, ad hoc hypotheses, and appeal to prejudices of all kinds” (p. 113). Kuhn
(1962, p. 151) says conversions to a new theoretical paradigm occur through “persuasion rather
than proof” and often through the death of “pigheaded” allegiants to the old theoretical paradigm—
Feyerabend’s (1970, p. 154) “freedom from…the tyranny of constipated systems of thought.”
Competing theorists are “practicing in different worlds” (Kuhn, p. 149). “What they look at has
not changed,” but there is no available theory-free description since “…[they] see different things
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when they look from the same point in the same direction” (ibid.). Alogical conversions, akin to
the religious type, must ensue in place of logical decisions, since competing theorists inevitably
uptake an observation according each to their own framework.

4.2. Commensurable adjudications
I have argued that without theory-informity, there is no observational information. The degree of
theory-informity required for the observational uptake of information is a continuum from the most
basic to the most scientifically advanced theories that inform observations. If we hope to evaluate
our scientific theories critically using observations as evidence, we must make use of observations
that are theory-informed. I argue that the theory-informity of observations does not entail
incommensurability.3 The various concepts we use within our ordinary theoretical frameworks do
not automatically negatively impact the commonality of theory-informed observations for
competing theories. This section features two arguments that center on a distinction between two
different modes of theory-informity.
The literature tends to appeal to ‘theory-laden observations’ and ‘theory-informed
observations’ without distinction. I reject the idea that these are synonymous. That observations
are ‘laden’ by theories invokes the principle that they are heavily loaded or burdened by theories,
while ‘informed’ invokes the principle that observations become meaningful information in light
of theories. I thus re-appropriate ‘theory-ladenness’ to apply only to cases in which theoryinformity biases observation to the point of exclusion of an alternative theory; if Golgi’s body is
observed to be a mere coagulum resulting from improper staining techniques, then that excludes

3

Even falsificationist Popper defends theory-informity: “…observation is always observation in the light
of theories” (p. 59, fn. *1); and “…observations, and even more so observation statements and statements
of experimental results, are always interpretations of the facts observed… interpretations in the light of
theories” (p. 107, fn. *2).
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the observation that it is a cell organelle. As I use the terms, theory-ladenness is a mode of theoryinformity which arises when observations are respectively informed by the competing theories
themselves, whereas theory-informity tout court is the simple fact that observations are informed
by or interpreted according to theories.
Competing-theory neutrality is an alternative mode to theory-ladenness that theory-informity
can take. Competing-theory neutrality is instantiated when the theories that inform observations
are neutral with regards to competing theories, in the sense that observational evidence could favor
either of the theories being evaluated. In other words, the concepts involved in the uptake of
competing-theory neutral evidence do not depend on theoretical commitments that distinguish
competing theories. Sometimes, such competing-theory neutral observations will favor one theory
over another; in such a case, that observation counts as a commensuration standard, since it could
have been the other way around. In other words, both competing theorists can uptake the same
observational information.
To substantiate the distinction between theory-ladenness and competing-theory neutrality,
consider the theory-laden evidence of freefall as interpreted by geostatic and heliocentric theorists
as opposed to the competing-theory neutral evidence of stellar parallax enabled by the heliometer.
In the tower experiment, the motion of a falling object was either seen as straight, given a geostatic
model, or simultaneously straight and circular, given a heliocentric, rotating-earth model. This is
theory-ladenness: the same raw data is interpreted divergently by competing theorists, as Hanson,
Kuhn, and Feyerabend showed us. A theory-informed observation common to both competitors—
a competing theory-neutral observation—came thanks to innovations in refracting telescopes, and
in particular, to the heliometer. The heliometer provided competing-theory neutral observational
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evidence in the sense that it enabled both heliocentric and geostatic theorists to uptake
observational evidence of stellar parallax, which corroborated a moving earth.
First, I argue that theory-ladenness entails incommensurability, but theory-informity tout
court does not. Competing-theory neutrality can enable commensurability and logical
adjudications based upon observational evidence.
Second, I argue that competing theory-neutrality does not entail commensurability in the way
that theory-ladenness entails incommensurability. This is evidenced by the fact that there are times
when theories do not see adjudication even given competing-theory neutral evidence. In such
times, competing theories remain incommensurable.
To initiate my first argument, consider a useful illustration in terms of mineral sample testing,
in which theory-ladenness and competing-theory neutrality are seen to have different outcomes.
Whether a given sample of jade is jadeite, nephrite, or a common simulant can be considered
competing theories of a mineral sample’s status. A jadeite-theorist may have the view that a sample
of jade is jadeite based on its visual characteristics and its weight. But a nephrite-theorist may have
the view that the same sample is nephrite, based on those very same observed characteristics. This
can happen because jadeite and nephrite appear similar and have overlapping density ranges. If
these competing theorists use no other means to adjudicate but each verify their theory with
observation statements given their respective theory, they are inevitably incommensurable. That
indicates theory-ladenness,

which,

without

a

competing-theory

neutral

test,

entails

incommensurability.
But if these theorists use a competing-theory neutral test, it is possible that their competing
theories can become commensurable. Physical and chemical tests of mineral samples are
themselves based on theories, and they provide observations that are theory-informed, but they do
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not uniquely favor any of the theories on trial. The tests do not in themselves presuppose the sample
is one mineral or another: they are common to jadeite, nephrite, and their simulants, and can yield
any determination. A refractive index test, for example, can help determine whether the sample is
jadeite or nephrite, or something else. If the refractive index test is used, it is a possible standard
for commensurability: it offers a competing-theory neutral observational measure. If the result of
the refractive index test falls into the range of jadeite, but not nephrite or any other simulant, then
the competing theories are commensurable, and a logic-based adjudication can ensue in favor of
the jadeite theory. This illustrates how competing-theory neutrality can enable commensurability.
Now for a look at history. The distinction between theory-ladenness and competing-theory
neutrality is brought out with an expansion of my discussion of microbiologists’ proper- and
improper-staining techniques. These techniques were equally theory-laden and self-verifying. In
the case of Golgi, we saw that such theory-laden interpretations of the same observation—the
silver impregnation slides—disabled commensurability. Competing theorists’ divergent
interpretations of the same evidence entailed that these theories were incommensurable given the
evidence at hand.
However, commensuration was enabled fifty years later given competing-theory neutral
evidence offered by the novelty of the electron microscope. There is a competing-theory neutral
theory to how the electron microscope works, explanatory over the evidence the microscope
provides. Since the electron microscope did not favor either of the two competing views about
silver-staining, and since both proper- and improper-technique theorists accepted the results of the
electron microscope, it can be said that it offered a competing-theory neutral observational
measure. Silver impregnation did not need to be used to view the internal reticular apparatus
posited by Golgi’s proper-technique theory, so improper-technique theorists could accept it. The
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observations based upon the electron microscope were indeed theory-informed, and yet
competing-theory neutral: they enabled logical adjudication between the proper- and impropertechnique theories in favor of the proper and against the improper, and thus in favor of Golgi’s
internal reticular apparatus. To maintain the improper-technique theory, one would have to reject
the technique of the electron microscope (and its magnificent corroboration of other accepted
organelles) or otherwise explain why such a strong statistical correlation occurs between Golgi’s
silver impregnation results and those afforded by the theory of the electron microscope. This case
on its own reveals the two modes of theory-informity: it is sometimes healthy and innocuous (a la
the electron microscope’s competing-theory neutral but still theory-informed observations), and is
sometimes biased and disabling (a la the improper- and proper-technique theories and their theoryladen observations).
Consider an infrequently discussed example: the commensuration between the PaulingCorey (1953) and the Watson-Crick (1953) theories of the structure of DNA, in which the
competing-theory neutral but still theory-informed observational evidence relevant to logical
adjudication was Franklin’s exceptional X-ray crystallography images of the macromolecule.
These images were accepted by competing theorists, indicating that there were clearly two, not
three strands of phosphate groups, and the nucleic acids were interior to the base pairs of the
molecule.
Now for my second argument of this section. Competing-theory neutral observations enable
commensuration (i.e. commensurable, logic-based, decisive adjudication): it is only theoryladenness that precludes it. Competing-theory neutral observations are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for competing-theory commensuration. Theory-informity can enable
commensuration when theory-informed observations are competing-theory neutral. But
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competing-theory neutrality does not entail adjudicatory commensurability in the way that theoryladenness entails adjudicatory incommensurability.
The X-ray diffraction crystallography images presented prior to Franklin’s had not been
enough to adjudicate the competing theories of the structure of DNA. Pauling and Corey (1953)
proposed their triple-helix theory given X-ray diffraction crystallography images. X-ray diffraction
was a competing-theory neutral test: any of the competing theories could accept its results and its
results could have favored any of the competing views. Before Franklin’s image was provided that
adjudicated in favor of the double-helix theory—X-ray diffraction crystallography was not
sufficient for commensurability.
Theory-informed observations can provide competing-theory neutral informational measures
that allow for logical adjudication. In such cases, theory-informed observations can be considered
common insofar as they are impartial exploratory measures acceptable to each competing
explanatory theory. Competing-theory neutrality, while still theory-informed, enables potential
commensurability. Without a competing-theory neutral measure, competing theories and their
respective theory-informed observations remain incommensurable. In other words, theoryladenness in the absence of any competing-theory neutral observation entails incommensurability.
So, theory-ladenness has distinctively negative consequences for commensurability that
theory-informity vis-à-vis competing theory-neutrality does not. We have seen that (1) theoryladenness necessarily precludes commensurability and thus commensuration in the absence of
competing-theory neutral evidence; and (2) while competing-theory neutrality enables
commensurability, it does not necessitate commensuration.
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5. Adjudications are never final
We saw that logic-based adjudications of theories can sometimes occur given competing-theory
neutral evidence, without which they remain incommensurable. But competing-theory neutral
evidence, we also saw, does not entail commensurability nor force an adjudication in the way
wholly theory-laden evidence entails incommensurability and precludes logic-based adjudications.
This final section argues that even when competing theories are commensurable and competingtheory neutral evidence enables a logic-based adjudication, adjudications are never final. Rather,
the commensurability of competing theories is always indexed to a particular historical moment.
As was seen in Section 3, there are moments when incommensurable competing theories become
commensurable: novel competing-theory neutral evidence can enable the logical adjudication of
competing theories in spite of foregoing periods of theory-ladenness. This section expands that
argument with cases of oscillating adjudications: in the expanse of time, competing theories can
experience back-and-forth shifts between periods of incommensurability and moments of
commensurability, along with reversals of logic-based adjudications.

5.1. Oscillating commensurations
Historical cases of oscillating commensurations, in which ancestral theories make comebacks as
novel versions of the same theories, support the view that even commensurations are never final:
all adjudications, both conversions and commensurations, must always be historically indexed.
An oscillating history of commensurations between particle and wave theories of light
returned to incommensurability at least twice before the two theories joined together to construct
the principle of wave-particle duality that is the core of quantum physics.
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Until a competition was announced by the Académie of Sciences in 1818, commensuration
favored the view that light had a particulate nature. Newton’s contemporary Huygens (1678;
preceded by Hooke, 1665) proposed a wave theory of light, but over a century passed until it was
taken seriously in mainstream physics. Newton’s light corpuscles, which travel in straight lines,
and not Huygens’ spherical wavelets, which emanate as a wavefront from source points, could
sufficiently explain the discretization that occurs in diffraction and dispersion: the first occurrence
of commensuration favored the particle theory.
In 1802, Fresnel regenerated the wave theory with a principle of interference to explain the
diffraction and dispersion effects that previously challenged the wave theory, and in 1807, Young
published his double-slit experiment. By passing light through two slits, he revealed an
interference pattern characteristic of waves, unexplained by particle theory. That began to tip
adjudication in favor of wave theory. In the competition of 1818, Siméon Poisson dismissed the
wave theory given that it predicted the result that a steel ball placed between a light source and a
screen would produce the effect of a bright spot of light at the center of a circular shadow, due to
the interference of light waves with themselves. He figured that result, which Newton’s theory
crucially does not predict, was “absurd”. François Arago put Poisson’s experiment to the test and
confirmed in observation the prediction Poisson had deduced from the axioms of wave theory,
corroborating the wave theory with competing-theory neutral observational evidence (Wheaton
1983; 2009). Perhaps most consequential was Foucault’s (1850) experiment, which found light
slows down in dense media—contra Newton’s theory and pace Huygens’ first assumption that
gave birth to his wave theory (Aspect, 2017). All of these observations falsified axioms of the
particle theory. The result was commensuration in favor of a wave theory, armed with Fresnel’s
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wave-interference principle, and later, too, with Maxwell’s (1865) dovetailing of light, electric,
and magnetic fields into a unified electromagnetic field theory in which energy “undulates”.
Now for the oscillation: favor briefly tipped back to particle theory given an observation of
the photoelectric effect that did not conform to the axioms of the classical wave theory as then
formulated by Maxwell. The atomic release of a ‘photoelectron’ (later, simply ‘electron’) occurs
when a light beam radiates energy over the surface of an atom at a frequency threshold, anywhere
from visible to extreme ultraviolet, dependent on the element. At the end of the 19th century,
evidence surfaced that a below-threshold beam of light does not accumulate the sufficient energy
to release a photoelectron after intensified exposures, as predicted by wave theory. If a light beam
acts as a continuous wave of energy, energy should accumulate with increased exposure and thus
reach the energy threshold required for photoelectric emission. But to observe that effect, a beam
of light must already be at that threshold frequency: light energy does not continuously build on
itself to release an electron in the way that continuous impacts of gentle ocean waves cause a rockface to visibly erode with increased intensity or extended exposure. Rather, below-threshold, light
radiation spreads over the surface of an atom without photoelectric emission. This ‘all-or-nothing’
effect was well-explained by particles whose energy is discretized.
The confounding photoelectric effect brought competing-theory neutral observational
information to light that seemed to falsify the axiom that stated light acts as a continuous wave of
energy, since there is no detectable effect of that continuity. However, as mentioned, waves did
explain many phenomena that particles did not. Wave and particle theories were again thrown into
a period of incommensurability, and the competing theories remained incommensurable for at least
a decade after Einstein (1905) published his theoretical solution that extended Planck’s abandoned
theory of light quanta. Millikan (1916, p. 355), a decade later, substantially defended Einstein’s
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theory against both mainstream wave theorists and returning particle theorists, adducing evidence
of its corroboration, stating that “[The photoelectric effect] seems to demand some modification
of classical theory.” Einstein (1905) had shown that, indeed, light rays do act as Planck’s wavelike quanta, but also, too, as a stream of particles. At higher intensities, more photons are emitted,
but all with the same discretized frequency, thus explaining the photoelectric effect. His theory
laid the groundwork for the “paradox-based” wave-particle duality principle, fundamental to the
mechanics of all electromagnetic phenomena.
Particle and wave theories thus became compatible and complementary. As Einstein and
Infeld (1938) wrote:

There seems no likelihood for forming a consistent description of the phenomena of light by a
choice of only one of the two languages. It seems as though we must use sometimes the one
theory and sometimes the other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new
kind of difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately neither of them fully
explains the phenomena of light, but together they do. (pp. 262-263)

Rather than fuss over adjudication, quantum mechanics and its success demonstrates that, at least
on very small scales, we can take paradox and run.
Now for the Lamarckian and Darwinian theories, which have seen oscillating adjudications
with the to-and-fro rise, fall, and rise again of some Lamarckian ideas. Our current situation in
evolutionary research suggests that the Lamarckian “embarrassment” is back to haunt us given
novel observations of “epimutations”, which could play a role in evolution. Epimutations are
alterations to biological traits through environmental pressures other than mutations in the DNA
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sequence, such as the “silencing” of genes via the attachment of methyl groups to particular
sequences, so that those gene sequences cannot be used by the cell’s protein-making apparatus
(Balter, 2000, p. 34). In 2014, Nature asked, “Does evolutionary theory need a rethink?” Their
answers are divided, with one group answering: “Yes, urgently” and the other group answering
“No, all is well.” Both teams agree that the processes by which organisms grow and develop can
play a crucial role in evolution; the question is whether this is revisionary. Some say it looks as
Lamarckian as genetic mutations look Darwinian (Darwin did not know about genes). In a 2020
study in Cell Reports, researchers at Yale University showed in real time that multiple generations
of yeast cells could pass on epigenetic (non-genetic) environmentally-induced changes in gene
activity (Luo et al., 2020). Given the new and forthcoming research, our contemporary mainstream
Neo-Darwinian framework may be better off leaving room for some Neo-Lamarckian processes.
Though it is important to note that the new evidence does not yet suggest a mechanism for the
inheritance of acquired phenotypic traits; epigenetic mechanisms are more subtle.
Lamarkianism was not a fringe view in its day; Spencer, Darwin and Haeckel all allowed for
development through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The Darwinian theory of natural
selection had insufficient adjudicatory support until Mendel’s work led to genetics research, from
which Neo-Darwinism entered the scene. One of Weismann’s central dogmas of genetics, the
Weismann barrier, states that hereditary information’s transfer is unidirectional: from germ to
soma, but not from soma to germ. The Weismann barrier made a DNA mechanism for Lamarckian
evolution through lifetime-acquired characteristics untenable by presenting competing-theory
neutral observational evidence against it. The evidence was so decisive that Lamarckianism was
regarded as refuted by mainstream science; any residual proponents were thereby relegated to the
fringe.
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Defenders of epigenetics believe that evidence indicates that there is a mechanism in the
methyl groups that attach to DNA that could allow for lifetime-acquired characteristics to be
passed on to offspring. Recent decades of research suggest there are various mechanisms for
horizontal gene transfer, and more explicitly restrain the force of the Weismann barrier given
evidence of soma to germ transfer. In particular, the pressures of a mother’s early-life environment
can be passed on to her offspring via a mechanism in the methyl groups of DNA. One might doubt
whether that is really Lamarckian, but it is enough to bypass Weismann’s barrier, and thus affords
a potential resurgence of Lamarckian ideas more generally.
Both cases of oscillating adjudications support the conclusion that adjudications are
historically indexed, rather than final.

5.2. The no-end principle
No finality to adjudication illustrates what I call the no-end principle, which states that there is, in
principle, no end to the accumulation of competing-theory neutral observational information that
can reverse a historical adjudication.
The force of the no-end principle can be broken down into two points. The first is
incontestable: unless humanity sees its end or otherwise chooses to stop investigation, we will
always continue to investigate, accumulating observations throughout the course of time. The
second is that amongst our future observations there could possibly always remain novelty and
anomalies that exceed our most comprehensive explanatory frameworks. Whether these future
observations will always contain novelty is a matter to be seen; but it is sufficient for the no-end
principle that it be merely possible. A look at the history already considered illustrates that it is not
only possible but probable that future observations will include novelties, and that those novelties
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might even sometimes subject us to oscillating commensurations. Even if it were merely possible
that the oscillations I presented above occur, the no-end principle means that we would be smart
to take adjudications and even commensurations as historically indexed, rather than as the final
word.
The no-end principle is not a threat to science, but can be seen as opportunistic. The noend principle only threatens views that defend science as progressing towards greater explanatory
power in terms of the supersession of incomplete or inadequate theories by more comprehensively
explanatory ones.4 That view of science heeds an implicit goalpost, as a foundation of its
formulation, towards which our scientific progress moves. It is ill-founded. ‘Progress’ is thought
to be satisfied when the evolution of science is aligned with aims to advance an ideal and complete
theory that is wholly explanatory—free of weaknesses that characterize past theories. It is thought
that theories that are less explanatory over observations are always abandoned forever. Not so, as
we have seen. Wave theory, particle theory, Lamarckian theory—and also heliocentric theory and
geological catastrophism—are just a few examples of dead theories that have come back to life.
While there have historically been commensurations of competing theories, given insight
into theory-comebacks and rescinding commensurations, it is irrational and ironically against our
interests to expect or aim for any conclusive adjudication in the progressive sense. And for that
reason, I think that our idea of ‘progress’ tends to be directed towards an ideal that not only should

4

One might object that this point against progress sounds stronger than the no-end principle, insofar as one
might define progress in terms of growing explanatory power, and at the same time, maintain that theories
can lose their explanatory power, and thus place of prominence. On that view, a theory could have a revival,
but that revival is not a return to the original theory, so much as an updated form that includes aspects of
the original; thus, even such revivals imply progress. But I would claim that novel versions of ancestral
theories are the same as, but not identical to, the original theory. Consider that a theory that never falls out
of fashion also evolves and changes in framework over time, but we don’t deny that it’s the same theory. If
we did, we’d say, e.g., plate tectonics is no longer a good theory; and that’s simply not the case. We
constantly make tweaks to our mainstream theories as evidence accumulates. In the same way, a theory that
dies out and comes back to life updated counts as the same theory.
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not expect to find satisfaction, but defeats the interests of a science that should be understood as
first and foremost creative and practical, over and above explanatory. I think there is no end to
the creative productions we should expect from science. If some degree of immortality is the
greatest hope we have for medicine, certainly once achieved, we will and should want and expect
even greater novel feats in its wake; I suggest such feats would be due to novel theories, since,
currently the theories of allopathic medicine cannot accommodate something like immortality.
Kuhn (1962) says, “Novelty for its own sake is not a desideratum in the sciences as it is in so many
other creative fields” (p. 168). It may not be, but should be.
On my view, comprehensive explanation is not itself the end for science, but a crucial
means for advancing our scientific creative abilities to produce problem-solving benefits for
humanity. And those novel benefits should be and are included in our desiderata. Kitcher has
recently raised interest in the social dimensions of science, arguing that it can work for the “human
good” (see most recently Kitcher’s 02/13/2019 lecture). This is in line with some forgotten ideas
of Francis Bacon, our much-appraised father of science itself. As he famously says, Artium vexare
natura: art vexes nature. He advocates for the “generation or transformation of natural bodies by
art” in his Novum Organum: he dreams of humanity harnessing a “science of magic” that uses the
“mechanical arts” to “vex” matter (see Weeks, 2007 for this analysis of Bacon’s thought). In his
New Atlantis, he includes a list of some sought-after scientific feats, which he calls Magnalia
Naturae: “The Wonderful Works of Nature; Chiefly Such as Benefit Mankind”.

6. Conclusion
I have shown that theory-informity both restricts and graces our observational abilities to
adjudicate between competing scientific theories; theory-ladenness is to be avoided and
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competing-theory neutrality is the ideal if we are to logically adjudicate. But that only went to
show that even the commensuration that does occur given competing-theory neutral observations
is never absolute or final. That is the work of the no-end principle, which states that competingtheory neutral observational information may come to light that can reverse theoretical
adjudications. The last section brought evidence in favor of the no-end principle and argued for its
force to consider commensurability and adjudications as historically-indexed. There are times
when theories are incommensurable, and times when they become commensurable, and times
when commensuration is reversed. I thus reach my conclusion.
A possible upshot of the no-end principle is now worth noting. If it is correct that there is
no finality to adjudication, this raises the question of whether competing theories are best seen as
adjudicable in the first place. Taking seriously a historical index for adjudications raises questions
for what we can say about competing theories across the expanse of time. It suggests that we could
potentially be better off bypassing adjudications altogether in favor not just of patience given the
sways of competing-theory neutral evidence, but of sometimes seeing competing theories as
compatible, lest we forever be subject to the throes of adjudicatory oscillations in which so-called
“falsified” or “superseded” theories come back with a new force. This suggests the potential to
replace theoretical competition with theoretical pluralism, which, if well-organized, might enhance
the efficiency of research towards novel methods for medical cures, other technological feats, and
epistemic goals. Quantum mechanics, with its central principle of wave-particle duality, is
exemplary of the strength of this possibility. In light of historical evidence, theoretical pluralism
presents a worthy alternative to our paradigmatic adjudicatory method for advancements in
science.
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Popper quotes Novalis at the outset of his Logic of Scientific Discovery: “Theories are nets:
only he who casts will catch.” Better to cast more than less, and “broken” nets can not only still
catch but can also be repaired. Perhaps we could make use of a whole archive of theories for a
single observational domain, as recent advocates of theory proliferation and theoretical pluralism
argue (Chang 2012; Bschir 2015; Oriti 2017). As the wave-particle duality case shows, oscillating
commensurations can result in competing-theory compatibility, in which competing theories are
stronger together, even in paradox, than either is alone. We may be witnessing a similar
development in a return of some Lamarckian ideas.
I conclude that the sciences can benefit in exploratory and explanatory ability from the
comebacks of superseded theories and sometimes even with the compatibility of what were in the
past competing theories once commensurable. Historical adjudications should always be taken
with a grain of salt, and we should not expect or wish for a final adjudication, be it an arbitration
or commensuration. No finality to adjudications can be celebrated. We should look forward to the
possible wake of nonconforming anomalies to present themselves with the accumulation of novel
observations. Such anomalies enable us to continue finding the benefits that nature has on offer
for our manipulation towards our ever-growing wellbeing, which itself—at least I along with
Bacon hope—knows no end. “To infinity and beyond!”
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CHAPTER SIX

Theoretical pluralism in science

…I became convinced that there was something worth preserving in Priestley’s phlogiston, in Ritter’s
elementary water, in Dalton’s HO formula for water, and so on, without denying the merits of the newer
ideas that came to replace them. … Of course it would be unwise to make generalizations from a few
particular studies, but they were too suggestive to ignore. Like an itch demanding a scratch, they made
a persistent call for a re-examination of some fundamental assumptions about the nature of science
that were deeply ingrained into my own thinking. They made me seriously call into question the common
intuition that there could only be one right answer to a scientific question, and that once science has
answered a question definitively its verdict is final… I began with a grudging fascination with plurality
in science. But the longer I examined this troublesome plurality, the more I became positively excited
about it.
—Hasok Chang (2012), Is H2O Water? Evidence, Realism, and Pluralism

1. Introduction
I defend a normative claim, which is that we should be pluralists with regard to what theories we
use in exploratory investigation, and ultimately in practical decision-making. I define theoretical
pluralism and then show that it promises to solve problems that have been raised in this dissertation
and elsewhere in the philosophy of science.
There is a sense in which scientific research and practice is already pluralistic. Many
scientists might be perfectly happy to grant pluralism, and would readily admit that there are
multiple actively pursued theories within science at any given time. Scientific papers often take a
position within a debate, and the very idea of debate entails a pluralistic approach. The theoretical
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pluralism I advocate is different, since the locus of plurality is transferred from the epistemic
community to the epistemic agent. Unlike the community of scientists in debate, theoretical
pluralists do not conduct research under an exclusive and restrictive set of theories. Theories are
first of all conceptions that stretch beyond a simple set of propositions; they are ways of parsing
what is observed and are constantly evolving to accord with observation. That is their virtue. A
robust theoretical pluralism is utterly scientific: it need not be a dogma itself, and, in recognizing
that even competing-theory neutral commensurating evidence doesn’t always last (Chapter 5), it
encourages none. Theoretical pluralism rather encourages individual scientists and teams of
collaborators to use a wide-ranging multiplicity of competing theories in directing research—in
proposing hypotheses, deducing testable predictions, designing experiments, gathering data, and
interpreting results—as well as in making informed practical decisions. The pluralist sees that a
single action, even when guided by a single theory, can often be described in terms of more than
one theory. One decision—to get the vaccine or not, to test nuclear weapons or not, to drill into
Yellowstone or not—can become more informed as one increases the uptake of information
gathered by a variety of relevant theories.
In this chapter, I argue that theoretical pluralism is an ideal epistemic norm that could
potentially guide the beliefs and actions of epistemic agents. Hasok Chang (2012) similarly calls
his pluralism about science an ‘ideology’. It is important to recognize that we can avoid the
dogmatic connotation of that word insofar as theoretical pluralism encourages us to regularly
find ways to question and test whether any given epistemic norm—including this pluralist one—
is functional in any given context. Just as we can use theoretical pluralism to see the vices of
theoretical monism, we can use theoretical monism to point out the potential vices of theoretical
pluralism (see Chapter 7 for this exercise).
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Theoretical pluralism begins with the virtue of epistemic tolerance, which was the subject of
Chapter 4. Practicing tolerance can be a challenge even in the absence of any pluralist
commitments. Since pluralism requires not only tolerance, but also active inclusion of the fringe,
resistance to it should be unsurprising. It is also not to be expected that we can get there all at
once—the first glimpses of a fully-fledged pluralism can even induce a kind of vertigo. Seeming
to go against all logic, pluralism threatens the basis of cognitive stability. One might see this as a
red flag for pluralism. I see it as a reason to be careful and take things slowly. That does not mean
that there is no urgency to the problems pluralism could solve, such as the theory-ladenness that
undermines effective communication between the proponents of competing theories and the slow
uptake of research into anomalous phenomena. I discuss the pluralist solutions to such problems
plaguing science in Section 3. As we are just getting our bearings, though, we should keep an even
pace and beware of taking our pluralist commitments too far and too seriously on the first go. I
would advise readers to try to entertain what follows with a healthy skepticism and always with
one foot securely in the monist camp. The true pluralist does not deny the virtues of theoretical
monism, such as sometimes having a focused research program, but also sees its vices, such as
entrenchment in theory and unwavering methods.

2. Theoretical pluralism: a multidimensional definition
I outline a multidimensional definition of theoretical pluralism as (1) an active pluralist stance
towards scientific research and practice, (2) a practical and methodological maxim, and (3) an
epistemic attitude. Surely there are other dimensions to theoretical pluralism that deserve
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articulation. For now, however, these few dimensions will enable the articulation of the important
contributions theoretical pluralism can make (Section 3).

1. An active pluralist stance towards scientific research and practice. First, theoretical
pluralism involves adopting an active pluralistic stance with regard to the use of theories
in scientific investigation and the implementation of the fruits of that research in decisionmaking processes. Chang (2012) similarly articulates his pluralism about science as a “call
to action”: “It is not an idle pronouncement to ‘let a hundred flowers bloom’, but the effort
of actively cultivating the other 99 flowers” (p. 260). Theoretical pluralism demands more
of the scientist than mere tolerance of unorthodox theories. It demands that scientists put
effort and time into understanding their domain of expertise according to the principles,
posits, and methods of those alternative theories. Where there are not ready alternatives,
theoretical pluralism encourages scientists to develop them. In making practical decisions,
pluralists use a whole range of theories to see if and where they might converge. Where
the recommendations of the plurality of theories do not align and are incompatible,
pluralists have to work to solve a problem. Where decisions are time-sensitive, pluralists
can either follow the theory or set of theories that confronts the fewest number of
anomalies, or engage in debate just like monists do. Pluralist debate can be expected to be
more successful than it is for monists, since pluralists will be well-informed on all the
relevant data, and are not tied to any option in particular. We can also expect there to be
less biasing rhetoric, less aggression, and less recourse to ad hominem arguments. When
there are multiple theories involved, monists work against each other and put each other
down, while pluralists work together and raise each other up.
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2. A practical and methodological maxim. Secondly, and similarly, we can take on theoretical
pluralism as a practical and methodological maxim, which states that we should treat all
theories as works in progress, where our current well-confirmed theories only differ from
the ones that have been ruled out insofar as they have seen focused development in the
hands of mainstream researchers. We can use a diversity of research programs to
investigate phenomena. It is not just a matter of trying a theory out for fit or giving it a fair
hearing. Rather it involves the creative development of alternatives and a commitment to
honing them in accordance with observations—even sometimes in an ad hoc manner when
confronted with a recalcitrant observation. Sometimes ad hoc hypotheses are successful;
for Copernicus’s 1543 heliocentric model to work (and likewise with Aristarchus’s much
older model), he needed stellar parallax—the apparent shift in the position of stars from
different positions in Earth’s orbit—which was not observable. He thus hypothesized, ad
hoc, such extremely distant stars that stellar parallax would be unobservable to the naked
eye. Stellar parallax was observed by Bessel 300 years later (see Chapter 5). This is a case
of ad hoc success (for more analysis of ad hoc hypotheses along these lines, see Hunt, 2012,
p. 4). The pluralist deduces predictions from a theory in an attempt to evaluate the theory
for the express purpose of finding its points of weakness. Unlike the theoretical monist, the
pluralist doesn’t just throw theories out when they fail. Rather, pluralists accept that they
play an important creative role in theory construction. Scientists working pluralistically
therefore see no problem with reformulating auxiliaries and background assumptions after
finding falsifying evidence or confronting an inexplicable phenomenon. They then go
about figuring out ways to test their ad hoc moves to make sure that they are secure—
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sometimes, as in the case of Copernicus, this can take hundreds of years. For the pluralist,
the value of making risky predictions does not come when evidence is confirmatory. Unlike
the monist, the pluralist’s eyes do not widen so much at successful predictions, and because
the pluralist favors no theory in particular, the pluralist is free to take greater risks in
deducing predictions than the monist. Disconfirmations can be seen as projects for
scientists to exercise their creativity in developing various ways that a theory might find
its way in the face of an anomaly. Dark matter, for example, is not directly observable, but
is needed to explain otherwise anomalous distances between stars and is thus inferred.

3. An epistemic attitude. Although it may be useful for getting one’s bearings, theoretical
pluralism asks not that we treat theories as hypotheses or conjectures, since hypotheses or
conjectures can turn out to be correct. Pluralism asks that we actually use and entertain the
whole plurality of theories without the expectation of discovering their truth-value. There
are ways to understand cross-continental megalosaurus fossils according to a continental
fixist framework (e.g. sunken landbridges), and there are different ways to understand the
same phenomenon according to a continental mobilist framework (e.g. continents having
once formed a single landmass). As such, theoretical pluralism is an epistemic attitude that
we can have towards theories: according to theoretical pluralism, theories are ways of
organizing the phenomena of experience and are constantly changing alongside
observations. The pluralist does not treat theories as the sorts of things that are simply true
or false. Pluralists thus do not claim anything about what there actually is tout court, since
theoretical claims are always historically indexed.1 In this way, theoretical pluralism avoids
1

One option is to treat truth-statements from within the boundaries of a theoretical framework, rather than
external to it. For a treatment of truth as internal to theories, see Elgin, 2019, and Putnam, 1978. Pluralist

153

the dogmatic metaphysics we often slip into when we use scientific theories. Theoretical
pluralists cannot say that something is impossible, nor can they say that something does
not exist. That is a virtue considering how many successful fringe theories were initially
dismissed using similar language.

3. Theoretical pluralism as a solution
Theoretical pluralism is an approach for dealing with a central epistemic concern that has been
raised in this dissertation, namely, theory-entrenchment. The inability or unwillingness of the
mainstream to entertain promising alternative theories can lead to both theory-ladenness and
anomaly neglect or even blindness, as when continental fixists called the jigsaw-fit of the
continents an illusion. Pluralism is also a strategy we can use to confront problems that have kept
philosophers of science logged in debate, including the pessimistic meta-induction and the
successful predictions of theories that have been rejected. Rather than attempting to undermine or
skirt these worries, pluralism gives us the option to take them seriously.

3.1. Theory-entrenchment, theory-ladenness, and anomaly neglect
Theoretical pluralism is a solution to epistemic worries that arise as a result of theoryentrenchment. Theory-entrenchment is an epistemic attitude in which one particular set of theories
is favored to the exclusion of alternatives. Although it is an attitude, it need not be conscious, so
long as it leads to characteristic behaviors. Such behaviors include the dismissal or neglect of

conceptions of truth may also benefit from work on dialetheism (see Priest, 2000), which provides formal
tools for saying that two competing theories can both have claim to truth. I would suggest making explicit
reference to a particular theory when providing statements of truth. According to heliocentric theory, for
example, it is simply false that the earth is immobile.
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anomalies due to disbelief as well as the inability to appreciate an alternative interpretation of a
phenomenon, or theory-ladenness. Both theory-ladenness and anomaly neglect lead to
communication struggles between scientists with competing theories.
The first three chapters of this dissertation each suggested that theory-entrenchment is central
to the marginalization of a promising theory. I used theory-entrenchment to explain the
phenomenon in which scientists in the establishment take on claims about the impossibility of
fringe theories when those fringe theories make claims that seem to conflict with the claims of an
established orthodox theory. Scientists that always work with and develop a multiplicity of theories
would not have automatically excluded the novel evidence brought forward by Wegener,
Semmelweis, Garcia, and the number of fringe theorists discussed in Chapter 4. Alfred Wegener’s
theory of continental drift was thought to be impossible largely due to entrenchment in continental
fixism, which straightforwardly excluded the possibility of lateral continental movements. When
Marie Tharp described the rift valley in the mid-ocean ridge, Bruce Heezen exclaimed, “It cannot
be! It looks too much like continental drift” (Tharp, 1999). Semmelweis’s effective antiseptic
handwashing technique was not implemented due to entrenchment in the miasma theory, which
excluded the possibility that an invisible germ of puerperal fever could travel on the hands of a
gentleman: “But a gentleman’s hands are clean” (Meigs, 1854, p. 104). John Garcia’s discovery
of conditioned taste aversion was initially undermined by establishment psychologists due to
entrenchment in behaviorist learning theory, which excluded the possibility of Garcia’s results:
“Those findings are no more likely than birdshit in a cuckoo clock” (Gould & Marler, 1987, p. 4).
Garcia’s findings that associations could be formed in a single trial and with a long delay and that
not all stimuli have equal potential to condition a behavior were met with incredulity simply due
to the fact that they seemed to violate central principles of behaviorist learning theory.
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The problem with theory-entrenchment is not so much the failure to endorse the alternative
theories that provided ready interpretations of results that were anomalous to mainstream theory.
According to pluralism, it’s not that these fringe theories better captured reality than the theories
had by the mainstream at the time—except insofar as those working under fringe theories were
capable of making a number of important observations that the establishment failed to notice or
otherwise neglected. Theory-entrenchment leads scientists to rule out certain observations as
impossible according to what is supposed to be actual fact. The problem is not that mainstream
scientists were glued to the wrong theory, but rather that, being glued to an exclusive theory tout
court, they were unable to make or accept observations that were anomalous to the theory. The
pluralist doesn’t even think it is such a big deal that some fringe theory wasn’t immediately taken
up: the big deal is that the observational evidence itself was taken for granted for decades because
one exclusive theory was being used.
If scientists had the pluralist attitude to even entertain these alternative theories, they might
not have neglected important evidence—evidence that, in these cases, seemed to shift adjudication
away from the entrenched theories. Pluralist scientists will also not be troubled by the lack of
communication due to theory-ladenness in debates, since they will be capable of interpreting the
same observational evidence from multiple theoretical points of view.
Let’s consider how taking on a pluralistic approach to theory can help prevent anomaly
neglect and theory-ladenness. Monists are more likely to neglect phenomena that are anomalous
to their theory, or to treat them in a haphazard way that fails to make note of theoretical
implications. Since pluralists have a whole fleet of theories, less often will they fail to make note
of observations that might be anomalous to a subset of those theories. Pluralists can readily
abandon ship when a hole needs patching up—monists can end up in what Kuhn called ‘crisis’.
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One of the goals of Chang’s (2012) pluralism is to recover knowledge from theories of the
past—observations that might be anomalous to our mainstream theories. This lost knowledge is at
least in part a result of theory-entrenchment and the lack of interest in searching for more than one
explanation for a given domain. We shouldn’t necessarily expect later views to be better off than
earlier ones, as if by certain accumulation: Copernicus’s mathematical 1543 heliocentric model
took its central premise from Aristarchus’ 300 BC view, between which 1800 years of
geocentricity elapsed. Later views may, but not necessarily, have more observations on offer for
interpretation, which can make later views at least prima facie more sophisticated. Time enables
the accumulation of observations, and that is made explicit by technologies like microscopes
before which certain observations were not possible. We can also forget some crucial observations
due to focus on something else or lose alternative ways of seeing the same observational
phenomena. When scientists leave a theory behind, they risk also leaving behind a portion of its
findings, which might have implications as research continues.
Examples provided by Chang include anomalous variations in the boiling point of water and
the reflection of radiant cold. Jean-André de Luc (1727-1817) noticed that distilled water contained
quantities of air, which seemed to lead to premature boiling. He spent weeks constantly shaking a
flask to remove the air from the water: “Four mad weeks of shaking had its rewards. De Luc
reported that the de-gassed water exhibited very strange behavior – it would not boil at all at the
normal boiling point; instead, it became ‘superheated’ to 112˚ C and then exploded” (Chang, 2007,
p. 7). Contemporary mainstream theory does not readily account for this.
Similarly, current physics does not take cold to be anything other than the absence of heat,
and thus excludes some old observations that could be explained with the reality of cold. MarcAuguste Pictet (1752-1825) showed that radiation from a cold object could be focused by concave
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mirrors to cool another object some distance away from it. Count Rumford (Benjamin Thompson;
1753-1814) provided an explanation for this effect in terms of ‘frigorific rays’. His theory was that
the decrease in temperature is not the emission of heat (caloric), but the absorption of frigorific
rays. His experiments seemed to demonstrate, for example, that, like heat, cold is reflected by
white and emitted by black.

What happens to the radiative equilibrium set up with two cylinders filled with water much
colder than the ambient temperature, when one of the cold cylinders is blackened? To his
delight Rumford found that the index of the thermoscope [a differential thermometer] moved
toward the blackened cold cylinder, indicating enhanced cooling. How else could this be
explained, except by saying that ‘‘the frigorific rays from the blackened surface were more
powerful in generating cold than those which proceeded from the naked metal’’? (Chang, 2002,
pp. 145-146)

While contemporary theory takes cold to be the mere absence of heat, NASA used the idea that
white reflects cold for their 1964 space blanket (Chang, 2002, p. 149).
While Chang’s pluralism is based on an analysis of the merits of superseded theories of the
past, the cases I provided in the first four chapters encourage us to look towards anomalies of the
future. In each case, novel theories that were ahead of their time explained novel observations that
were anomalous to mainstream theories. It seems appropriate that I look in this direction to expand
on Chang’s list of phenomena that remain anomalous to mainstream theories.
One example of an unnoted forward-looking anomaly concerns the composition of the color
spectrum, which we tend to understand as composed of wavelengths which get gradually smaller
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as we move from the red end of the spectrum to the violet end. We supplement this physical theory
with a theory of perception, which credits our visual apparatus for our ability to see distinct colors
in an otherwise physically indistinguishable continuous spectrum. Here is the anomaly: one can
focus the color spectrum cast by sunlight through a prism such that it appears to be composed of
three overlapping disks of colored light, including only red, green, and blue-violet. Isaac Newton
(1643-1727) got close to articulating this in his Opticks, but did not note that it is only in the
overlapping portions of the red and green disks that a crescent of yellow-orange appears, and it is
only in the overlapping portions of the green and blue-violet disks that a crescent of bright blue
appears. Adjust the angle of the prism slightly and all three colored disks—red, green, and blueviolet—begin to overlap as the yellow and bright blue crescents narrow, and bright white appears
in the region of the spectrum where all three disks coincide.
In a paper that aims to provide a simple demonstration and explanation of the atmospheric
green flash phenomenon, Craig Bohren (1982) just so happens to include an image of the color
spectrum phenomenon I am attempting to describe (Fig. 1 below). He achieved this image by
propping up a mirror at an angle in water and shining a simulated sun (a screen projector) onto the
mirror through the water, such that the resulting spectrum of light is cast onto the ceiling.
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Figure 1. Bohren’s image, which can be variously interpreted
depending on one’s theoretical background.

While one might see the three overlapping ellipses of colored light I just described, whose
edges get progressively crisper as we move from blue-violet to green to red, Bohren says, rather
frankly, “…this is what is seen: a white disk with its upper rim blue-violet and its lower rim red.”
But that notes nothing of the conspicuous shape of the bits of green that appear in the image. He
explains the phenomenon he describes according to the theory of refraction:

Because all the separate components of the beam—red, orange, yellow, green, blue—are
refracted differently, the disks do not quite coincide. In the region where they do the disk is
white, but one of its rims is red and the other blue; this is because blue light is refracted most
and red light least. (Bohren, 1982, p. 272)

According to a different interpretation, there is no orange, yellow, or blue disk in this projected
spectrum. Yellow and orange appear only in the area where the red and the green ellipses solely
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overlap, and blue only in the area where the green and blue-violet ellipses solely overlap. Bright
white appears in the area where the red, green, and blue-violet ellipses overlap. While current
theory speaks of metamers—the phenomenon in which a mix of red light and green light creates
yellow light, for example—our current theories of refraction do not permit this alternative
description of the color spectrum. It runs against our theory-entrenched instinct that colors as they
appear to us do not in any way correlate with the physical features of the continuum of wavelengths
that compose the visible spectrum. According to the alternative description just suggested, the
perceptual colors do seem to correlate with a physical feature, namely, a geometric and spatial
feature. When I sent Bohren a photograph of the color spectrum I observed, roughly similar to the
one above except with a bright background, his interpretation was metamers—quite unlike his
interpretation of his own 1982 image. When I reiterated that the image was created by simply
casting sunlight through a prism, he did not seem to believe me. He asked again what my light
source was. “I need to know the exact details of your experimental set up,” he said. But there was
not much I could tell him, since this is something I observe every sunny day of the year by placing
prisms in every window, not to mention that it can be observed in his figure.2 While I have no
theory to explain the anomalous description of that image, we simply concluded that the confusion
must be due to our divergent interpretations of what we are observing. He interprets the image in
light of the mainstream theories of refraction and visual perception. However, he says he knows
of no experiment in which we can get all the colors to fully separate into distinct disks, which

2

In 2020, the color spectrum serendipitously landed on a blank page on my desk. Given how strangelooking this rather mundane phenomenon suddenly looked to me, I decided to trace it. When I saw the
geometrical pattern of three overlapping ellipses appearing on the page before me, I was stunned. I couldn’t
even come up with a single physics paper in which an ordinary macroscopic prism was implemented;
apparently we’ve been there and done that. I searched every textbook I could lay my eyes on back to
Newton’s Opticks, until I stumbled upon a result that looked familiar to me in Bohren’s 1982 paper—part
of a series of “Simple Experiments in Atmospheric Physics” he wrote for Weatherwise.
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makes my alternative interpretation of the spectrum in which yellow and bright blue only appear
in overlaps between red and green and green and blue-violet disks seem more permissible.
Like Chang’s examples, this simple yet anomalous feature that can be observed in the color
spectrum deserves our wonder, not least for the fact that contemporary theories in cognitive science
tell us that the human eye contains three types of photoreceptor cones, coincidentally
corresponding to the colors of the overlapping ellipses in the color spectrum: red-sensing, greensensing, and blue-sensing.
The implication of this example is that mainstream theory-entrenchment hinders our ability
to make note of alternative interpretations of well-studied phenomena. Pluralism can help us
rekindle our sense of wonder in the mundane, and can cure our disenchantment.

3.2. Pessimistic induction, the success of ‘false’ theories, and underdetermination
Philosophers of science have long faced a worrying observation: the once-accepted theories of the
past are now rejected by the contemporary mainstream. Given that this seems to go across the
board, from physics to psychology, it is reasonable to conclude that our current theories will be
inadequate according to the lights of future mainstream theories.
The problem goes beyond pessimism, however. It’s not just that we can draw an inductive
inference from the fact that we think the theories of the past turned out to be false, or that their
posits failed to refer to real entities—but, some way or another, those theories of the past also
managed to make successful predictions.
The realist conversation has thus turned towards explaining away the successful predictions
of theories that have been rejected by contemporary standards. In a literature that originates with
Laudan’s (1981) “Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Peter Vickers (2013) presents 20 cases
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(and acknowledges that there may be many more) in which theories that have been decisively
rejected nevertheless had novel predictive success. Superseded theories from the past that did not
have explanations acceptable to mainstream science today were surprisingly successful.
Monistically-inclined realists address this problem on a case-by-case basis, often removing the
threat of such theories with a divide et impera strategy. The idea here is that if the successful
predictions came from parts of the theory that are independent of the rejected theoretical principles,
then the monistic realist need not feel threatened. A holist might reject this strategy, but even so,
it cannot work in all cases, since some theories based entirely on theoretical principles that the
mainstream would not accept have also had success—e.g. Velikovsky’s predictions that Venus
must be much hotter than its cold cloud cover indicates and that Jupiter must emit radio signals
(Chapter 4). Vickers himself uses another tactic that involves showing that the successful
predictions made by these theories were unimpressive, or otherwise were derived from
assumptions external to the rejected theory. Any success of a rejected theory would otherwise have
to be deemed a coincidence or a miracle. But the sheer volume of conspicuous cases calls that
dismissive interpretation into question.
Rather than reject these instances one-by-one, theoretical pluralism directs realists to see the
entire batch of successful predictions derived from discarded theories as a reason to revise how we
think about theories. This feature of theories, namely, that they are designed in accordance with
the world of our experience and thus are designed to work, deserves more attention as a
phenomenon to be explained with a positive account.
Perhaps the most impressive case on Vickers’ list is that of Arnold Sommerfeld’s 1916
prediction of the hydrogen fine structure. Hydrogen fine structure refers to the red spectral line in
the pattern of colors of light emitted by a hydrogen atom, which, with high-resolution examination,
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turns out to be a doublet. Sommerfeld’s model of hydrogen was an extension of Bohr’s famous
atomic model—electrons orbit the nucleus of the atom in a way analogous to the solar system.
Although chemists still speak in terms of orbitals, Bohr’s model is thought to be naïve at best.3
Sommerfeld showed that the model needed relativistic corrections, and also adjusted the model to
make electron orbits elliptical. Using this expanded model, which neglects both electron spin (the
key determinant of spectral lines according to contemporary theory) and wave mechanics, he
developed an equation to determine the fine structure of the spectral lines that result when energy
is absorbed and emitted by a hydrogen atom. This equation does not just encode accurate
predictions of the spectral lines; it is exactly the same equation as the one derived by Paul Dirac in
1928 from the theory of quantum mechanics (QM). Physicists have called this a “lucky
coincidence,” a “cosmic accident,” and even “a miracle” (see Vickers, 2020, p. 993, fn. 9). Vickers
(2020, p. 1009) goes to lengths to conclude that the alignment is not serendipitous, but rather
“Sommerfeld’s orbital precession is to classical mechanics what spin is to Dirac QM”—as part of
his defense of the realist position.4 Realism aside, it is fascinating that two theories with different
posits describing the same domain manage to make the same accurate prediction, and that there
are even analogies to be drawn between those different posits.

3

Bohr was also “lucky” in his predictions of the spectrum of hydrogen:
Bohr simply declared that an electron "orbiting" the proton (nucleus) exists in a set of discrete stationary
states in which it does not radiate. Everyone accepted this because his theory was so accurate (for the
hydrogen atom). Most textbooks refer to stationary states but rarely point out that other than the ground
state, they are anything but stationary, with lifetimes measured in fractions of a nanosecond. This
bothered me for years, until I finally read about a way out of this seeming paradox. Bohr's theory is
incomplete because it doesn't include electromagnetic radiation. But to include it requires quantum
electrodynamics, which is mathematically and conceptually very difficult. (Bohren, personal
communication, June 2021)
4
Physicist Craig Bohren confirms that the parallel Vickers draws between orbital angular momentum and
spin is correct (personal communication, June 2022).
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Another example not on Vickers’ list is nearby—Ernest Rutherford’s (1871-1937) discovery
of the atomic nucleus by firing two protons and two neutrons at gold foil and analyzing the results
using a scattering theory and the classical Coulomb law. His results indicated that the atom had a
heavy nucleus at the center. According to Bohren, if you do the scattering problem using quantum
mechanics, you get the same result: “The nuclear atom is necessary for quantum mechanics, but if
Rutherford’s conclusions had depended on a wrong theory for analyzing his experiments, then
where would we be today?” (Bohren, personal communication, June 2022).
On a larger scale, the Ptolemaic, Tychonic, and Copernican theories all converged in their
impressive predictions. The Ptolemaic geocentric model states that Earth is fixed, with all other
astronomical bodies in its orbit. The Tychonic geoheliocentric theory also states that the Earth is
fixed, with the Sun and Moon in its orbit, while the other planetary bodies orbit the Sun. The
Copernican heliocentric theory states that the Sun is fixed, with Earth and all other planets in its
orbit, while the Moon orbits the Earth. Interestingly, the Tychonic and Copernican systems make
exactly the same mathematical predictions with regard to the positions of the planets in relation to
Earth. This is because the relative motions of all the other planets remain unchanged when we
move from the Tychonic to the Copernican system; the difference is that the Sun is fixed rather
than the Earth (Kuhn, 1957, p. 204). We tend to be even more surprised by the successes of the
geocentric model, and its convergences with a contemporary heliocentric model. While Newton’s
theory and laws of motion favor a heliocentric model, Albert Einstein’s (1879-1955) theory of
general relativity gives both the heliocentric and geocentric systems equal validity:

Can we formulate physical laws so that they are valid for all CS [coordinate systems], not
only those moving uniformly, but also those moving quite arbitrarily, relative to each other?
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If this can be done, our difficulties will be over. We shall then be able to apply the laws of
nature to any CS. The struggle, so violent in the early days of science, between the views of
Ptolemy and Copernicus would then be quite meaningless. Either CS could be used with
equal justification. The two sentences, “the sun is at rest and the Earth moves”, or “the sun
moves and the Earth is at rest”, would simply mean two different conventions concerning
two different CS. Could we build a real relativistic physics valid in all CS; a physics in which
there would be no place for absolute, but only for relative, motion? This is indeed possible!
(Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 224)

A geocentric coordinate system is sometimes still used today for convenience—e.g. for modelling
the irregular orbit of the moon, or predicting the positions of stars as viewed from Earth. It should
thus be unsurprising that the Antikythera mechanism—an analogue computer based on a
geocentric system from some time before 60 BC—could predict eclipses, modeled the lunar
anomaly, and could calculate the positions of the five planets known at the time within a fraction
of a degree per year (Freeth et al., 2021).
The cases of parallels between contemporary and superseded theories go beyond physics,
too. Consider miasma theory in its day as explanatory of epidemic diseases. Miasmas, noxious
airs, were said to emanate from swamps, causing diseases like malaria and yellow fever. Miasma
theory predicted that draining the swamps would lessen the spread of these diseases, since swamps
were thought to emanate miasmatic airs. When the swamps were drained, cases of malaria and
yellow fever declined. Today we attribute the success of swamp-draining to the elimination of
germ-carrying mosquitoes, which breed in standing water.
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The monist realist will have trouble with this case, since this prediction is clearly impressive,
and a divide et impera strategy won’t work given that the theory from which the prediction was
derived is rejected by contemporary standards. So we seem to have a case that can only be dubbed
a lucky coincidence or miracle by the monist. But a pluralist looking at this case realizes that the
theoretical framework that names miasmas connects actual phenomena in such a way that wiggling
one phenomenon—miasmatic airs emanating from swamps—has an effect on the phenomena of
malaria and yellow fever. Furthermore, since miasmas were thought to emanate most profusely
during the night (miasma was sometimes called ‘night air’), miasma theory called for keeping
windows closed at night, which—in virtue of keeping mosquitoes out according to contemporary
theory—also reduced cases of malaria and yellow fever.
The history of medicine is full of oddities that today we often deem not only ineffective but
abhorrent and harmful—bloodletting included. The practice of bloodletting is more than 3000
years old and was sometimes effective. Up until the 19th century, bloodletting was sometimes
explained in terms of Hippocrates’ humoral theory, which stated that the four humors—blood,
phlegm, yellow bile, black bile—had to be in balance to maintain health. So, sometimes, a patient
could be diagnosed with having too much blood, and bloodletting was a treatment. Galen promoted
arteriotomy and developed the concept of ‘plethora’, namely, that an excess of humours is the
cause of illness. Bloodletting from the veins behind the ears was known to cure vertigo and
headaches. The successes do not stop there. We now know that some pathogens, such as staph,
thrive on iron carried by heme, the molecule in red blood cells that helps carry oxygen (Skaar et
al., 2004). If no heme is available, the bacterium’s chances of surviving are reduced. Furthermore,
“As recently as 1942, Sir William Osler’s highly regarded medical textbook advocated
bloodletting as a treatment for acute pneumonia” (Rouault, 2004)—to find out whether it that
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works today or not, however, requires research that might just be too risky. However, Bernard
Brabin (2021) has analyzed data from the 19th century that indicates that “Early bloodletting and
higher iron losses were associated with shorter recovery times, despite higher average case fatality
with bloodletting” (p. 139). Clearly, draining a patient’s blood can readily lead to death, which
challenges research on human subjects. However, bloodletting is known to cure a number of
genetic disorders today. It is the most commonly used treatment in emergency cases of hereditary
hemochromatosis, a genetic disorder in which iron absorption is increased, leading to excess iron
deposits throughout the body. Still today therapeutic phlebotomy—typically regular brief sessions
of bloodletting with a needle—is used to remove excess iron, and increases life expectancy
(Rombout-Sestrienkova et al., 2020). Another example is polycythemia vera, a genetic condition
in which bone marrow leads to increased red blood cell mass (Nagalla, 2021). Bloodletting was
also recently corroborated for treatment of urticaria (Stewart, 2019). Not to mention its
technological utility in that bloodletting was a precursor to erythrocytapheresis and blood
transfusions generally (Cohut, 2020). Contemporary humor-based Persian Medicine sometimes
makes use of Complementary and Alternative Medicine techniques due to their low cost and fewer
side effects; some of these practices, including emergency bloodletting, are being advocated in
mainstream medicine (Jefari et al., 2021; Shirazi et al., 2022).
The successes of rejected and superseded theories are no reason to be pessimistic about our
contemporary theories. Why despair about success? The successes motivate the optimistic
inductive inference that theories, in general, have value. At least insofar as they were developed
in accordance with observation, they can make predictions about what will be observed. Why do
the successful predictions of discarded theories surprise us so much? I would point to entrenchment
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as a factor that contributes to our surprise. We are conditioned to expect our contemporary
mainstream theories to work to the exclusion of alternatives.

3.3. Realism
Theoretical pluralists need not be antirealists. They need not deny that theories correspond to or
represent aspects of a shared reality. Even on theoretical pluralism, the adequacy of a theory is
determined by how well it accounts for observations. If theoretical pluralism had it that theories
don’t even accommodate observational phenomena, then pluralism, not realism, would be in
trouble.
That said, accommodating observations is not as simple as conforming to what is given.
Observations, recall, become meaningful information (i.e. evidence) when they are theoryinformed (Chapter 5), and different theories can sometimes inform observation differently, such
that a single piece of data can be evidence for two different theories. Take the free-fall experiment,
the light microscope on a silver-stained nerve cell, or the movements of the heavens prior to stellar
parallax. At various moments in scientific history, observations have been explicable in terms of
more than one theory.
This does not mean that all theories are automatically adequate. Clearly they are not, nor, it
seems, must we expect them to ever be, except for some particular loosely-defined end, like
reducing the number of cases of puerperal fever using Semmelweis’s technique of handwashing
with chlorinated lime, or malaria by draining the swamps. Miasma theorists claimed that the
transmission of puerperal fever could not be anything other than airborne, but clearly it was.
Continental fixists had no ready explanation for the magnetic stripes on either side of the midocean ridge, but clearly they were there. In both cases, miasma theorists and fixists could have

169

potentially provided explanations if they hadn’t ruled out such observations before they were even
made.
Inadequacy need not mean we have to dispose of a theory. Inadequate representation and
failed predictions means the theory needs qualifications or adjustments. Miasma theorists did not
need to deny that some contagious diseases could be spread via water, skin-to-skin contact, or
invisible organisms. Nevertheless, miasma theory’s main claim remains pertinent today:
contagious diseases—which we today know to be caused by viruses—can be spread through the
air. ‘Noxious airs’ are to the miasma theory of disease as ‘airborne viruses’ are to the germ theory
of disease. The crucial differences are granularity and scope: miasma theory, at least as we left it
back in the 19th century, parses observations more coarsely, and is more limited in its ability to
account for disease phenomena than is the germ theory of disease. Germ phenomena, which are
tiny, and thus much more fine-grained, have a greater explanatory scope over disease phenomena.
When it first came on the scene, germ theory made room for alternative mechanisms to explain
and prevent disease transmission, without denying that disease-spread could also be airborne.
Some of the observations that are explained by the germ theory of disease could potentially be
explained in terms of miasmas. Recent data suggests that oceanic and terrestrial microbes emanate
into airs even beyond the troposphere, congregating in species-specific colonies to form highways
and falling from clouds like snowflakes (Reche et al., 2018). An updated miasma theory might
even prove convenient for tracing related disease phenomena given that it tracks observations with
a coarser grain.
A theory starts with a link between two observable phenomena—for example, cases of
childbed fever and implementation of handwashing. This link is a correlation between
conceptualized observations. Imagine a spider building a web between two pickets of a fence. The
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web the spider constructs is dependent upon those pickets. But not only is the spiderweb not two
pickets of a fence, it doesn’t tell us all that much about the two pickets of the fence, except for how
one point on one picket is located in relation to another point on the other picket. In each case, the
whole web is held up in virtue of those pickets, and the spider can catch prey only in virtue of
taking advantage of a relationship between the pickets as its foundation. No web is free-floating.
Analogously, theories take advantage of stuff that’s really out there by picking out correlations
between categorical chunks of it. Take cases of malaria as linked to miasmas emanating from
swamps versus cases of malaria as linked to germ-infected mosquito bites. From a single point on
one picket (cases of malaria), miasma theory and germ theory link to two different points on the
other picket (miasmas and germs).
For the pluralistic realist, the joints of nature are already out there, but there is more than one
way to carve them. Theories, while carving nature at its joints, do not necessarily tell us all that
much about nature itself. Our concepts do, however, track enough aspects of what’s really out
there and interrelations between those aspects that we can get oriented and take action, as when
miasma theory led people to drain swamps and keep their windows closed at night. Both actions
prevented bites from malaria-carrying mosquitoes. As Peter Godfrey-Smith (2021) puts it, “It’s
possible to believe that some parts of science are very good at describing structure—relationships
between things—without being so good at describing the objects that stand in these relationships”
(p. 228).
Consider an example from physics. According to mainstream theory, rays of light do not
really exist. If you shine a light beam through a slit with dimensions similar to the light’s
wavelength, the beam of light expands outwards in all directions, unlike a ray. Geometrical optics,
which posits rays, is not therefore false; as Bohren put it to me, ‘false’ is too strong a word.
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Geometrical optics works if the goal is to explain instances of refraction or reflection, which are
both scattering phenomena (Sommerfeld, 1923). For example, we can begin to explain the features
of a natural rainbow using geometrical optics, but some features get left out:

Rainbows are often said to be caused by reflection and refraction. No theory causes anything.
A single theory is adequate to explain the physical cause of rainbows (as well as coronas and
glories): water drops illuminated by sunlight scatter in all directions, but in some more than
others, and these directions depend on the wavelength and drop size. This explanation is
unassailable, but it is not quantitative and cannot describe in detail what has been or predict
what has yet to be observed. If we want numbers (e.g., rainbow angles) we appeal to
(approximate) quantitative theories, which is the source of misconceptions about them causing
what is observed. We may choose from a hierarchy of theories, geometrical optics the lowest
ranked. If we want a better description, we move up the hierarchy, sacrificing simplicity for
accuracy. (Bohren, personal communication, June 2022)

Geometrical optics does not predict or explain interference phenomena, which are explained in
terms of waves. Mainstream physicists use interference to explain the colored fringes that appear
at the boundary of a sharp shadow and the supernumerary bows that appear above natural
rainbows. Theories that are explanatory over interference patterns can capture more features of the
rainbow. Quantitative theories that can explain natural rainbows include Airy theory and LorenzMie theory—but both of these are also based on idealizations. For example, they both posit
spherical water droplets. While small droplets closer to the ground can be spherical due to surface
tension, clouds only drop rain when droplets of water are condensed and heavy enough to fall.
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These larger falling raindrops are generally not spherical nor even teardrop shaped. Due to air
pressure, they are flattened, and more similar in shape to the top of a hamburger bun (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. NASA’s diagram of a falling raindrop.

The realist need not commit to there being only one acceptable theoretical language explanatory
over a given observational domain. Nor need a theory explain everything in its relevant domain.
The realist can retain the view that the posits of current mainstream scientific theories correspond
to aspects of reality, and that observable phenomena can be described and explained in terms of
them, but accepts that there can be descriptions and explanations of the same observational domain
in terms of other theories that may be discontinuous with current mainstream theories. The pluralist
does not have to deny that a single theory could do all the explaining, but to treat contemporary
theories this way is an idealization that restricts the questions we are allowed to ask and limits the
number of ways we can do science.
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4. Conclusion: How to be a pluralist
So how does a single person, or a single lab with limited funds, do science pluralistically? Andre
Geim exemplifies the attitude and activity I am recommending. He doesn’t stop where his expertise
does, and it pays. He is the only person in the world who has been awarded both the Nobel Prize—
in 2010, for his discovery of graphene—and the Ig Nobel Prize—in 2000, for levitating a frog in
a water droplet. ‘Ig Nobel’ as in ‘ignoble’: the prize is awarded for achievements that make people
laugh (and then think) by the Annals of Improbable Research. How did Geim manage these
achievements? Both of his prized findings came out of unfunded side experiments—“Friday Night
Experiments” or FNEs. Ten percent of the time, Geim’s lab is allowed to work on “crazy things
that probably won’t pan out at all, but if they do, it would be really surprising” (Lewis, 2014). He
recollects how this all started:

…I poured water inside the lab’s electromagnet when it was at its maximum power. Pouring
water in one’s equipment is certainly not a standard scientiﬁc approach, and I cannot recall
why I behaved so ‘unprofessionally’. Apparently, no one had tried such a silly thing before,
although similar facilities existed in several places around the world for decades. To my
surprise, water did not end up on the ﬂoor but got stuck in the vertical bore of the magnet.
(Geim, 2011, pp. 73-74)

And thus, the world saw a physicist make a tiny frog levitate in a drop of water. “The levitation
experience…taught me the important lesson that poking in directions far away from my immediate
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area of expertise could lead to interesting results…” (Geim, 2011, p. 75). The FNEs enable
members of Geim’s lab to ask questions experts can’t reasonably ask—that are ruled out by
theoretical fact. Geim’s research philosophy is to “graze shallow” in a specialized field, and then
get out—before you get entrenched.
Sure, Geim is just one physicist—but this was not just a sheer stroke of luck. He and his lab
also used their brains—and dared to use them to do things that the most highly educated experts
on dihydrogen oxide, or carbon, for example, would not. The graphene finding took even less
funds to accomplish. Just scotch tape and graphite. What else are we missing out on because we
aren’t foolish enough? The physicist William Roentgen (Röntgen; 1845-1923) had his cathode
tube covered with black cardboard when the eerie incandescent glow we now attribute to x-rays
appeared on a nearby fluorescent screen. He even found that “the fluorescent screen will light up
when placed behind a book of a thousand pages” (Röntgen, 1896, p. 274). He deduced from the
experiments that followed this happenstance what looked like an absurdity: many opaque bodies
are actually transparent—but not lead. Impermeability seemed to be in a direct relationship with
density.
What could happen if all scientists started doing this kind of thing 10% of the time—1% of
the time—disentrenched from the mainstream paradigm?

Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, scientists take a different attitude toward existing
paradigms, and the nature of their research changes accordingly. The proliferation of
competing articulations, the willingness to try anything… these are symptoms of a transition
from normal to extraordinary research. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 91; italics mine)
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Certainly, with Kuhn, ‘extraordinary’ becomes a technical term, but he really means it:
extraordinary, special, amazing, mind-blowing—entering into extraordinary, sometimes even
paranormal territory, as with UFOs becoming UAPs. This is the life of science.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Problems and Projections

1. Demarcation
The complaint keeps coming—‘Surely we must draw the line somewhere? Obviously it is our duty
to silence theorists who are anti-science: flat earthists, Christian scientists, homeopathists, HIVAIDs denialists, and anthropogenic climate change denialists.’ Even if we wanted to include these
voices, it is hard to imagine that we have the resources (time, effort, funding) to do so. We can’t
really expect geologists, for example, to sift through every flat-earth (anti-globe) theory when the
general idea is based on a conspiracy theory.
My response is that I really do think that all positive theories should be included—as well as
the questions that arise for them—and that the more theories scientists are capable of maneuvering
with, the better off research will be. Remember that we are not believing in any theories at the
expense of others, rather people are being asked to use theories that inspire research.
There may be one exception, however: theories that are actually intended to be harmful.
Theories that are built with the intention to reduce wellbeing to Earth and the life on it do not
deserve a place in science without some serious explaining to do. These include theories that are
meant to deceive people (e.g. some versions of climate-change denialism, theories fabricated to
promote pharmaceuticals for profit), cause harms to procure power (e.g. theories developed for the
sole purpose of military technology that isn’t merely protective), or promote inequalities (e.g. some
versions of race genetics). Such theories are wrong—in the moral sense. They are worth including
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in the pluralist theory archive only insofar as some people do actually have them; if they are
threatening, it is better that we be aware of the threats that they pose.
So, pluralists don’t think of theories as the kinds of things that are either true or false, but
rather as the kinds of things that can be right or wrong. A theory is right if it is genuine and
developed for the purpose of scientific progress. It isn’t scientific—it is genuine pseudoscience—
if it does not have wellbeing, including intellectual advancements, in mind.
I would suggest requiring an honor statement from epistemic agents who wish to opt in and
make theoretical contributions. That lets a whole lot of theories in, which is what we want.
After that, people—in the sense of all epistemic agents who opt in to pluralism—can be the
judge. Like Oscar Levant, we can erase the fine line between ‘genius’ and ‘insanity’. The best
ideas are both.
With an honor statement, unfortunately, fraudulent theories sneak in, as will some theorybased research and practice that is done in ignorance of the harm it creates. That isn’t unusual even
for monism. Lysenkoism, which reigned in the Soviet Union against Mendelian genetics, was a
fraud, and pursued under political duress. Members of groups that are underrepresented in science
have been harmed by contemporary evolutionary psychology. Grossi et al. (2014) argue that
evolutionary psychology “is a new incarnation of age-old tropes regarding genetic differences
based on sex that have played a role in maintaining pre-existing power structures in society” (p.
282). For example, David Buss (1989) claims that men are evolved to want multiple partners and
like very young women, and women are evolved to want one male partner who is a protector and
breadwinner. Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer claim that rape is an evolved response for men
who can’t find partners. They present the following argument with no trigger warning:
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Most rape victims are women of childbearing age.
In many cultures rape is treated as a crime against the victim's husband.
Rape victims suffer less emotional distress when they are subjected to more violence.
Rape takes place not only among human beings but also in a variety of other animal species.
Married women and women of childbearing age experience more psychological distress after
a rape than do girls, single women or women who are past menopause.
As bizarre as some of those facts may seem, they all make sense when rape is viewed as a
natural, biological phenomenon that is a product of the human evolutionary heritage.
(Thornhill & Palmer, 2000, p. 30, italics in original)

This is awful and triggering to anyone who has experienced rape. None of these facts make sense
naturally or otherwise—and none of them should make sense. Why would we ever want it to make
sense to us that rape is treated as a crime against the victim’s husband? That is not something we
want to be able to reason our way to—naturalistically or not. This is not the kind of scientific
progress that we want. This theory encourages harmful behavior by delivering the rapist qua being
a biological organism from responsibility for the act of rape. In attempt to lighten the load, they
add:

Here we must hasten to emphasize that by categorizing a behavior as "natural" and
"biological" we do not in any way mean to imply that the behavior is justified or even
inevitable. Biological means "of or pertaining to life," so the word applies to every human
feature and behavior. But to infer from that—as many of our critics assert that we do—that
what is biological is somehow right or good, would be to fall into the so-called naturalistic
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fallacy. That mistake is obvious enough when one considers such natural disasters as
epidemics, floods and tornadoes. In those cases it is clear that what is natural is not always
desirable. And of course much can be, and is, done to protect people against natural threats—
from administering antibiotics to drawing up emergency evacuation plans. In other words,
the fact that rape is an ancient part of human nature in no way excuses the rapist. (Thornhill
& Palmer, 2000, pp. 30-31)

Denying that it excuses the rapist does nothing for a theory that claims rape is due to an
evolutionary past that the rapist was not part of. No matter what the authors claim, the theory itself
has legal consequences. A defense attorney can use this regardless of the authors (alleged)
intentions. The rapist couldn’t have helped it: his evolutionary descent has made him prone to rape.
It is as if the ‘natural’ biological organism was not also a person. This was published by the
National Academy of Sciences. It would be best if no one were exposed to it, but it has not been
retracted for 22 years.
Another example is the focus on gay men in early AIDS theory, which promulgated phobia
and resulted in lost jobs and opportunities. Furthermore, people of color are underrepresented in
science but overrepresented when it comes to HIV and AIDS, yet research has continued to focus
on white men (Young, 1991; Castillo-Mancilla, 2014). In 2021, Rutgers University conducted a
study that demonstrated racial bias in mainstream healthcare providers, who are less likely to
prescribe HIV prevention medications to black women than to white women (Hull, 2021). This is
in spite of the higher incidence of HIV in black women than in white women—and a factor that
contributes to poorer health and continued stigmatization.
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So, even with an archive of only mainstream theories, we shouldn’t expect theories to be
without their vices.
Theories that would normally be excluded for scientific reasons will also be included; I
argued our scientific reasons were inadequate reasons for neglect and silencing in Chapter 4. Also
included will be theories that are based on testimony, theories based on conspiracies,
underdeveloped theories, theories not based on observation, religious theories, theories that
implement magic, and theories that we currently deem harmful. It is unscientific to exclude them.

1. Theories based on testimony. The fact that stones fall from the sky was once known only
through testimony; the fact that young starlings fly towards geomagnetic north was once
known only through testimony. UFOs should be on this list. Given NASA’s new research
program, some mainstream astronomers seem to agree. According to an article in the New
York Times, “U.F.O.s almost certainly are not alien visitors buzzing Earth’s skies, but
NASA is nonetheless financing a study that will look at unexplained sightings with an open
mind” (Chang, 2022). Given the huge body of anecdotal evidence based on eyewitness
testimony—some of it from ex-government and military officials—the mainstream
incredulity is almost humorous to anyone who knows ufology. Almost, because it is also
maddening. There are PTSD support groups for alien abductees. To deny thousands of
people of their trauma in this way is inhumane. Many people’s livelihoods have suffered
as a result of their honesty about having close encounters with these spacecrafts, and these
beings—whatever they are. Many people are likely afraid to come out with their own
experiences considering the loss of respect it has brought to others.
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The fringe even has found ways around the unreliability of witness testimony. For
example, Stephan A. Schwartz has found ways to implement statistics across testimonial
reports in his research exploring extraordinary human functioning. Schwartz has held three
different governmental positions, including Special Assistant for Research and Analysis to
the Chief of Naval Operations under Admirals Zumwalt and Holloway (1971-1975) for
which he received a Certificate of Commendation. His independent work is primarily in
nonlocal consciousness and specifically remote viewing—something he can’t understand
why the mainstream isn’t more interested in. He has discovered a number of lost artifacts
by breaking down large numbers of individual testimonial reports into concepts, and
tracking where concepts cluster and overlap. This detective work has been extremely
successful. Using his method of cross-comparing remote-viewing testimonial reports, he
helped discover Cleopatra’s Palace (along with Goddio; Foreman, 1999), Marc Antony’s
Timonium, ruins of the Lighthouse of Pharos, and multiple lost ships in the Bahamas and
off the coast of California (Schwartz, 2014). Currently, Schwartz is a consultant to an
archaeologist, Roger Smith, who is in hopes of tracking down Columbus’s ships (Schwartz
et al., 2019).

2. Theories based on conspiracies. Why isn’t there public trust in our scientists? Because the
government is actually keeping information from us, and mainstream scientists often seem
oblivious to this. The CIA spent decades researching UFOs—this is just one of many
conspiracy theories that have actually played out. Ufologists often claimed the CIA knew
much more about UFOs than they were telling us. Of course, they were derided for such
claims—indeed, that “conspiracy” played a role in UFOlogy at all is one of the reasons
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used by Mark Moldwin (2004) to explain “Why SETI Is Science and UFOlogy Is Not”.
However, conspiracy there was—as was revealed by the UAP (Unidentified Aerial
Phenomenon) Report in 2021, and further in the 2022 Congress hearing.

3. Underdeveloped theories. Underdeveloped theories are theories that are still in their
youth—Wegener’s continental drift was an immature version of continental mobilism in
comparison to plate tectonics. That was not a good reason to exclude it in the early 20th
century, when the rest of the world believed the continents were forever fixed in their
places. Nascent theories should be fostered, not snuffed out.

4. Theories not based on observation. Were we to demand observational evidence as a
criterion, string theory might be ruled out, along with other theories positing things we
have not learned to measure. So long as we know a theory is not based on observation, or
that it is speculative, all should be well and good. Science can be ambitious, even utopian.
It has been that way since Bacon wrote the “Magnalia Natura” at the end of his New Atlantis
(see end of Chapter 5). It is absolutely idealistic. Positing things as yet unobserved can
motivate inquiry. Plato handed Atlantis down to us, and the mainstream dismisses it as a
myth. Troy too was once dismissed as a legend, as was the great flood, and belief that the
earth was once populated by dragons. Yet each may prompt productive quests that uncover
things about the world and its history. The fringe, on the other hand, is open to the
unknown. Remember that Goddio found the mythical Heracleion by searching for it.
Speculation is a wonderful tool for seeking knowledge.
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5. Theories based on religious ideologies. As with Plato’s works, so with the Bible—it is full
of real history. Why don’t we want to understand how these people see the world?
Knowing without understanding isn’t very scientific. Listening to understand requires
empathy, compassion, and love—words philosophers even hate. The best way to change
people’s minds—if that’s really what you want to do—is understand what’s in them. No
one can hear where they are wrong if you aren’t repeating back to them what they actually
mean by their words; empathy plays a crucial role in science just as it does in therapy.

6. Theories based on magical or supernatural posits. The negative connotation of ‘magic’ as
relates to science deserves correction: phenomena and practices that are designated as
magic can be seen to be mere anomalies that we do not yet have a theory to explain.
Contemporary scientific theories have their roots in magic, and harnessing ‘natural magic’
can be seen to be the role and power of science, as Francis Bacon envisioned. Magic—
forces that, by current science, lack explanation—covers action at a distance, but also ESP,
power of prayer, cosmic effects on behavior, and, once, theories of gravity, superposition,
and illness through invisible organisms.

7. Potentially harmful theories. Theories in mainstream science are sometimes
sociopolitically harmful, or carry risk of physical harm. For example, there is the
aforementioned case of evolutionary psychology, which can be politically harmful to
marginalized social groups. Examples of physical risk arise in medical contexts. For
example, clinical trials still frequently exclude women and people of color (Boyle, 2021;
Scientific American, 2018), who are already the most stigmatized groups when it comes to
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health (Budhwani, 2019). It would not be unreasonable to have worries about the objective
extension of research findings of an efficacious treatment to black women, for example,
when that efficacy is based on clinical trials that almost exclusively include white men.
The solution here is not to exclude this data but to identify its limits and improve on it. As
mentioned above, early theories of AIDS were once sociopolitically harmful:

…(T)he very definition of AIDS is exclusionary, based upon the symptoms that men
get when they are infected with HIV, and that infection has advanced to the “end stage.”
Women have different clinical manifestations of HIV-disease (such as recurrent
gynecological problems), so are excluded from an official AIDS diagnosis and the
medical and social benefits which are allocated to People With AIDS (PWAs). (Young,
1991)

The mainstream HIV/AIDS theory is no more innocent today than it was three decades ago,
however, as sociopolitical confounds can still sometimes come into contact with data
collection, analysis, and theory evaluation. For example, the best and most conclusive
evidence for the theory that AIDS has a viral, infectious agent (i.e. HIV) has been said to be
the statistics of the spread of HIV/AIDS in high-risk groups (Chin, 2007, p. 53). This piece
of data is frequently used to block dissent (Goodson, 2014). I already mentioned the Rutgers
study that found that doctors are less likely to prescribe HIV-prevention medications to black
women. When this piece of information is taken into consideration, suddenly the incidence
of HIV/AIDS in high-risk groups, such as black women, no longer looks like such a good
reason to boast about the mainstream theory that HIV is, without question, the cause of AIDS.
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While dissent comes from a number of distinguished and respected scientists, that
seems to have done more damage to their reputations than to the theory that HIV causes
AIDS. It has been claimed that the status of these scientists makes their dissent especially
irresponsible. Their claims and questions wouldn’t be a risk if we didn’t put so much weight
on status, but, even so, the quality of their previous work, and the number of them, gives us
reason to suspect that there is more to the story than meets us in the media. Dissenting experts
even include Nobel laureates: Lynn Margulis, the aforementioned champion of
endosymbiosis, Luc Montagnier (1932-2022), who lead the team that discovered HIV, and
Kary Mullis, who developed the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). The most infamous
HIV/AIDS denialist, however, is Peter Duesberg, UC Berkeley-tenured member of the
National Academy of Sciences. In 2000, dissidents to the HIV/AIDS hypothesis, including
Duesberg, were called in to advise president Thabo Mbeki during the epidemic in South
Africa, where nearly 20% of the population was infected with HIV. HIV-denialists like
Duesberg have since been blamed for the Mbeki administration’s delayed distribution of
antiretroviral drugs, which resulted in an estimated 300,000 preventable deaths (Nattrass,
2008; Chigwedere et al., 2008). Duesberg published a defense of his position, which
prompted letters of complaint to UC Berkeley. Critics stated that Duesberg made false
claims, cherry-picked evidence, and failed to make note of his own colleague’s conflict of
interest (Cartwright, 2010). The university responded by formally investigating Duesberg for
misconduct in 2010. Failing to find evidence for misconduct, the case was closed in 2011.
At present, the power structures currently in place in the US have mainstream academic
scientists and the fringe pitted against each other. People are too distracted and too angry to
work together to dismantle the real threat. There are also profit motives that impede open
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communication and debate. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act was put in place, which allows
scientists to profit from government-funded discoveries and inventions. As a consequence,
scientists can get funding by doing research that the government—whatever people are in
power—want them to do. That incentivizes acquiescence to the government narrative.
Government officials, in turn, profit from contributions made by pharmaceutical companies
and others in the healthcare industry (Facher, 2020). This increases pressure to maintain a
single narrative and stifle dissent.

Pluralism gives us the option to categorize theories based on the kinds just discussed. This
would help make any limitations and potential confounds more salient. It’s important to remember
that the status of a theory regularly changes, however, and so will categorical assignments.
Categories are something we can leave up to collective decision.
As for how to fund all these theories, a public socially-mediated database of observations
and theories could be developed with a decision-making function. I will outline this idea further
below in response to worries about implementation. Typically, however, individuals procure
funding, not theories themselves—and a single individual that is a pluralist, recall, uses a number
of theories to conduct research. If we were to embrace pluralism, funding one theory at the expense
of another wouldn’t even be a concern anymore. That is one good reason for embracing pluralism.
Recall, too, that the fringe research that is done tends to be very affordable in comparison to
the huge budgets needed by mainstream science—otherwise it wouldn’t get done, considering the
fringe’s general lack of funding. Joseph Weber is another example. Gravitational waves were one
of Einstein’s predictions, and Weber was the first physicist to search after them, initially with some
funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF). He used two-meter by one-meter ultrapure
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aluminum cylinders to register the signals of the stretching of space—now known as Weber bars.
If multiple of these cylinders simultaneously vibrated at ten-millionth of a nanometer, that would
mean that he had detected gravitational waves. Twice—in 1969 and 1970—Weber made his
detections.
NSF withdrew its funding, however, when the mainstream discounted Weber’s research
because of failed replications. While Weber was being denied both his finding and his funding, he
stuck to his claim and continued to experiment with his cylinders:

…Weber worked on his gravitational wave detectors even after the National Science
Foundation (NSF) cut off his funding in 1987 and shifted its focus to developing LIGO—the
agency ultimately spent more than $1 billion on it. With almost no funding, Weber worked on
his devices until he died in 2000 at the age of 81. (Cho, 2016)

In 2016, LIGO scientists announced that they had detected gravitational waves. Astronomer and
wife of Weber, Virginia Trimble, believes that “…if there had been two technologies going
forward they would have pushed each other, as collaborators not as competitors…and it might
have led to an observation sooner” (Cho, 2016). Surely she is biased in favor of her late husband;
even so, in her suggestion, she articulates exactly the kind of pluralism I have in mind.

2. Politics
Politics is perhaps the most difficult territory for a pluralist to navigate. The central worry from
the monist perspective is that the pluralist is going to, unwittingly or not, take the control of
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information out of the hands of scientists. Monism allows scientists to come through with a clear
message that can guide the public, for example, to get vaccinated. That is valuable, and the pluralist
seems to lose sight of that—or, worse yet, invite unfounded medical advice to guide public opinion.
One look at the state of our global epistemic community reveals that the control of
information is already out of the hands of scientists. In the United States and beyond, facts are
following a political divide with mainstream science on one side. There is a proliferation of
conspiracy theories—some of which are very dangerous, like QAnon. Cranks are raising
skepticism about scientific matters that pertain to public health, such as vaccination, but also
education, like creationist science or Holocaust and slavery denialism in the classroom. People are
eating up fake news and anti-science beliefs loom large. Newspapers are closing left and right (on
average 2 per day; Karter, 2022). Nearly half of Gen Z isn’t using Google, but rather is seeking
their information through social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok (Delouya, 2022).
Much of the public does not trust the message, crystal clear though it may be. Why don’t
they trust it? First and foremost, they cannot understand it. This is a major failure of our education
system and warns against the continued proliferation of inaccessible and esoteric information. It is
just as Sagan prophesied:

We've arranged a global civilization in which most crucial elements - transportation,
communications, and all other industries; agriculture, medicine, education, entertainment,
protecting the environment; and even the key democratic institution of voting - profoundly
depend on science and technology. We have also arranged things so that almost no one
understands science and technology. This is a prescription for disaster. We might get away
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with it for a while, but sooner or later this combustible mixture of ignorance and power is going
to blow up in our faces. (Sagan, 1997, p. 28)

On top of the inaccessibility of scientific explanations, there is a defense tactic at work in which
even the most knowledgeable questioning of a mainstream theory is demonized. The monistic
mainstream has been unable to tolerate the questions coming from our Nobel laureates; instead,
their credibility is tarnished with claims that Nobel prizes make people mentally unwell (Gorski,
2012; Basterfield et al., 2020). Cranks are demonized by a good portion of the public who cannot
even see what is going on under all the microscopes. Review articles documenting the dissent that
remains available in the peer-reviewed scientific literature are consistently retracted (e.g. Goodson,
2014).
We are not just living in the era of misinformation—we are living in the era of missing
information. It is not that one group is saying a false thing and the other group has it right—facts
have been utterly lost. We know this much: the US government—the most powerful government
in the world—reserves the right to keep facts from us. In order to trust any information as the end
of the story, people have to take a leap of faith in someone. Some have taken their refuge in
mainstream science; some have not.
According to the European Commission (2020), conspiracy theorizing saw a sharp spike with
the onset of the pandemic. According to UNESCO’s Director General, “Conspiracy theories cause
real harm to people, to their health, and also to their physical safety. They amplify and legitimize
misconceptions about the pandemic, and reinforce stereotypes which can fuel violence and violent
extremist ideologies.” Surely they do. Why was there this sharp spike in conspiracy theorizing?
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One reason is that people were under the impression that science was supposed to be able to
protect us from things like SARS-CoV-2. Vaccinations didn’t help prevent illness before millions
of people got ill and died. Given the pride we take in science and ‘Western’ medicine, that’s just
not good enough. Furthermore, time and again, fringe theories have come good, and so have
conspiracy theories. The CIA’s Project MK-Ultra conducted illegal experimentation on humans
for research into mind control. Not to mention the Tuskegee syphilis study, or 1957 in Jessup,
Maryland, where prisoners were given Asian flu. Is it any wonder that people don’t trust scientists
with government ties? People are required to cite such affiliations in books and journals, but that
doesn’t mean they always do, especially given nondisclosure agreements.
A large population in the United States found mask-wearing oppressive. The limitations on
freedom the virus took on people as a result of the authority of mainstream science in governments
were not just unpleasant or frustrating, they were often considered harmful by people who had
already lost their faith in science with the onset of a global pandemic. The government, which has
financial ties to pharmaceutical companies, presented an overly simplified picture. For example,
although they showed that statistically the benefits of vaccination outweigh the risks, they did not
openly discuss risks, and pilloried anyone who raised questions as unscientific. The mixing of state
with dogmatic belief—‘scientific’ or otherwise—is oppressive.
The point of this discussion is that hard-lined theoretical monism is undesirable given our
current political environment. It comes across as dogmatic and breeds skepticism. Admittedly,
pluralism could make our situation worse if it were put into practice without planning and
oversight. If we have scientists haphazardly describing fringe theories or alternative medical
treatments as deserving of serious research, we put the portion of the public that still trusts science
at risk. Without a clear message, people might stop effective medical treatments.
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This is where a socially-mediated database of observations and theories in which information
can freely flow and trust can be built is desperately needed. If it is to work, people cannot be
anonymous—what we need right now is for epistemic agents to take responsibility for the
information they share. What we need is not a clear yes or no message—get the vaccine or don’t—
but access to trustworthy knowledge—all the information, without censorship—that allows us to
decide for ourselves. We need to work towards full disclosure. An inclusive database would allow
the public to directly examine the comparative risks and benefits of competing medical options.
Likewise, people could see the case for mainstream climate science alongside the naysayers, rather
than getting such information through politically polarized channels that filter out dissenting
views. Side-by-side comparison begets trust and cultivates scientific literacy. This may sound
utopian in that it places a burden on the public to do their homework, but it’s a reasonable
regulative ideal given the failures of monism. Rather than treating the public as dumb, we should
encourage informed decision-making. For those who do not avail themselves of this resource,
merely knowing that exists could increase responsiveness to public health initiatives.

3. Implementation
The pluralist attitude and usage of the indexical reference to theory when making statements of
fact doesn’t come naturally to most people, and could easily overwhelm scientists attempting to
conduct theory-based research, leading to confusion and chaos. How could a pluralist ever make
a decision when sometimes different theories recommend different actions? It sounds nice in
principle, but it seems impractical. How could pluralist science ever be organized, focused, and
goal-oriented?
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We are currently witnessing the development of computer technologies that could help
organize pluralistic science. I mentioned developing a public socially-mediated database of
observations and theories—a globally-accessible observation library and theory archive to which
everyone who opts in must contribute. My aim now is to provide a preliminary sketch of the
collective use and potential functions of such a platform. One might think of it, to begin with, as a
super-LinkedIn, super-Wikipedia, super-Reddit, super-Twitter, and so on. Certainly it would need
the sorts of functions those platforms have at a minimum.
All the information on this platform should be a globally-accessible and public, and epistemic
agents should be able to freely opt in or opt out. To opt in and access the information available
through the database, individuals would have to contribute personal details about background
experience, education, expertise, any theory-based training, employment information, as well as
their own observations, including date and location information, and the theories they use to
explain them, if any. The duty to regularly contribute observations would be on par with voting.
Citations could be included until all the information from journals, books, and other sources are
filtered into the database.
One function would be to show how each theoretical framework deals with all the
observations in the framework’s domain. Frameworks might be visualized as interactive webs,
where each node of the web is an observable phenomenon that is described in terms of the theory.
One could click on a node and get a list of alternative frameworks that attempt to make sense of
the observational data associated with that node.
My working title for this archive is “Frameworld”, since it is meant to organize, proliferate,
connect, and explain observations using a diversity of theoretical frameworks. It could also connect
researchers across the globe, and potentially serve many other functions. Such a database could
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streamline information by eliminating unnecessary words and adding visuals, make processing
information seamless and comprehensive, enable a more complete interdisciplinary approach to
research, make esoteric information highly accessible, and enable the use of algorithms to analyze
information and perhaps even develop theories that comprehensively interpret and explain
observable phenomena.
One might be concerned about providing a science platform with so much space for amateurs
to make contributions. One option would be to include degrees of credence based on expertise for
the best action to take in a given situation. For example, statistics could spit out that vaccine theory
is supported by 95% of M.D.’s, and then one could look at the 5% of M.D.’s who are self-reported
anti-vaxxers, or reported having an alternative suggestion for dealing with viruses, see what else
they support, what kind of institution they work at, etc. An individual can be free to make his or
her own decisions about what to do based on all that information.
I would be wary about too much filtering of amateurs, however. Scientists are not the only
human beings capable of making useful observations and collecting evidence. Certainly trained
scientists do have an extremely special skillset for conducting research, generating data, making
observations, and so on. The ability to use instruments, equations, and follow a strict methodology
enables scientists to collect evidence in a formal and organized manner that leaves room for
replication and objective extension of findings. The database could help streamline and formalize
the process of replication. Statistics could track replications and even assign degrees of reliability.
Amateurs also contribute evidence across the sciences, especially in species counts, paleontology,
and meteorology (Hill, 2017). Of course, a single piece of eyewitness testimony is no good for
making objective claims, but a whole collection of it may be hard to ignore. People without
credentials also use practical observations constantly in their daily lives (e.g. a correlation between
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ingesting ibuprofen and reducing the pain of a throbbing headache). Observations from day-to-day
life have been the precursors to scientific claims. Many common analgesics originated with
ancestral herbal remedies.
So my suggestion here is that researchers (and the public) can sift through the multitude of
theories based on (1) statistical analysis of credence and (2) how the observations at hand currently
conform or do not conform to the various theories in the database. All theories can remain on the
table even if not in current use, whether that's due to current nonconforming evidence, no evidence,
or too wild, or for whatever reason there is a lack of credence.
Once this kind of organization is put in place, pluralism isn’t so extreme. While scientists in
institutions behave monistically, the global community of epistemic agents is already pluralistic
with regard to theories. There already is this phenomenon of fringe theorizing amongst the public.
There is even the ‘Nobel disease’—when Nobel laureates go fringe.
I am suggesting formalizing what I see to be a currently informal mode of practicing science.
The scope of science is much greater than the community of trained scientists. There is no denying
that fringe research influences the mainstream, again, whether or not we like it. Often the fringe
forces the mainstream to face evidence, and explain it better, or articulate itself more clearly and
straightforwardly.

The

public

demands

attention,

and

that

scientists

communicate

recommendations in a way that is convincing. If people aren’t convinced, it’s science’s job to
convince them, not to blind them from alternatives. Real scientists respond to fringe theorists in
these ways all the time. That is worth encouraging, and it deserves to be formalized with something
like my database suggestion.
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